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Amidst rising agricultural pollution, poor conditions for livestock animals, and disparity 
between “high” and “low” food cultures, gustatory taste has entered contemporary public 
rhetoric as a significant modality of intervention. This dissertation considers the 
environmentalist and social potential of this public embrace of sensory rhetoric. To do so, 
I build a rhetorical theory of sensation through a sensory re-engagement of the rhetorical 
tradition. Scottish Enlightenment thinkers, I argue, embraced aesthetic taste as a site 
where rhetoric and ethics mingle, and yet in promoting its cultivation, they fell into 
elitism. The subsequent, Marxist discourse on sensory emancipation developed rhetoric’s 
sensory and taste-based connections to ethics, taking an historical rather than an 
individualist perspective. I evaluate to what extent this discourse overcame 
Enlightenment elitism, and forge connections between the Marxist tradition and the 
current call among new materialists such as Bruno Latour for an immanent, 
compositionist reworking of critique. My final two chapters examine how a theory and 
critical practice of sensory rhetoric is elaborated in contemporary activist efforts from the 
industrial food exposé to the slow food and farm to school movements. Contributing to 
work in rhetoric and politics, my project provides an account of rhetoric’s materiality that 
closely links processes of materialization and practices of sensation. Contributing to work 
in rhetoric and ethics, I demonstrate that the ethico-rhetorical capacity for response 
abides not in the individual subject alone, but among all participants in the evolving zone 
of sensory contact. To the extent that those sensory collectives can recognize and 
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embrace their ambient, inventive, and ever-evolving character, they harbor the potential 
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In his bestselling 2001 exposé, Fast Food Nation: The Dark Side of the All-American 
Meal, investigative journalist Eric Schlosser ventures into the heart of flavor. His mission 
brings him not to a family farm or a local restaurant, but rather to an industrial park off of 
Exit 8A in Dayton, New Jersey. Nestled in among “a BASF plastics factory, a Jolly 
French Toast factory, and a plant that manufactures Liz Claiborne cosmetics” (121), 
Schlosser locates the heart of flavor at International Flavors and Fragrances (IFF), one of 
the largest flavoring and fragrancing manufactories in the world. “Without [the] flavor 
industry,” the reporter explains, “today’s fast food could not exist” (121). The processing, 
preservation, and transportation of modern food, he says, destroys most of its existing 
taste, leaving a “blank palette” to be decorated with added flavors (126). Though 
manufactured flavor often forges our most intimate connections of recognition, 
enjoyment, and remembrance with our favorite processed foods, how that flavor is 
composed is a secretive and mysterious process, even to those who practice it—and one 
Schlosser hopes to illuminate in his visit.  
Touring the IFF flavor laboratories, Schlosser is fascinated—one might even say 
charmed. He likens the strange, magical scene to Willy Wonka’s Chocolate Factory: 
“Wonderful smells drifted through the hallways, men and women in neat white lab coats 
cheerfully went about their work, and hundreds of little glass bottles sat on laboratory 
tables and shelves” (122). The research area includes a “snack and savory lab,” 
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responsible for the flavors of everything from corn chips to pet food, a “confectionary 
lab” attending to the tastes of ice cream, toothpaste, and antacids, and a “beverage lab” 
developing additives for sodas, wine coolers, and “organic soy drinks” (122). Like Willy 
Wonka’s factory, the spectacle is at once stimulating and disturbing, and at all points 
uncanny—particularly as it materializes in the figure of the flavorist. On his tour, 
Schlosser comes across one such figure: a “dapper chemist” in tie and lab coat who is 
“carefully preparing a batch of cookies with white frosting and pink-and-white sprinkles” 
(122). Marking a collapse of gender roles and a strange collision of art and science, the 
flavorist is “a chemist with a trained nose and a poetic sensibility” (127). This unlikely 
combination recalls the alchemists, magicians, and—well, sophists of old who cultivated 
a mysterious knack for producing their powerful effects.  
In language that for a student of rhetoric strikingly resembles Plato’s critique of 
sophistry, Schlosser declares “the job of the flavorist is to conjure illusions about 
processed food” (127). In the hands of these contemporary, sensory sophists, food and 
flavor pull apart into separable realms, with bland, cheap, and overprocessed food matter 
serving as the mere vehicle for the charms of flavor. Thus, Schlosser remarks, “adding 
methyl-2-peridylketone makes something taste like popcorn. Adding ethyl-3-
hydroxybutanoate makes it taste like a marshmallow” (126). The “chemical wizardry” of 
the flavorist, then, casts vibrant illusion over dull truth. The processes for producing such 
likenesses are carefully guarded trade secrets, but those that are known are strange and 
surprising. To produce smoke flavor, for instance, manufacturers burn sawdust, capture 
the chemical aromas released into the air, and bottle them in a water suspension—all “so 
that other companies can sell food which seems to have been cooked over a fire” (129).  
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At the conclusion of his tour, Schlosser encounters illusion in its purest form—in 
“an unusual taste test” where “there wasn’t any food to taste” (129). Instead of food, the 
reporter is presented with an array of small glass bottles and a stack of aroma-absorbing 
paper strips:  
Before placing the strips of paper before my nose, I closed my eyes. Then I 
inhaled deeply, and one food after another was conjured from the glass bottles. I 
smelled fresh cherries, black olives, sautéed onions, and shrimp. [Then] I 
suddenly smelled a grilled hamburger. The aroma was uncanny, almost 
miraculous. It smelled like someone in the room was flipping burgers on a hot 
grill. But when I opened my eyes, there was just a narrow strip of white paper and 
a smiling flavorist. (129)  
In his encounter with the flavorist, Schlosser follows Socrates in his suspicious yet 
interested flirtation with rhetoric and its realm of appearance. Like Socrates, he groups 
knack, persuasion, appearance, and deception together in the specter of the rhetorical 
magician. For Schlosser as for Socrates, the flavorist/sophists are cause for suspicion both 
because they work in a world of appearance rather than “reality” and because they bring 
about their effects without full knowledge of the volatile materials they work with.  
On the one hand, today’s sophist, who conjures flavor and fragrance alike, is quite 
literally closer to “cookery” and “cosmetics” than was Socrates’. Yet if Socrates’ sophists 
lacked science, these modern-day, sensory rhetoricians do not, instead dwelling in a 
queer middle space between science, art, and knack. “Flavors are created by blending 
scores of different chemicals in tiny amounts,” Schlosser explains (127). This is “a 
process governed by scientific principles but demanding a fair amount of art” (127). The 
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flavorist draws from physics and chemistry, physiology and psychology. But he also 
relies on a certain je ne sais quoi, an art and a knack for striking up alluring chemical 
combinations. The flavorists Schlosser met were “charming, cosmopolitan, and ironic,” 
embracing their unusual place in (sensory) culture (127). One likened his work to musical 
composition: “A well-made flavor compound,” in his view, has “a ‘top note,’ followed by 
a ‘dry-down,’ and a ‘leveling-off,’ with different chemicals responsible for each stage” 
(127). There is fervent competition among these artist-scientists to achieve masterful 
flavor compositions—though all occurs, Schlosser emphasizes, behind industry doors. 
Flavorists do not publically reveal the food products enlivened by their masterpieces, and 
they carefully conceal their prized chemical formulas and unique manufacturing 
processes from competitors. Though he may tour the flavor laboratories and test kitchens, 
Schlosser is forbidden from visiting the manufacturing wing of IFF, for fear of 
compromising trade secrets. 
Also like Socrates, Schlosser reserves the sense of sight as the ultimate domain of 
the real. In his strange taste test, it is Schlosser’s vision that tells him something is off, 
while taste seduces him into enchanting illusion. And in the reporter’s tour of flavor, the 
traditionally “lower” sense of taste emerges in its most ethereal articulation. Dealing in 
appearances, the “smiling flavorist” “conjures” the spectacle of grilled hamburger, fresh 
cherries, and buttery popcorn for the reporter, who “tastes” by sniffing alone. In the 
reporter’s encounter with the flavorist, olfaction emerges as the preeminent arena of taste. 
Schlosser reports that olfaction comprises 90 percent of our taste experience, with the 
human nose being “more sensitive than any machine yet invented” (125). The result is 
that the realm of the flavorist is airborne, elusive, ethereal. Flavor cannot be pinned 
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down, grasped, or visualized. It is developed experimentally, intuitively, and blindly, 
through trial-and-error processes of sensory exploration and innovative mechanical 
techniques. But flavor does not only come down to smell—touch too plays a key role. To 
help integrate smell and mouthfeel, flavorists turn to the machine, further reworking 
traditional means of cookery. Incorporating the physical science of “rheology,” they 
assess mouthfeel with such technologies as the texture analyzer—“essentially a 
mechanical mouth” with multiple probes that judge a food’s “bounce, creep, breaking 
point, density, crunchiness” and so on (126). The apparatus of today’s sophistry, then, 
goes well beyond the scroll hidden in Phaedrus’s robes. Yet still its operations elude its 
practitioners, who cannot explain why exactly their magic potions work, but can only mix 
them together.  
In revealing contemporary cookery as an unsettling enterprise of mimicry, 
Schlosser’s tour of flavor presses at the apparent divide between “natural” and 
“artificial.” The reporter quotes a food scientist to sum up the (non)distinction: “A natural 
flavor . . . is a flavor that’s been derived with an out-of-date technology” (126). As such, 
“when you distill it from bananas with a solvent, amyl acetate is a natural flavor. When 
you produce it by mixing vinegar with amyl alcohol, adding sulfuric acid as a catalyst, 
amyl acetate is an artificial flavor. Either way it smells and tastes the same” (127). 
Flavor, then, masks its own origins. While consumers are led to believe that “natural 
flavor” is more healthy, this is not necessarily the case, the reporter explains. For 
instance, when almond flavor (benzaldehyde) is “naturally” derived from peach and 
apricot pits, it contains traces of cyanide, absent when it is “artificially” derived through a 
mixture of oil of clove and amyl acetate. On the biotech side of flavor, Schlosser reports, 
6 
 
“natural” flavors are being developed through evolving technologies of “fermentation, 
enzyme reactions, fungal cultures, and tissue cultures,” enabling the production of 
“extremely lifelike dairy flavors” and “much more realistic meat flavors” (128). Whether 
classified as natural or artificial, Schlosser insists, added flavors concern the realm of 
pretense rather than truth—a play of appearances epitomized by “natural smoke flavor.”  
Like Socrates, Schlosser is drawn out of his own in following the flavorist. Where 
rhetoric led the lover of wisdom out of the city, it leads the lover of food away from the 
farm—to a seductive realm of appearance that at once fascinates and repels him. Out of 
his element, the very grounds of Schlosser’s value system are queered—truth comes to 
blend with appearance, and nature with artifice. In his odd taste test Schlosser wants to 
reject flavor for being artificial and deceptive, and yet his nose resists. The aromatic 
flavors come to him as vibrantly real, while vision struggles against that reality. Though 
he does not trust the work of the flavorist, the reporter is awed by the artistry of this 
modern-day composer.  
What these two suspicious yet curious critics reveal, perhaps against their better 
intentions, is that in all realms—whether we call them art, science, or knack—we always 
run up against the limits of human knowledge and human control. We never transcend 
appearances, but only come to sense and compose them differently. Even the flavorist, 
with all his science, cannot deduce good flavor from formulas and principles alone, but 
must blindly cook them up in experimental “tastings” like Schlosser’s. If Socrates 
suggested how language and truth could adopt an agency of their own in the materiality 
of the scroll, then, Schlosser gestures toward the unruly material agencies of chemicals 
and taste buds—complex forces that can be tracked with science and machinery, to be 
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sure, but that always also reserve a creative energy and a chemical potency that eludes 
these. Flavor, in short, dwells an arena between subject and object, truth and appearance, 
in the indeterminate space where experience and reality entwine. 
If Socrates and Schlosser perhaps unwittingly suggest that rhetoric, in its world-
composing activity, is not so far from truth, appearance not so far from reality, this is not 
to dismiss their unease over rhetoric. On the contrary, rhetoric is indeed a powerful, risky, 
and often intractable activity, and the rhetorical practices that Socrates and Schlosser 
critique in their own times are particularly so. Just as some ancient sophists surely duped 
their students for money, the drive for wealth to the detriment of consumer well-being 
continues to fuel today’s more complex machineries of rhetoric. Yet if sophistry and 
flavory are problematic, it is not for the reasons these critics give—that they work at the 
borders of human agency and knowledge or that they deal in “mere” appearance and 
sensation. The problem also isn’t their use of technology—as Schlosser himself 
demonstrates, in the realm of flavor, the divide between nature and artifice breaks down. 
While the reporter means to suggest that even “natural” manufactured flavors are 
artificial, he at the same time points to the chemical composition of all flavor—and 
what’s more, the “cookery” of all cookery. The flavorist works and plays in a potent 
chemical realm, to be sure. But this is the realm of all kinds of food preparation, whether 
it “smokes” its product by a real fire or an added chemical.  
If Schlosser’s Platonic critique of the flavorist will not help us to articulate the 
dangers of rhetoric in its current sensory articulation, what will? If the flavorist, and the 
entire apparatus of industrial food that he figuratively embodies, is indeed a great modern 
danger—as Schlosser and many other food activists argue—how can we track that 
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danger, once we dispense with oppositions of reality/appearance, nature/artifice, 
tradition/sacrilege, and art/science/knack? What could better guide a critical practice, a 
critical pedagogy of taste? If rhetoric continues to work at powerful, sensory levels, 
seducing consumers beyond the reach of knowledge and reason, we cannot rely on truth 
alone to critique and change it. How can we then assess the contemporary workings of 
sensory rhetoric and participate in them ethically? This dissertation engages these 
questions by building an account of sensory rhetoric through an examination of how 
sensation and taste have been tapped in Enlightenment, post-Enlightenment, and 
contemporary rhetorical theory and practice. The remainder of this chapter frames my 
inquiry by reviewing several distinct materialisms that have manifested in rhetoric and 
arguing that a sensory theorization of rhetoric could integrate them and help address a 
shared problem of immanence. I then establish taste in particular as an ideal conceptual 
site for theorizing sensory rhetoric and advancing on the problem of immanence.  
Materialism and Immanence 
Since poststructuralist critiques of the 1980s recast rhetorical agency in distributed, 
discursive terms, focus has turned to the body, things, and environments as co-
constitutive rhetorical forces, and rhetoric has been expanded beyond the realm of the 
symbolic. A more recent branch of this initial “corporeal” or “affective” turn is a turn to 
“new materialism” that draws on theorists like Martin Heidegger, Bruno Latour, Jane 
Bennett, and Donna Haraway. This development has been crucial for elaborating 
rhetoric’s ontological, world-making role, emphasizing the entanglement of language and 
materiality, and staging inquiry into the nonhuman world. However, these advances were 
enabled by a certain bracketing of practical, political questions that we are now in a 
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position to revisit with a new set of orientations. In facing this task, it is worth recalling 
an older materialist tradition in rhetoric—the Marxist strain reaching back to Kenneth 
Burke, which has long pursued its theorizations of rhetoric’s materiality with a sense of 
political urgency. The central problem in this older materialist tradition is that of 
immanence.  
In brief, the problem of immanence (to be discussed further toward the end of 
chapter 3), refers to the inability to get outside—the inability of the critic, the activist, and 
even the object to get outside of an existing realm of practices. For Marx and the critical 
theorists who followed him, the challenge is how to conceive rhetorical and political 
agency given that material life is always already conditioned by structures of 
domination—or, as it is sometimes put, how to reckon with people’s participation in their 
own oppression. The problem is elaborated in Michel Foucault’s conception of power. 
According to Foucault, 
relations of power are not in a position of exteriority with respect to other types of 
relationships (economic processes, knowledge relationships, sexual relations), but 
are immanent in the latter; they are the immediate effects of the divisions, 
inequalities, and disequilibriums which occur in the latter, and conversely they are 
the internal conditions of these differentiations. (History 94, emphasis added) 
For Foucault, power is not imposed from some outside entity onto bodies, but rather is 
produced through everyday activity. He elaborates, positioning himself against a certain 
interpretation of Marx: “relations of power are not in superstructural positions, with 
merely a role of prohibition or accompaniment; they have a directly productive role, 
wherever they come into play” (History 94). The immanence of power comes from its 
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generativity, its continual production of objects. It is existing and ever-evolving power 
relations, then, that compose any potential object of study or of political intervention. 
Foucault famously explored sexuality as an example of the immanent, generative 
workings of power: “If sexuality was constituted as an area of investigation,” he said,  
this was only because relations of power had established it as a possible object; 
and conversely, if power was able to take it as a target, this was because 
techniques of knowledge and procedures of discourse were capable of investing it. 
Between techniques of knowledge and strategies of power, there is no exteriority, 
even if they have specific roles and are linked together on the basis of their 
difference. (History 98, emphasis added) 
Like Marx and the Frankfurt School (as we will see in chapter 3), Foucault recognizes 
and embraces the fact that any object of dissensual study or intervention—such as the 
concept/phenomenon of sexuality—will necessarily exist only because of existing power 
structures (and thus will already be articulated in a certain way by them). There is no way 
to step outside of the objects, concepts, values, feelings, or even sensations emergent 
from existing power-knowledge relations. These objects, sensations, and so on can, 
however, always be inhabited and performed differently. The challenge, then, becomes 
how to do so—how to practice immanent critique and intervention. As my project will 
suggest, this challenge can be traced back to the notably apolitical search for a “standard 
of taste” that animated the Scottish Enlightenment, and it can be traced forward into the 
project of new materialism to promote an ecological sensibility, an attunement to the 
vitality of things. 
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Rhetoric’s new and old materialisms, I propose, can come together around the 
problem of immanence to generate a richer theorization of rhetoric’s materiality and a 
fuller sense of immanent political critique and action. My project stages such an 
intervention by tracking rhetoric’s connection to sensation and aesthetics. If the problem 
of immanence dwells in the way domination is produced and reproduced within rather 
than outside of human experience and practices, then sensation is an important site for 
interrogating the immanence of rhetoric. My project thus builds on Enlightenment and 
post-Enlightenment thought to theorize gustatory taste as a rhetorical capacity that 
operates at both sensory and aesthetic levels. Gustatory taste invites theorization from 
each of the angles by which rhetoric’s materiality is approached: it is a bodily capacity 
that can also be mapped onto things and environments, a site where human/nonhuman 
and life/death distinctions are blurred, and, as a qualitative field where subject and object 
co-compose each other, a paradigm of immanence. A rhetorical theory of sensation (and 
taste in particular) positions us to produce a rich, posthumanist conception of critical 
capacity that can inform the problem of immanence. In addition to advancing the 
theorization of rhetoric’s materiality, this inquiry will enhance our understanding of 
rhetoric as a receptive capacity interwoven into ethical life, inform the discourse of 
critical rhetoric, and nuance our understanding of critical pedagogies within and beyond 
the academy. An incorporation of new and traditional materialism also marks an 
opportunity to bring rhetoric scholarship on the communication and composition sides of 





In the late 1960s, Michel Foucault declared that discourses are “practices that 
systematically form the objects of which they speak” (Archaeology 49), and Jacques 
Derrida detailed a view by which “there is nothing outside the text” (158). The 
subsequent attention to the constitutive powers of discourse revolutionized the humanities 
in ways particularly significant for rhetorical studies, opening a way to think rhetoric as 
not mere ornament, but something with the power to produce knowledge and worlds. 
However, the new enthusiasm for discourse eventually prompted a concern that the 
humanities may have “forgotten” materiality. Thus, in a recent material turn, scholars 
have drawn from Foucault, Judith Butler, Gilles Deleuze, and Eve Sedgwick to 
complicate approaches to discursivity through attention to the body, emotions, and affect 
(e.g., Massumi, Ahmed, and Berlant). In a posthumanist development of this turn often 
termed new materialism, scholars have brought in Hans Driesch, Bruno Latour, Martin 
Heidegger, and Graham Harman to emphasize the overlap between discourse and 
materiality, the vitality of things and environments, and the imbrications of human and 
nonhuman forces (e.g., Haraway, Hayles, Wolf, Bennett, Barad). Yet while 
poststructuralist thinkers have spent the past few decades retrieving materiality from a 
temporary amnesia, Marxist thinkers have been integrating certain poststructuralist ideas 
into political theories which all the while have remained rigorously committed to 
materiality (e.g., Connolly, Hardt and Negri, Jameson, Laclau and Mouffe, Spivak). The 
resultant versions of materiality are provocatively varied. Today, while many new 
materialist thinkers continue to declare a break with Marx and Marxism (e.g., Latour, 
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Bennett, Braidotti, Rickert), others seek an engagement with Marx in poststructuralist 
territory (e.g., Barad, Deleuze, Berlant).  
We can thus, for heuristic purposes, describe three materialisms in the humanities: 
(1) an older, Marxist materialism (itself very diverse); (2) a newer, corporeal/affective 
materialism; and (3) a more posthumanist branch of corporeal/affective materialism 
termed “new materialism.” We can accordingly map three relatively distinct approaches 
to theorizing rhetoric’s materiality. First, and oldest, is a traditional materialist approach 
that variously emphasizes rhetoric’s connection to economic conditions, material 
structures of power, and the materiality of discourse itself (McGee, Cloud, Aune, 
Greene). Second is a corporeal or affective materialism that has reinvested in the role of 
pathos and turned to the body, things, and place as significant rhetorical forces that 
interact at the presymbolic level of affect (Kennedy, Biesecker, Edbauer Rice, Davis, 
Hawhee, Blair, Dickinson, Ott, Selzer, Syverson, early Rickert, Gross, Senda-Cook). 
Third, and most recent, is a “new” or posthumanist materialism that posits a highly 
distributed, immersive sense of rhetoricity which includes nonhuman things and 
environments (Hawk, Barnett, Rickert, Rivers, Marback).  
These three materialisms are capable of productive interaction, yet the poles of 
new and old materialism remain relatively insulated from one another. In addition to their 
theoretical conflicts, these two materialist approaches are also fairly divided across 
rhetoric’s disciplinary locations, with communication scholars inclining toward 
traditional materialist views of rhetoric’s materiality and composition scholars inclining 
toward “new” materialist views.1 My project aims to put these two materialist poles in 
deeper conversation, drawing in part from the engagement with affect and corporeality 
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common to both communication and composition scholars. In what follows, I offer a 
brief discussion of the two “poles” of new materialist rhetoric and traditional materialist 
rhetoric. I then turn to a proposal for how, why, and to what end rhetoric’s three 
materialisms might be integrated over the concept of taste.  
New Materialist Rhetoric  
In 1968, when Lloyd Bitzer described the rhetorical situation, rhetoric scholars began to 
complicate simplistic models of communication and persuasion. Bitzer argued that 
identifying the situation in which discourse occurs is key for understanding the 
relationships among sender, receiver, and text that emerge out of that situation. In 
response, Richard Vatz objected that exigencies are not simply out there, but are created 
by the speaker—it is the speaker, rather than the situation, who is the origin of the 
rhetorical event. Influenced by the poststructuralist critique of the self-present subject, 
subsequent rhetoric scholars further complicated things. Barbara Biesecker, for instance, 
argued that the Bitzer/Vatz debate maintained a common but unsupportable assumption 
that rhetoric plays out as a dance of independent elements which affect each other in only 
superficial ways. According to this typical “logic of influence” model of rhetoric, the text 
is situated as “an object that mediates between subjects (speaker and audience) whose 
identity is constituted in a terrain different from and external to the particular rhetorical 
situation” (110). In its place Biesecker proposed a logic of articulation, by which the 
elements at play in a rhetorical event (text, audience, speaker, situation) are never fixed, 
fully present entities simply influencing one another, but are provisional emergences in a 





As part of the affect turn, composition scholars have cast such poststructuralist 
disturbances of elemental, influence-oriented models of rhetoric in more ecological, 
material terms. Thus Margaret Syverson proposes that we think of composition “across 
physical, social, psychological, spatial, and temporal dimensions” (23). And Jenny 
Edbauer Rice, drawing from Deleuze and Guattari, elaborates on Syverson by offering 
the figure of the rhetorical ecology as an alternative to the rhetorical situation, one that 
better enables us to think rhetoric’s viral, affective movements across bodies and 
environments (“Unframing”). As such, then, a poststructuralist approach to rhetoric’s 
materiality has cast rhetoric’s role in material and ontological terms, where audiences, 
speakers, texts, things, and environments are continually co-constituted.  
This work, part of the field’s affect turn, begins to shift rhetorical theory away 
from its traditionally human center. The more recent development of this shift brings 
Heidegger, Latour, Hayles, and Harman into the theoretical mix (Hawk, Barnett, Rickert, 
Rivers) to further emphasize rhetoric’s entwining of human and nonhuman, material and 
discursive. Thus in his 2007 A Counter-History of Composition, Byron Hawk draws on 
Heidegger’s view of technology as fundamentally relational, deriving its being from its 
associations with humans, environments, and other equipment in a way that disrupts the 
human/technology dichotomy. This enables him to build on and extend Hayles’ view of 
posthumanism as an embrace of the intelligence of environments which “[locates] 
thought and action in the complexity of distributed cognitive environments” (177). 
Referencing Deleuze and Guattari’s argument for the overlapping realms of book, world, 
and author, Hawk maintains that world, representation, and rhetor must not be thought 
discretely, but as elements of assemblages where semiotic, material, and social orders 
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overlap (205). Ultimately, Hawk articulates a complex, Deleuzian vitalistic approach to 
rhetoric and composition that casts rhetorical invention in terms of not just distributed 
cognition, but a liveliness distributed throughout environments virtual and concrete.  
In his 2013 Ambient Rhetoric, Thomas Rickert supplements the metaphors of 
network and ecology with the concept of ambience to better evoke the “vital, material, 
and encompassing” aspects of rhetorical invention (105). Brian Eno’s work serves an 
example, inviting the environment to “play” music in ways that reveal it as not inert, but 
actively involved in everyday being (109). Rickert builds on Hawk’s discussion of 
Heidegger by theorizing rhetoric’s ambience in terms of the Heideggerian notions of 
thingness—the way nonhuman entities are complexly interwoven into worlds—and by 
theorizing our reckoning with rhetoric’s ambience in terms of dwelling—a way of being 
“conditioned and permeated by things so that they are inseparable from what it means to 
live in the world” (223). He also extends the Heideggerian perspective with Harman’s 
view that it is not only when humans interact with things that new worlds are revealed 
and concealed, but also when things interact with each other. As such, he theorizes the 
rhetoricity of things (speed bumps, keys, rooms, etc) not merely in terms of persuasion 
(as he understands Latour to do), but in terms of their ontological role in calling worlds 
into being. In other words, rhetoric concerns not the way things are represented or the 
way things and language are mediated, but rather how things show up and thus are for 
each other in moments of contact, calling upon each other for a response. Rhetoric’s call 
cannot be isolated as linguistic or material, nor as a medium between the two. Rather, like 
Hawk, Rickert sees language and materiality as inseparable forces of rhetoric: evoking 
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Heidegger, he defines language as the preconditions for symbolicity (rather than 
symbolicity itself), conditions that are enmeshed with materiality. 
Rickert and Hawk both identify broad political implications for theorizing 
rhetoric’s materiality in terms of nonhuman vitality. Thus Hawk’s material view of 
invention leads him to object to critical pedagogies, such as that of James Berlin, as being 
limited by a simplistic understanding of invention. Berlin’s mechanical process of 
ideology critique, he argues, has a definite end-goal: cultivating a certain kind of critical 
consciousness, liberating students according to a specific vision of freedom. To this 
extent, Berlin’s program functions as a rigid process, rather than a more open-ended, 
circuitous method where politics is at risk and pedagogical outcomes are unknown. 
Invention, for Hawk, is not the lone act of an individual subject, but the generative play 
of energies among student, teacher, classroom, and technology. It is only more open-
ended methods that can help the full potential of invention be realized in the classroom 
(Hawk cites Gregory Ulmer and Geoffrey Sirc as furnishing examples of such methods).  
Rickert unpacks the political implications of material rhetoric in terms of the 
efforts of environmentalism. Resonating with Biesecker’s move from a logic of influence 
to a logic of persuasion, he argues that environmentalists have assumed a simplistic 
model of rhetoric aimed at persuasion rather than world-making. As an ambient view of 
rhetoric reveals, the problem of sustainability is not merely a problem of people’s beliefs, 
attitudes, and policies (which Rickert believes environmentalists too often assume), but a 
problem of an entire way of dwelling in which things and environments actively 
participate. Cars, for instance, having woven themselves into landscapes, lifestyles, 
infrastructures, and policies, are a dominant force in generating an unsustainable world. 
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An environmentalism that adopts an ambient view of rhetoric would aim not merely for 
changes in human values, attitudes, or choices, but would stage ontological change in the 
human-nonhuman world. For instance, rather than simply embracing the value of 
sufficiency over efficiency (as environmentalist Thomas Princen proposes), it would aim 
to cultivate environments where sufficiency can be materially enacted—all the while 
recalling that the things and environments with which we dwell can never be fully known 
or controlled.  
While new materialist approaches to rhetoric have thus generated important 
political implications, these are so far very broad, and offer more of a critical ground-
clearing than positive alternatives. Many questions remain open, perhaps most 
significantly the question of how power is to be tracked and engaged in a vitalistic, 
ambient rhetorical field. Hawk, for instance, is correct that Berlin’s pedagogical methods 
are limited. Yet while a richer approach to invention demands we relinquish rigid 
processes for more open-ended methods, we still must respond to Berlin’s Marxist call to 
confront the ideologies that animate our teaching and emerge (often unexpectedly) from 
it. How can a vitalistic approach to the classroom enable a better, more open-ended 
response? Rickert leaves us with practical-political questions in a similar fashion. He 
establishes that environmentalism must target the forces of world-making rather than 
beliefs and practices alone, but leaves unaddressed how a more ambient approach to 
political critique and action could point the way. Meanwhile, whereas Rickert’s 
theorization of rhetoric’s nonhuman, ecological operations is crucial, he misses an 
opportunity to engage Marxism and rhetoric’s Marxist materialist traditions in his 
political inquiry, dismissing them cursorily in a single paragraph for an (albeit 
19 
 
problematic) overemphasis on the human (21). Yet Marx (as I will discuss in chapter 3) 
was a new materialist in his own right, commencing his career with a dismissal of the less 
lively treatments of matter that preceded his own (Theses; German Ideology). Returning 
to the Marxist roots from which the most recent materialisms have distinguished 
themselves (e.g., Hawk, Rickert, Bennett, Latour) is an important next step for material 
rhetoric, and a step that can benefit traditional materialist approaches as well. The next 
section thus turns to traditional materialist approaches in rhetoric with an eye to how they 
can inform and be informed by “new” materialist approaches.  
Traditional Materialist Rhetoric 
Since Kenneth Burke, rhetoric scholars have adopted Marxist approaches in both 
composition (particularly via work on critical pedagogy) and communication 
(particularly via practicing and theorizing criticism). However, the bulk of this work 
attends to Marxist ideology critique without connecting this to a theory of materiality. 
Marxist theories of rhetoric’s materiality have been developed primarily by 
communication scholars—among them Michael McGee, Dana Cloud, and Ronald 
Greene. Like posthumanist approaches, the Marxist angle on rhetoric’s materiality 
emphasizes rhetoric’s ontological, world-making functions, with rhetoric theorized as 
more or less constitutive of social and political worlds. Yet the focus has been not on 
rhetoric’s extra-linguistic or extra-human aspects, but instead the connections between 
rhetoric’s materiality and power. In this vein, scholars inquire into how rhetoric can be 
understood as material in two senses originally tapped by Marx: as real, concrete human 
experience of economic and social realities (as opposed to the abstractions of 
onsciousness), and as the materializations of power that condition those concrete realities.  
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Thus, in his 1982 “A Materialist Conception of Rhetoric,” McGee followed the 
precedent of Marx and Engels’ German Ideology in responding to a perceived idealism in 
the field of rhetoric. Contemporary rhetorical theory, he declared, conceived rhetoric as a 
body of principles for reaching a particular outcome—effective discourse. To replace this 
idealist, product-oriented approach to theorizing rhetoric, McGee proposed we rethink 
rhetoric as a real, ongoing process rather than an idealized aesthetic product, a process 
continually prompted by an ever-present exigence—the necessities of life. This process 
was “as material and as omnipresent as air and water” (26)—though, following Marx, 
rhetoric’s materiality included much more than the sheafs of paper that might archive a 
speech. Indeed, “the whole of rhetoric is ‘material’ by measure of human experiencing of 
it, not by virtue of our ability to continue touching it after it is gone” (26).3  
Recalling the 1960s’ “process” turn in composition, McGee was responding to an 
aesthetic, literary orientation in a field that he saw as more properly concerned with “the 
brute reality of persuasion as a daily social phenomenon” (25). Yet unlike many process-
oriented compositionists, for McGee what mattered was not the cognitive process of an 
individual inventor, but rather the larger process of social negotiation occurring at levels 
from individual speakers and auditors to vast institutions and publics. And here entered 
the second Marxist dimension of his materialism. Though McGee in 1982 did not discuss 
economics or justice per se, he was concerned with how the lived, necessary practice of 
rhetoric played out in shifting relations of dominance and compliance. Thus he figured 
rhetoric, that everyday practice of social negotiation, as fundamentally “a species of 
coercion” (40) by which “speakers” (ranging from individuals to institutions) seduced 
“audiences” (from individuals to “the people”) into acquiescence. Rhetoric, he declared, 
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was as coercive as war, but distinct in being “the symbolic sublimation of pain” (40), 
offering as it did an appeasing sense of concern for the audience’s interests.  
Though many have developed on McGee’s essay (indeed, Barbara Biesecker and 
John Lucaites have devoted an edited volume to its legacy), the most prominent, and 
perhaps most contentious, have been Dana Cloud and Ronald Greene. In her oft-cited 
1994 essay, “The Materiality of Discourse as Oxymoron,” Cloud affirms McGee’s 1982 
essay, as well as the more orthodox modes of Marxist ideology critique prominent in his 
and Wander’s Marxist work from the 1970s and 1980s. However, she objects that a 
subsequent poststructuralist, Althusserian turn in both McGee’s work and the field at 
large has led to a preoccupation with discourse and a lost sense of rhetoric’s materiality. 
Views like McGee’s of the materiality of discourse, she argues, manifest more as the 
discursivity of materiality, stalling at the stage of interrogating ideologies and the 
apparatuses that house them (including Greene and McKerrow), rather than following 
McGee’s earlier efforts to bring the tools of rhetoric to bear on analyzing how ideologies 
fuel and are fueled by economic inequality and social injustice. Rhetorical critics, Cloud 
argues, seemed to have forgotten that people need to be liberated from more than just 
discourses and codes, but from actual material realities. For Cloud, then, rhetoric’s 
materiality lies less in its overall practice (as McGee saw it, inclining as he was toward an 
integration of materiality and discourse) and more in its motivations and effects as a 
medium of power. Though admittedly modernist, she maintains, the job of the rhetorical 
critic is to reveal rhetoric’s connection to everyday material conditions—to unmask and 
demystify dominant ideologies, to speak up for marginalized discourses.  
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 Cloud’s greater emphasis on material experience can potentially motivate an 
engagement with corporeal and new materialism, and, as I will argue in chapters 3 and 4, 
her continued focus on demystification is not without promise, despite recent new 
materialist criticism. Still, Greene (“Another Materialist Rhetoric”) convincingly objects 
to Cloud on a number of grounds. Ignoring legitimate and pressing criticisms of 
poststructuralism, he argues, Cloud retains a bipolar, oppressor-oppressed model of 
power (rather than a more complex, multiplied understanding); a representationalist 
understanding of discourse (rather than a more constitutive one); and a misguided focus 
on power “interests” (which undergirds an intentionalist view of rhetorical and political 
forces). Related to these problems, he maintains, Cloud continues with the logic of 
influence model criticized by Biesecker, conceiving rhetoric as a medium between fixed 
speakers and audiences—assuming, for instance, that if Gulf War protests had been given 
proper media voice, the public would have realized the problems with the war and 
resisted. Such an assumption, Greene maintains, fails to recognize entire apparatuses of 
power that generated consent for the war in the first place—it fails, in short, to reckon 
with the problem of immanence. Rhetoric, in Greene’s view, occurs at the more primary 
level of “governing apparatus,” material configurations of ideologies, institutions, and 
technologies that continually and immanently generate speakers, audiences, situations, 
and constellations of power, rather than simply moving ideas through language between 
fixed speakers and audiences in stabilized situations. Echoing Biesecker, Greene asserts 
that this approach to rhetoric’s materiality demands a critical method of articulation to 
replace the hermeneutics of suspicion that Cloud offers, and one that attends to both 
institutional histories (including rhetoric’s own), and larger apparatuses (including 
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institutions, discourses, practices, technologies) (“Another Materialist Rhetoric,” 
“Rhetorical Materialism”). The rhetorical critic’s task is to investigate how ideological 
elements map onto political issues through rhetoric’s technologies of deliberation.4  
Greene develops his materialist approach in his 2004 essay “Rhetoric and 
Capitalism: Rhetorical Agency as Communicative Labor.” Here he resonates with 
Rickert, arguing that (especially among Marxists) rhetorical agency tends to be imagined 
as “a communicative process of inquiry and advocacy on issues of public importance” 
(188). Such a view (which he maps to both Cloud and Aune) prompts a moralizing 
approach to citizenship and overlooks “how capitalist exploitation works in and through 
cultural logics of domination and representation” (194). As an alternative, Greene seeks a 
view of rhetorical agency that is immanent to capitalism and social being, rather than 
separate from it. He proposes that a shift from viewing rhetorical agency as 
communication to seeing it as “communicative labor” offers such an opening. Drawing 
from feminist economists, Greene expands the notion of labor to include not just the 
factory worker, but also “the large amounts of (often gendered and raced) labor 
associated with care, affect, and consumption that take place beyond the factory gates at 
home, in hospitals, in schools, and in stores” (199). Evoking Hardt and Negri’s notion of 
immaterial labor, he casts rhetorical agency as “a form of life-affirming constitutive 
power that embodies creativity and cooperation” (201).  
Of the developments of traditional Marxist materialism, Greene’s is the most 
compatible with the new materialist approach to rhetoric, and is becoming more so as he 
develops the influences of Foucault, Althusser, and Deleuze. Greene shares with new 
materialist rhetoric an emphasis on rhetoric’s powers to constitute things—at least human 
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things, like subjectivities, values, and consent for war. His approach also shares an 
insistence that desirable political outcomes cannot simply be identified and aimed for (a 
view likewise shared by Marx, Adorno, and new materialists, to be discussed in chapter 
3). Yet despite these resonances, Greene’s approach to rhetoric’s materiality remains 
distinctly human-centered, a fact made most explicit in his contribution to the 2009 
volume dedicated to McGee. Here, he objects to the recent proliferation of work on the 
rhetorical powers of monuments, quilts, environments, bodies, and everyday practices. 
This sort of expansion of rhetoric’s object domain, Greene argues, leads to a commitment 
to a “generalized rhetoricality inherent in cultural forms and objects” (44) that (1) risks 
presenting as a transcendental power that produces the subject as an effect and (2) derails 
a more systematic and concrete exploration into the material forces that constitute 
rhetorical subjectivity. Instead, he argues, rhetoric should focus on how specific 
networks—of institutions, technologies, discourses, and so on—produce a “concrete 
rhetorical subject, a subject that speaks and is spoken to” (44). Greene’s example is the 
“citizenship apparatus” we can unpack as: a complex of institutions that promote civic 
engagement in high schoolers, discourses about progressive education that promote 
communication as a means of citizenship, and rhetorical technologies like learning how 
to debate. In the end, for Greene, the things and environments that constitute speaking 
subjects are ordered in politically significant ways that we can analyze through specific 
technologies, institutions, discourses, practices, and so on, but rhetoricity inheres in 
speaking subjects alone.  
It is true that taken in isolation, many studies expanding rhetoric’s object domain 
to include quilts, monuments, and so on do not provide robust theorizations of rhetoric’s 
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materiality, offering instead more local critical insights on their objects of analysis. 
However, considered as a whole, this work is doing much to shift the field’s concepts, 
methods, and habits of thought, as becomes apparent in more reflective or comprehensive 
treatments of this work (e.g., Blair, Senda-Cook, Stormer) and more theoretically inclined 
object studies (e.g., Marback, Morris). Moreover, chances are that in his critique, Greene 
does not have in mind the work of compositionists Syverson, Edbauer Rice, Hawk, and 
Rickert—scholars who have offered a rich theoretical milieu for the expansion of 
rhetoric’s object domain. As I argued above, this work has indeed entailed a certain 
abstraction of the political and bracketing of concrete political questions. However, the 
vitalization of objects it has accomplished opens a new, lively territory of rhetorical 
materiality and power. With the new materialist turn and against Greene, I propose that 
expanding rhetoric’s object domain is crucial to exploring the operations and political 
stakes of rhetoric’s materiality. Such an expansion, as Jane Bennett has argued, avoids 
the arrogance of imagining human agency as something separate. This arrogance impedes 
environmentalist orientations, and in any case is increasingly less viable as we encounter 
our own otherness in cyborgian form (Hayles, Haraway, Hawk). It also enables us to look 
beyond the rhetorical subject for the energies of change (a potential which is present in 
Hardt and Negri’s work, though not engaged by Greene).  
At the same time, to take on political questions, new materialist rhetoric needs 
methods for evaluating emergent power structures such as those Greene offers. This is 
apparent when we consider Rickert’s chapter on ambient sound, where he investigates the 
Microsoft start-up tune. Here Rickert offers a robust theorization of the vibrant rhetoricity 
of both room and sound. Yet while his attention to Microsoft’s ambient presence in 
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everyday life is certainly provocative, gesturing at the corporatization of life that 
proceeds through ambient rhetorical means, Rickert makes no move toward critique 
(indeed, it is not clear that he wants to make such a move). For those such as Greene, 
whose primary motivation in theorizing rhetoric’s materiality is political (seeking new 
theorizations and approaches to worldly change), the ambient approach offers a rich 
opening onto the task of mapping articulations of power. In such a view, these 
articulations ultimately include the participation of technologies, things, and 
environments as well as the actions of people. In short, any generalized rhetoricity that an 
ambient approach assumes need not mean an abandonment of the logic of articulation. 
That said, rhetoric scholars might approach articulation somewhat differently. It is 
in gesturing at this difference that Nathan Stormer suggests a way to bridge new and old 
materialist rhetoric. Reading the explosion of work on “environments, genes, rituals, and 
monuments” (262) to indicate a promising posthuman turn in the field (259), Stormer 
echoes Greene in acknowledging a need to “account for questions of order from scholars 
who hold rhetoric to be present in multitudes of practices” (260, emphasis added). He 
proposes the concept of articulation as a helpful heuristic for such a project, but draws 
from Haraway and Latour to unpack a posthumanist model of articulation, in contrast to 
the dominant Laclau/Hall model embraced by Greene and many others. This enables him 
to acknowledge the imbrications of materiality and discourse even while recognizing a 
need to posit them as separate spheres in certain instances. Stormer proposes that rhetoric 
scholars might adopt a “posthumanist historiographic perspective,” thinking 
prosthetically and using a genealogical approach to our objects in order to study how they 
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are articulated and what they articulate. This opens the way for a posthumanist mode of 
political criticism, though Stormer does not address this directly.  
Drawing on both versions of rhetoric’s materiality, I want to extract a shared 
problem for new and old materialist rhetoric: the question of how to approach political 
intervention given an immanent, human-nonhuman understanding of rhetorical agency 
and an acknowledgement of the fluid, multiple character of power. This question 
combines the problems of immanence and articulation that traditional materialist rhetoric 
investigates with the inquiry into emergence that new materialist rhetoric has undertaken. 
Drawing on both traditions to interrogate this question promises to produce a richer view 
of rhetoric’s materiality and why that materiality matters. This project pursues such an 
approach to the problem of immanence with an inquiry into the sensory dimensions of 
rhetoric. The next section maps how taste, in particular, offers an ideal conceptual site for 
unpacking a sensory account of rhetoric. 
A (Re)turn to Taste 
An historically significant concept in rhetoric and politics, taste—in both its aesthetic 
sense (as a cultivated, critical response-ability to things) and its sensory sense (as a 
modality of object-human relations)—is an ideal conceptual site for putting rhetoric’s 
materialisms into conversation for several reasons. First, taste’s complex rhetoricity 
invites a theory of rhetoric’s materiality that draws together the multiple and disparate 
existing theorizations. Taste (in both its aesthetic and sensory dimensions) manifests at 
each of the material levels that rhetorical theory has engaged, while also opening a way to 
think a merging of those levels. As a bodily capacity for discrimination, judgment, 
pleasure, and desire, it evokes Debra Hawhee’s description of rhetoric as bodily training. 
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As a mode of involvement with nonhuman vitality, it resonates with new materialist 
approaches, acting, on the one hand, as a path to the ecological sensibility Bennett calls 
for, and staging, on the other, the sort of politics of things for which Latour calls under 
the banner of Dingpolitik. Finally, as a concrete site of power, taste directs us to how 
bodies, things, and environments can become permeated with the structures of power that 
concern traditional materialist rhetoric. As new materialism turns to questions of human-
nonhuman politics, Marxism’s long history of theorizing the politics of the senses and 
aesthetic taste promises to be informative. At the same time, an ambient approach to taste 
could guide an understanding of sensory rhetoric as a technology of power. Both 
possibilities are evoked in chapter 3. 
 Second, as a mode of encounter between bodies and things, the concept of taste 
enhances our understanding of rhetoric as a receptive capacity that is fundamentally 
generative (e.g., Davis). As such, it is a provocative conceptual site for thinking the 
complications of rhetorical agency that rhetoricians have offered from traditional and 
new materialist perspectives. From the vantage point of new materialist rhetoric, taste 
stages the dissolve between active and passive forces of invention that Hawk describes in 
terms of adaptability and Rickert describes in terms of chora. At the same time, as a 
product of capitalist forces as well as a (re)producer of those forces, taste helps us to 
think the dissolve in economic production and consumption that for Greene (2004) is 
central to rhetorical agency. In short, taste can act as a bridge between rethinkings of 
rhetorical agency that collapse production and consumption at economic-political levels 
(Greene) as well as broader ontological levels (Hawk and Rickert). These complications 
of rhetorical agency in turn speak to puzzles of immanence by complicating the notion of 
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conscientious consumption (an issue to be discussed in chapter 4) and enriching our 
understanding of rhetoric and ethics (to be discussed in chapter 5).  
Finally, taste in its aesthetic and sensory articulations is an ideal site for 
reengaging the question of critical capacity. This promises to assist in exploring the 
paradoxes of immanence that Greene points us to, by which public consent is 
manufactured in ways that reproduce structures of power and prevent critical distance—a 
view from outside of the operations of power. A new materialist approach to taste figures 
it as a set of orientations that not only become conditioned into people’s bodies, practices, 
and sensory worlds (Bourdieu; Ranciere), but also that become inscribed into things and 
environments. As such, taste considered from a new materialist perspective enriches the 
question of how to reckon with not just people’s participation in their own oppression 
(Marcuse; Adorno), but the participation of the human-nonhuman world at large. This in 
turn speaks to conversations in communication about critical rhetoric and in composition 
about critical pedagogy, offering a bridge between them. Implications of my investigation 
for theories and practices of critique, specifically, will be discussed at the end of chapter 
3. 
An integrated materialist rhetorical study of taste also promises to inform several 
additional discourses within and beyond rhetoric. Taste-based approaches to ethical 
refinement and political change from the Enlightenment through Adorno have been 
criticized as elitist (see, e.g., Bourdieu, Saisselin, Cottom, Shusterman). Bourdieu, 
moreover, argues that taste practices in general create class division and reproduce the 
orders of rule that construct them in the first place. As rhetorical studies develops its 
attunement to the material and sensory dimensions of rhetoric, we must both address and 
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complicate these positions, a challenge this dissertation takes on. Such a project is 
particularly important as food, food environments, and gustatory taste are increasingly 
implicated in the biologically mediated magnification of animal suffering and the 
(re)production of economic, social, and nutritional disparity at a national and global level.  
Defining Taste: Sense and Sensibility 
As a term, a concept, and a phenomenon, taste is murky and multiple. I 
provisionally map it out with the following necessarily (and provocatively) unsatisfactory 
schemata, drawn primarily from traditional thought in psychology and aesthetic theory.  
From the perspective of the individual, the term “gustatory taste” can refer to two 
things: (1) the sense of gustation (which itself includes bodily sensation and the 
phenomenal experience of sensation) and (2) one’s aesthetic sensibilities in relation to 
gustatory experience. The sense of taste refers to a bodily orientation to an object that 
enables a particular quality or modality of experience not possible via other sense 
modalities. But such a concept is never actualized, because the distinction between 
different sense modalities immediately falls apart when we consider the synesthetic 
character of the senses: taste sensation, for instance, is conditioned by visual, aural, and 
tactile experience, and olfactory experience most of all—as Schlosser suggests, the 
human body registers some 90% of flavor through the nose, not the mouth. In the end, 
there is no agreed-upon standard for distinguishing among the sense modalities—the 
traditional five senses, as well as the traditional four taste sensations of sweet, sour, salty, 
bitter, are joined by many more in some theories, and it is difficult to distinguish senses 
(taste, sight, smell, etc.) from sensations (sweet, sour, etc.). Regardless of how the sense 
modalities are carved up, we can make physiological and functional distinctions between 
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the bodily apparatuses connected with sensation. Flavor and smell enter the body 
chemically, for instance, in contrast to sounds and images, entering by physical impact.  
Continuing (provisionally) from the perspective of the individual, I define 
aesthetic taste (whether for music, art, food, etc.) as an affectability or response-ability 
related to a particular realm of things that is cultivated in deliberate and accidental ways. 
Every individual has a particular range of aesthetic tastes, which may be termed “high” or 
“low,” in various discourses. Aesthetic taste is a changeable affect-ability that involves 
four components: (1) discriminatory (in)ability (which can manifest in experience, brain, 
and/or sense organs, and is complexly related to language) (2) immediate experience 
(including enjoyment, intoxication, and disgust) (3) objective orientation (including 
desire, craving, and addiction) (4) (in)capacity for judgment of quality. These are 
schematic divisions of aesthetic taste which can easily be troubled—for instance, 
enjoyment is arguably an order of desire, as well as an experience that includes judgment. 
Yet to the extent that we can conceptually separate them, we can understand them to 
affect and blend into one another. For example, one’s ability to discriminate cherry vs. 
raspberry flavors in wine, surrealism vs. realism in painting, or saxophone vs. horn in 
jazz, can enhance enjoyment, drive desire, and assist in a more nuanced and reliable 
judgment. In cultivating the aesthetic affectability of gustatory taste, one necessarily 
impacts the sense of taste—the range or zone of possible qualitative engagements of a 
subject with an object.  
While focusing on the subject’s side of taste alone surely has theoretical value, a 
new materialist perspective urges us to complicate these subject-centered definitions of 
aesthetic and sensory taste, and in ways that can serve environmentalist purposes. Such a 
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perspective would ask us to highlight the active participation of the object (whether food, 
clothing, art, etc) in enabling certain modes of sensation and affecting each of the 
components of aesthetic taste. For instance, the sensation of the smooth, moist properties 
of Velveeta is enabled by multiple emulsifiers, and Velveeta’s emulsifiers in turn enable 
an enjoyment of a certain kind of creaminess. Likewise, the sensation of tartness is 
enabled by a grape’s particular acidic content, and here the grape’s acidity enables the 
judgment of a certain kind of fineness. Thus taste (and sensation more broadly) could be 
extended from the capacity of an individual human to a capacity of human-thing-
environment assemblages or networks, where subject and object are not stable and 
discrete, but constantly co-emergent. For instance, an eggplant has a set of affordances 
that interact (and in some cases intra-act) with the historically conditioned affordances of 
environments, cooking and eating practices, marketing practices, and bodies, each of 
which play a role in the overall taste ecology. In English there is already a linguistic 
tendency to include objects in the realm of gustatory taste—we say the eggplant has a 
bitter taste or tastes bitter just as we say people have or lack a taste for eggplant. This of 
course suggests multiple senses of the term “taste,” but I am interested in relocating that 
multiplicity to the concept of taste itself.  
In the end, gustatory taste cannot be fully parsed into sensory and aesthetic 
categories (either definitionally or in practice). My project engages this overlap and 
builds on it as well, inquiring into the connections between rhetoric and taste (in all its 




Methodologies of Theory/Criticism 
While my next two chapters draw from the various theoretical strands of 
rhetoric’s materialisms to theorize the concept and practice of taste, the final two chapters 
mobilize and develop the resultant theorizations of taste as a complexly material 
rhetorical capacity. In the course of this project, I draw from a variety of critical and 
theoretical models and heuristics.  
In 1989, Raymie McKerrow offered his much-debated theory of “critical rhetoric” 
as an interested (rather than detached) approach to rhetorical criticism aimed at 
intervening in structures of domination and gesturing toward possibilities for future 
action. While I adopt many of the aims of McKerrow’s partly immanent approach to 
critical rhetoric, I reject many of its more transcendental assumptions, including: (1) that 
a critical distance in achievable, enabling a final unmasking of reality; (2) that critique 
best operates by opposing itself to a fixed object in a traditional dialectical movement; 
and (3) that power crystallizes into poles of dominance and subversion (see Greene 1998 
for criticism along these lines). At the same time, my project is explicitly and 
methodologically committed to the question of the critical, seeking to describe a 
posthumanist mode of critical engagement and, in some way, to enact such a critical 
engagement with my objects of study. I thus approach my theoretical and critical 
practices with the question in mind of how to perform and discover an alternative to 
McKerrow’s version of critical rhetoric.  
James Jasinski’s 2001 essay points toward a more immanent understanding of 
critique that blends theory and criticism, rejecting the assumption present in McKerrow 
that an object of study might simply sit still in the studying. In so doing, he distinguishes 
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“methodologically driven” criticism from “conceptually oriented” criticism. 
Methodologically driven criticism begins from a particular theoretical perspective, such 
as Marxism, derives its procedural approach to its object from that theoretical perspective 
(e.g., look for class dynamics), applies the perspective to the object, and offers 
conclusions in terms of how they enrich or complicate the theoretical worldview from 
which the procedure emanated (e.g., Marxism). Conceptually oriented criticism, in 
contrast, is an immanent sort, proceeding “abductively,” through a circular, back-and-
forth movement between the object being studied and the concepts emergent from that 
study.  
Two developments that I integrate into my approach press Jasinski’s model 
toward a more posthumanist mode of theory/criticism. First, we must consider the 
critic/theorist’s abductive movement to produce not just concepts, but also objects. For 
example, as John Law suggests in his 2002 book Aircraft Stories, the stories about the 
TSR2 that he explores are “a way of helping to perform the aircraft” (5). And for Law, an 
object is always multiple—his scholarly performance of the aircraft composes it into 
multiple, overlapping ontologies. Likewise, Bruno Latour calls for a dismissal of negative 
modes of critique in favor of a critical practice that composes. He comments “with a 
hammer . . . in hand you can do a lot of things: break down walls, destroy idols, ridicule 
prejudices, but you cannot repair, take care, assemble, reassemble, stitch together” (475). 
Under Latour’s metaphors, the abductive criticism Jasinski describes becomes an 
ontologically generative stitching. I take this first supplement to heart in understanding 
my theorization of taste to help perform taste in the multiple ways it constitutes itself 
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through the texts, theories, and practices of my study—as, for instance, a rhetorical 
capacity, an ecology of people and things, and a technology of power.  
The second supplement to Jasinski’s conceptually oriented criticism is to call 
attention to the abductive movement itself as a generative theoretical exercise (regardless 
of any concepts or objects it generates). To this end, in engaging the various historical 
and contemporary texts in my project, I will use a combination of Derridian, 
deconstructive reading and Deleuzian, appropriative reading. Following John 
Muckelbauer, I seek to adopt an engagement with texts that does not simply appropriate 
or negate, as with traditional dialectical styles, but orients to the “singular rhythms” of the 
encounter. For instance, Muckelbauer’s affirmative reading of Plato’s dialogue The 
Sophist joins the dialogue’s search for the sophist in an encounter that produces 
something new—the insight, both representational and affective, that a style of 
movement—“itinerant travel”—is all that the sophist, and by implication, rhetoric, is. But 
emergent from Muckelbauer’s reading is not just a concept, but also a style of conceptual 
movement. As such, affirmative reading is ultimately more than a reading practice. Just 
like the search for the sophist, it is a practice in conceptual movement in which an 
apparently fixed object being “read” not only emerges as unfixed, but in so doing comes 
to move the “reader” in ways that exceed symbolicity. As such, Muckelbauer’s essay 
performs Deleuze’s assertion that we cannot ultimately distinguish between words, 
concepts, and things, making philosophy a practice of intervening in the world, not 
something fundamentally cut off from it. 
Because I find taste to be an object of study that uniquely invites the orientations 
we now connect with posthumanism, an affirmative reading practice will enable me to 
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register the posthumanist rhythms of various discourses on taste that do not identify as 
posthumanist (e.g., ranging from Hume’s writings to Schlosser’s exposé reporting to the 
curricular materials for Slow Food’s taste education efforts). Inhabiting these discourses 
as a posthumanist ultimately will generate a transformation of posthumanist rhetoric 
itself. Like Muckelbauer, I seek an intervention not only in the concepts of the discipline, 
but also in its styles and sensibilities of conceptualization. To this extent, performative 
writers like Vitanza and Ulmer are also an inspiration, even though I adapt a more 
analytic tone.  
Chapter Outline 
The next two chapters draw from and recast the rhetorical tradition to theorize sensation 
as an ambient, generative rhetorical capacity. Chapter 2, “The ‘Savour of Things,’” 
argues that David Hume’s, Hugh Blair’s, and Lord Kames’ celebration of aesthetic taste 
as a rhetorical and ethical capacity posed an instructive paradox. On the one hand, the 
Scottish Enlightenment’s obsession with establishing a standard of taste fostered elitism, 
prejudice, and class division. As I show, the bellelettrist embrace of taste was problematic 
it its commitment to a standard of taste, its departure from the original, sensory 
dimensions of aesthetic taste, and its failure to theorize sensory-aesthetic power. On the 
other hand, this period’s enthusiasm for taste generated affective and vitalist perspectives 
on communication, rhetorical invention, and the ethics of taste that resisted these 
problematic tendencies and opened the way for the kind of ecological sensibility recently 
advocated by Jane Bennett.  
With the shortcomings of the Scottish Enlightenment in mind, chapter 3, “Sensory 
Power,” turns to Marxist discourse on aesthetic education and “sensory emancipation,” 
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moving from Friedrich Schiller through Karl Marx and the Frankfurt School. As I argue, 
Marx’s attention to aesthetic capacity as an historical rather than an individual power 
grounded in bodily senses and not just “higher” ones tempered Enlightenment elitism. In 
his vision of sensory emancipation, Marx did not fully break with a standard of taste, but 
he gestured toward a standard that was broad and vague rather than individualized and 
specific. To a theory and critical practice of sensory rhetoric, I argue, Marx contributes a 
useful heuristic in his analysis of the sensory forms and the attendant material forms that, 
in any given era, enable and disable arenas of contact among the human and nonhuman 
participants in sensation. While Marx ultimately puts more stock in attention to material 
form, his Frankfurt School predecessors developed his early emphasis on sensation, 
reconnecting to Schiller’s original emphasis on aesthetic education as a modality of 
political intervention. The attendant notion of immanent critique, I argue, can be joined 
with recent emphases on affirmative reading and generative response-ability in the field 
of rhetoric.  
My final two chapters explore how a sensory, compositionist kind of critical 
capacity is under development in the contemporary food movement, one that attunes us to 
the rhetoricity of everyday sensation. I ask how this revived and notably sensory attention 
to taste repeats or reformulates the elitisms of past connections of rhetoric and taste. 
Thus, chapter 4, “Reassembling the Senses,” analyzes new theories and enactments of 
sensory rhetoric emergent in recent, exposé-style food journalism with a close study of 
Schlosser’s Fast Food Nation. This text, I argue, elaborates sensation as a rhetorical 
power in an ambient sense—that is, as a rhetorical capacity and vulnerability that is not a 
matter of individual human subjectivity, but rather a qualitative field of intra-acting 
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entities both human and nonhuman. In the course of this, it offers a model of critique that 
is immanent, sensual, and compositionist, describing and diagnosing sensation as a 
rhetorical, world-building power. While adopting the classic form of the exposé, Fast 
Food Nation (and other recent food documentary) also demonstrates how the exposé 
effects sensory (rather than purely representational) exposures that complicate its stated 
commitment to demystification.  
Finally, chapter 5, “(Re)Zoning Ethics,” considers how the pedagogies of taste 
apparent in contemporary food writing and documentary are developed in the explicit 
sensory education initiatives of today’s growing “slow food” and “farm to school” 
movements. In these efforts, sensory capacity is embraced as the most fundamental of 
rhetoricities—as an affectability or response-ability that calls “eater” and “eaten” into co-
emergent, relational being. In the process, the “eaten” is revealed not as an object but a 
vibrant thing, alive in its evolving connections to the human and nonhuman energies 
composing complex foodways. Today’s taste-based interventions, then, enrich the eater’s 
response-ability, her capacity to respond to the complex ecologies that compose her at 
both bodily and ethical levels. But the enriched response-ability of these interventions is 
not limited to the eater. Ultimately, eater and eaten participate together in composing a 
rhetorical response-ability that zones their possible modalities of contact and thereby 
stages lived environmental ethics. The more that efforts give themselves over to the risks, 
uncertainties, and multiple agencies of eating, the more they step away from the 
commitment to a standard of taste that limited Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment 
practice. While many activist interventions into taste currently retain elitism and 
paternalism, I argue, their embrace of nonhuman vitality commences a posthumanist 
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reformulation of ethico-rhetorical agency that was latent in the traditions surveyed in my 
early chapters.  
The sensory tradition that I trace in rhetoric casts sensation as not the private 
experience of individual minds or bodies, but rather a contingent, generative play of 
affect among human and nonhuman forces. Contributing to work in rhetoric and politics, 
my overall project provides an account of rhetoric’s materiality that closely links 
processes of materialization and practices of sensation. Contributing to work in rhetoric 
and ethics, my investigation of taste demonstrates that the ethico-rhetorical capacity for 
response abides not in the individual subject alone, but among all participants in the 
evolving zone of sensory contact. To the extent that those sensory collectives can come to 
recognize and embrace their ambient, inventive, and ever-evolving character, they harbor 
the potential to break with the Enlightenment ideal of a standard of taste and its 













                                                 
Chapter 1 Notes 
1
 While composition scholars have a long history of Marxist approaches to the classroom, 
this body of work largely focuses on ideology critique and does not extensively theorize 
rhetoric’s materiality. Meanwhile, new materialist approaches to rhetoric are just 
beginning to find wider engagement among communication scholars (see, e.g., Stormer, 
Keeling, Rogers). 
2
 Similarly, Louise Wetherbee Phelps (1988) objected to totalizing views of rhetoric as a 
collections of discrete elements (ethos/pathos/logos, or speaker/audience/text). 
3
 An interesting upshot was that McGee’s focus on rhetoric’s materiality ultimately made 
it more ephemeral than the idealist, product-oriented approaches to which he objected—
indeed, McGee compared the written speech to nuclear fallout, and rhetoric itself to the 
explosion. 
4








THE “SAVOUR OF THINGS” 
In eighteenth-century Britain, rhetoric’s sensory dimensions were most elaborated via its 
connections to aesthetic taste. Amidst a flowering of the fine arts and a time of increased 
cultural mobility, greater access to elite culture was being made possible by the 
transformation of scholarship from Latin to English, the wider dissemination of written 
texts, and the movements of rural peoples into urban centers (Herrick 186-7). Good taste 
was sought for a vast range of aesthetic objects, including the “belles lettres” (which 
encompassed poetry, history, and philosophy), as well as art, music, architecture, and 
even the natural world. Cultivating taste was a means for many non-elites to build their 
cultural capital, and there was a general feeling that British society was reaching an apex 
of civilization and aesthetic refinement. Among rhetoricians, the infatuation with taste 
was so pervasive that Barbara Warnick has proposed we consider aesthetics to be a sixth 
canon of rhetoric thriving during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. As I will show 
in what follows, the Scottish Enlightenment embrace of “aesthetics” implicated both its 
original meaning—concerning the bodily senses—and its emerging meaning— 
concerning the mental experience of beauty and sublimity. For simplicity, I will here 
adopt the latter and more contemporary meaning. 
 Many have characterized the Enlightenment turn to taste as an individualist, 
humanist, and elitist moment that marked an aesthetic narrowing of rhetoric and a retreat 
from its public function (e.g., Berlin, Clark, Conley, Covino). Mobilizing the perspective 
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of affect theory, this chapter joins recent efforts to complicate aspects of this picture 
(Agnew; Manolescu; Warnick). As I will argue, although the enthusiasm for taste among 
Scottish thinkers was undeniably elitist, its affective reformulations of rhetoric were in 
tension with that very elitism. The embrace of taste inspired new theories and enactments 
of rhetoric as a flow of affect among human and nonhuman forces, sparking not a retreat 
from public engagement, but rather a material reformulation of it. In aesthetic education 
efforts, new perspectives on rhetorical invention and rhetoric’s ethical and civic functions 
emerged. As such, an inquiry into the affective tenor of rhetoric’s encounter with taste 
can recast existing understandings of Scottish Enlightenment rhetoric, and in ways that 
inform a contemporary theorization of sensation as a rhetorical capacity. In particular, 
this period highlights the conflicting potentials and dangers of taste-based enactments of 
ethics and civic life that continue to haunt public efforts at the education of gustatory 
taste today.  
To frame my analysis of the affective dimensions of Scottish Enlightenment 
thought, I begin with a brief discussion of contemporary affect theory and its significance 
for political and rhetorical theory. I then turn to an explication of David Hume’s theory of 
taste, which, anchoring as it did a rich, affective theory of ethical communication, 
deserves more attention as a part of the rhetorical tradition. Next, and for the bulk of the 
chapter, I consider the integration of aesthetic taste into rhetorical education by Scottish 
bellelettrists. This integration, I argue, expanded rhetorical skill to include a not fully 
conscious capacity for sensory and emotional response that grounded ethical and civic 
life. In the process, rhetorical capacity (in the form of aesthetic taste) came to be seen as a 
capacity of cultures as well as individuals, and rhetorical invention was recast as 
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proceeding not from discrete individuals, but a play of human and nonhuman 
communicative forces. As I argue in my conclusion, the Scottish Enlightenment 
treatment of aesthetic taste as a rhetorical capacity was problematically elitist, but its 
transformations of invention pointed the way for an affective understanding and practice 
of rhetoric that resisted that elitism.  
Politics, Affect, and Rhetoric 
As briefly discussed in chapter 1, in the past few decades, an affective turn in the 
humanities has significantly reworked traditional methodologies of political theory, 
analysis, and practice. Supporting what Lauren Berlant calls “another phase in the history 
of ideology theory,” this turn has complicated critique that focuses purely on subjects, 
institutions, or discourse, directing attention instead to the flows of emotion, materiality, 
and sensation that only temporarily and unstably articulate into such forms. In this 
development, Gilles Deleuze’s notion of affect as a constitutive, pre-personal force has 
been crucial.
1
 For Deleuze, drawing from Baruch Spinoza, a body is both defined by and 
emergent from its capacity to affect and be affected, to move and be moved. Being both 
generated by and generative of bodies, affect always operates before, after, and between 
bodies (Spinoza). Conceived in the Deleuzian/Spinozan tradition, then, affect is 
distinguished from emotion as an impersonal, preconscious play of forces. The 
emergence of subjectivities, emotions, and even sensations marks the capture or 
territorializing of affect, which in turn changes affective flows. From a political 
perspective, then, inquiry into the nature of that capture—into how affect articulates and 
its possible alternative articulations—becomes crucial.  
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One fruitful new critical approach has thus been to identify and diagnose 
problematic calcifications of affect. Working in the feminist tradition, for instance, Sarah 
Ahmed has argued that the Western imperative to be happy corrals affective flows in 
such a way as to arrest the possibility of political change and to alienate bodies that resist 
happiness. She locates the possibility for an emancipatory politics in affective 
reformulations that would resist assuming that unhappiness is an obstacle to be overcome 
(Promise of Happiness 217). Lauren Berlant is similarly interested in how affective 
formations can calcify in politically damaging ways. She argues that a habit of “cruel 
optimism”—people’s desires for things that are bad for them—has infected Western 
political climates since the 1980s. Her attention to how cruel optimism feeds “fantasies of 
the good life” guides a provocative narrative of the affective habits fueling “class 
bifurcation, downward mobility, and environmental, political, and social brittleness” 
(Promise of Happiness 11).  
In considering how to intervene in such problematic articulations of affective 
flow, political theorists have proposed that we seek new affective attunements and 
sensibilities rather than new intellectual dispositions alone. Thus William Connolly has 
urged that critics and theorists attempt to break habits of thought reliant on classical 
notions of causality, time, and agency. Insisting that primarily intellectual approaches to 
political theory and practice are insufficient for democratic thriving, he advocates for a 
substantial, “deep” pluralism that embraces the “visceral register of being” (Pluralism 
11). Similarly, Jane Bennett has concluded that demystification and exposé are limited 
approaches to political intervention because they “do not reliably produce moral outrage 
and . . . ameliorative action” (xiii-xv). Both Bennett and Connolly propose that our 
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political analyses and practices should rely on interventions not just into concepts and 
knowledge, but also into sensibilities. For them, scholars and nonscholars must break 
with humanist habits of feeling and reasoning and develop our capacity to register the 
nonhuman dimensions of affect that play into political realities.  
The affective turn has inspired a rethinking of rhetoric and composition that 
situates the field to play an important role in Bennett’s and Connolly’s calls and in 
Ahmed’s and Berlant’s modes of criticism. Crucially, Deleuze’s impersonal, 
nonsubjective notion of affect has enabled rhetorical invention to be thought in more 
dynamic and distributed terms. Thus, Jenny Edbauer Rice argues that shifting our 
rhetorical analyses from an emphasis on situation to one on affective ecologies will 
provide a better sense of the way public rhetorics move. Drawing from Deleuze and 
Guattari, she asserts, “A given rhetoric is not contained by the elements that comprise its 
rhetorical situation (exigence, rhetor, audience, constraints). Rather, a rhetoric emerges 
already infected by the viral intensities that are circulating in the social field” 
(“Unframing” 14). In a compatible approach, Debra Hawhee retrieves the “middle voice” 
usage of the Greek term for invention, to indicate that invention “at once combines and 
exceeds the forces of active and passive. In the middle, one invents and is invented, one 
writes and is written, constitutes and is constituted” (“Unframing” 17). As in athletic 
competition, rhetoric’s movements cannot be mapped to the purely active productions or 
passive receptions of discrete bodies; rather, rhetoric proceeds as a play of affective 
encounters that continually articulate and re-articulate into subjectivities, modes of 
sensation, structures of feeling, and so on. 
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While affective approaches recast rhetorical invention as a material, distributed 
process of emergence, they also recast rhetorical skill as a capacity to move and be 
moved, to respond and evoke response. Thus, Hawhee (Bodily Arts) elaborates on the 
capacity of mētis, or the readiness for response to unpredictable situations, emphasized in 
the conjoined classical training of sport and rhetoric. Hawhee reads the stranger in Plato’s 
Sophist as a prime example of this wily, shape-shifting skill of cunning responsiveness. 
In John Muckelbauer’s more explicitly Deleuzian terms, Plato’s sophist “is less a 
determinate identity than a differential movement of the encounter in which the subject 
itself must be at stake” (97). And in Sonja Foss’s resonant feminist formulation, thinking 
rhetoric in terms of its invitational force situates us to understand it as a fluid capacity to 
move and be moved characterized by the mutual offering and reception of persuasion, 
rather than its imposition from above. For these and other scholars, rhetorical capacity is 
not just a capacity to move, isolated from a passive, moved object. Rather, it entails a 
capacity to move and be moved in a co-constitutive relation with an otherness and a 
future that are not fully predictable.  
Rhetoric’s affective turn has at least two powerful implications for the stakes of 
rhetorical practice and inquiry. First, in figuring rhetoric as a response to otherness, it has 
aligned rhetoric with the logic of ethics. Thus for Diane Davis, engaging the philosophy 
of Emmanuel Levinas, rhetoric inheres in the ethical origins of being, the fact that “I” am 
only insofar as I respond to an other. For Davis, a rich ethical life abides in the imperative 
to manage our “affectability,” our infinite responsibility and response-ability to others—a 
task which is fundamentally rhetorical (Inessential Solidarity; see chapter 5 for an 
extensive discussion of Davis). Similarly, for Lisbeth Lipari, drawing from both Levinas 
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and Martin Heidegger, a receptive rethinking of communication in terms of listening 
involves an emptying of expectation and a surrender to the unpredictable that paves the 
way for ethical life. A rethinking of rhetoric as an ethically fundamental capacity to be 
affected in turn situates rhetorical practice to ground the visceral, ecological sensibilities 
called for by Connolly and Bennett.  
Second, an affective formulation of rhetoric also nuances our approaches to 
rhetorical criticism in ways resonant with Ahmed’s and Berlant’s methodologies. Thus, 
as Ronald Greene argues, if we are to understand rhetorical power in terms of an 
impersonal flow of affective forces, our political analyses must ask not after fixed heroes 
and enemies, but rather after how those forces constellate into bodies, concepts, 
institutions, and habits of being (“Another Materialist”). From a similar standpoint, 
Christine Harold approaches activist critique by seeking those modes of activism that 
avoid simply resisting the market as a monolithic oppressor, and rather enter and follow 
market logics in ways that ultimately transform them. For these scholars, instead of 
thinking rhetorical power in rigidly dialectical terms, we must understand it as a more 
chemical, multi-directional, and not entirely tractable flow. Rhetorical criticism grounded 
in Deleuzian approaches, then, offers powerful new tools for not just diagnosing 
problematic articulations of affect, but also for imagining and enacting alternative 
articulations. In sum, considering rhetoric at the level of affective flow enables a model 
of ethical and civic being grounded in a response-ability to the other, a preparedness for 
(and thus invitation of) the unpredictable, and an engagement of power as 
multidirectional and immanent.  
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The wager of this dissertation project is that thinking rhetoric in terms of taste can 
advance these connections between rhetoric, ethics, and politics, and this chapter argues 
that it did so for eighteenth-century Scottish rhetoricians. Though generally dismissive of 
the bodily senses, the Scottish Enlightenment enthusiasm for aesthetic taste grew out of 
an analogy with those senses, and engaged them as a rich component of rhetorical and 
public life. Rhetoric, under its influence, emerged as a distributed, co-constitutive 
practice of affecting and being affected that was ultimately in tension with the humanist 
logics typically associated with Enlightenment thought. As such, the Scottish 
Enlightenment stands to offer a new past for rhetoric understood affectively and 
sensorially. The next section begins the project of exhuming that past with an 
examination of David Hume. Although a widely acknowledged influence on the 
bellelettrist rhetoricians who followed him, Hume has been given little in-depth 
consideration as a significant figure in the rhetorical tradition in his own right.
2
 Yet, as I 
will argue, his model of aesthetic taste grounded a distinctly affective theorization of 
rhetorical action and ethical communication. Himself a substantial influence for both 
Deleuzian affect theory and contemporary cognitive science, returning to Hume’s work 
promises to enrich today’s affective and material theorizations of rhetoric and 
composition.  
Hume’s Ethics of Communication 
Taste as an Internal Sense 
Developing on a medieval view that the mind operated by means of “internal senses” 
comparable to the external senses, eighteenth-century treatments of aesthetic taste 
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repeatedly compared it to gustatory taste. Perhaps the closest analogy was drawn by Jean-
Baptiste Dubos, who in 1719 argued: 
Do we ever reason, in order to know whether a ragoo be good or bad. . . . No, this 
is never practiced. We have a sense given us by nature to distinguish whether the 
cook acted according to the rules of his art. People taste the ragoo, and tho’ 
unacquainted with those rules, they are able to tell whether it be good or no. The 
same may be said in some respect of the productions of the mind, and of pictures 
made to please and move us. (238–239) 
For Dubos, aesthetic taste was quite literally a sixth sense “given by nature” in the way 
that gustatory taste is given—which is to say that it is a modality of human engagement 
with things that is not dependent upon reason.  
Francis Hutcheson, the first to offer a full-fledged theory of aesthetic taste in 
1729, similarly figured the sense for beauty as an “internal sense.” Assisting his departure 
from neoclassical views, the metaphor with gustatory taste helped him establish that 
beauty itself was a mental perception rather than an independent property of objects: 
“Beauty . . . properly denotes the Perception of some Mind; so Cold, Hot, Sweet, Bitter, 
denote the Sensations in our Minds, to which perhaps there is no resemblance in the 
Objects, which excite these Ideas in us” (14). Evident in this comparison of aesthetic and 
gustatory taste is a view that Hume would adopt—that beauty, like “cold, hot, sweet, and 
bitter,” was a secondary quality in the Lockean sense—emergent from certain 




Communication as Affective 
Hume’s theorization of taste developed on these “internal sense” approaches.3 For 
Hume, likewise, there was a “great resemblance between mental and bodily taste” (“Of 
the Standard” 834), with both sharing a noncognitive immediacy. Indeed, he frames his 
inquiry into a standard of taste with a wine-tasting example drawn from Don Quixote.
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Yet Hume diverged from his influence, Hutcheson, who believed taste was an innate 
capacity one either possessed or lacked. While he acknowledged native limitations to 
taste, including both discriminatory power (“delicacy of taste”) and rational capacity 
(“good sense”), Hume believed taste could be improved with experience. The discussion 
he offered of how was later mobilized and developed by instructors of rhetoric.  
Less apparent among the Scottish rhetoricians he influenced, Hume also 
innovated on previous thinkers by contextualizing his view of taste in a theory of 
communication that blended human and nonhuman senses of the term. Considered “the 
Newton of the moral sciences,” Hume, in his 1748 Enquiry Concerning Human 
Understanding, theorized human psychology with not just bodily analogies, but also 
broader physical analogies drawn from Newtonian physics. Ideas, he asserted, 
demonstrated an “attraction” to one another that paralleled the attraction of things in the 
“natural world” (Enquiry 1.1.4.6), whereas habits were a mental “force” (Enquiry 5.2.2) 
resembling gravity. In an anticipation of poststructuralism that is significant for 
Deleuzian and cognitive scientific theory alike, Hume’s empiricism and his view of the 
mind as primarily a sensing organ led him to question the assumption of a stable personal 
identity enduring over time. As a constellation of mental forces that resembled physical 
forces, human experience, Hume argued, was nothing more than a “bundle or collection 
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of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are 
in a perpetual flux and movement” (Treatise 1.4.4.4). We can have no direct experience 
of the coherence of these perceptions—the “I” is simply an idea that we posit onto this 
“flux” of perceptions as their container.  
This view of the subject significantly impacted Hume’s theory of communication. 
If mental life was primarily a flux of perceptions, this held both for belatedly posited 
subjects and for communication between those subjects. Resonating with affective and 
posthumanist approaches, Hume conceived of human communication in ways closely 
connected to the communication of force in the physical world, rather than in primarily 
linguistic terms. In his repeated usage, “communication” refers to the basic flow of 
passions that moves individuals to a response, circulating from one body to the next via 
movements of depersonalized and repersonalized affect. Thus he remarks:  
A good-natur’d man finds himself in an instant of the same humour with his 
company; and even the proudest and most surly take a tincture from their 
countrymen and acquaintance. A chearful countenance infuses a sensible 
complacency and serenity into my mind; as an angry or sorrowful one throws a 
sudden damp upon me. Hatred, resentment, esteem, love, courage, mirth and 
melancholy; all these passions I feel more from communication than from my 
own natural temper and disposition. (Treatise 317) 
Community, then, is soaked through with affect, in elusive but intimate ways: immersion 
in social life “infuses a sensible complacency,” “throws a sudden damp;” suddenly one 
“takes a tincture” of another’s sentiment, or “finds himself” sharing “the same humour 
with his company.” Recalling Edbauer Rice’s language, feelings travel across individuals 
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like viruses, forming affective communities: “The passions are so contagious,” Hume 
says, “that they pass with the greatest facility from one person to another, and produce 
corresponding movements in all human breasts” (Treatise 3.3.3.5).  
Because of contagious flows of affective communication, most of the feelings and 
perceptions we experience are not our own: “all these passions I feel more from 
communication than from my own natural temper and disposition” (emphasis added). 
Hume elsewhere likens this natural affective flow to a network of strings: “As in strings 
equally wound up, the motion of one communicates itself to the rest; so all the affections 
readily pass from one person to another, and beget correspondent movements in every 
human creature” (Treatise 3.3.1.7). Communication between people, then, parallels the 
communication of force in the physical world in that forces flow through things, rather 
than being possessed or produced solely by them. Just as the motion of a string is not 
confined to the string, but an impersonal force that territorializes onto it, so also do the 




For Hume, affective communication is enabled by sympathy, a psychological 
power of receptivity which allows us “to receive by communication [others’] inclinations 
and sentiments, however different from, or even contrary to our own” (Treatise 2.1.11.2). 
That sympathy seems instantaneous, however, does not make it nonreflective. Instead, 
Hume gestures toward unconscious modes of reflection that support it: We initially know 
another person’s sentiment or passion “only by its effects, and by those external signs in 
the countenance and conversation, which convey an idea of it.” Assisted by sympathy, we 
respond to the bodily and linguistic cues of our interlocutors, and our cold, distant “idea” 
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(our mental representation) of the other’s passion “is presently converted into an 
impression, and acquires such a degree of force and vivacity, as to become the very 
passion itself” (Treatise 2.1.11.3, emphasis added). This conversion process may be 
imperceptible to us, but it is not automatic—rather it proceeds by either “certain views 
and reflections” or the “force of the imagination.”6 Later instructors of rhetoric will target 
both imaginative and reflective practice as a way to intervene in this conversion process, 
thereby conditioning the individual’s affective response-ability and society’s affective 
flows.  
Taste as a Capacity for Ethical Communication 
To Hume’s view of things, sympathy provides the basis for both moral and 
aesthetic judgment, but only when corrected, just as we would correct any of our sensory 
experience. We do not, for instance, judge objects to shrink when they retreat from us, 
even though they have the appearance of doing so. Likewise, via corrected sympathy we 
do not judge our sympathy “with persons remote from us” to be any less lively than 
sympathy with those who are near (Treatise 3.3.1.15). This, finally, is where taste comes 
in: for Hume, taste, whether moral or aesthetic, refers to “corrected” sympathy.7 Guided 
by taste in its ethical dimension, the moral man is able to “depart from his private and 
particular situation, and must choose a point of view, common to him with others: He 
must move some universal principle of the human frame, and touch a string, to which all 
mankind have an accord and symphony” (Enquiry 9.6). Taste, then, resonating with 
today’s affective formulations of rhetoric, marks a certain preparedness for connection to 




Taste enables sentiment to manifest not just feelings of pleasure or displeasure, 
but also feelings of approval or disapproval—making moral and aesthetic judgments a 
matter of sentiment rather than reason. The Humean view of taste thus differs 
significantly from the Kantian conception which will follow in locating both aesthetic 
and moral judgment in sentiments of pleasure and approval rather than cognitive 
reflection. Though a quick, unconscious reflection precedes moral and aesthetic 
sentiments, judgment itself (which for Hume includes both the representation of 
something’s value and the motivation to act) is fully contained in the sentiment that 
emerges. In short, aesthetics abides at the everyday, bodily level of communication. As 
we will see shortly, it is via this pre-Kantian view of taste that rhetoric will find a 
provocative reckoning with a notion of human judgment that exceeds reason or 
consciousness, and that renders rhetorical capacity intimate to ethical life.  
As mentioned earlier, the Scottish Enlightenment turn to aesthetic taste has often 
been seen as a turn away from communication and toward private modes of rhetorical 
life. But as this explication suggests, for Hume’s theoretical approach at least, taste is 
anything but private. On the contrary, the cultivation of both moral and aesthetic taste is a 
thoroughly social process of rendering sentiments less personal through the cultivation of 
extended sympathy. This corrective process itself relies on everyday communication. 
Thus Hume elaborates on conversation as a means to that cultivation, preparing us for the 
direct experience of passions beyond our own, rendering our sentiments “more public and 




In addition to conversation, Hume believed, taste (or corrected sympathy) 
demanded conscious reflection and reasoning in order to be properly cultivated—even if 
it proceeded to operate, like sensation, by unconscious, reflexive means. In fact, 
conscious reflection was so crucial to the “proper” experience of beauty that one might 
not enjoy the sentiment of beauty (or correct a false perception of beauty) until long after 
an encounter with an object (“Of the Standard” 835). However, practice in such 
contemplation could prepare one for a more instantaneous and “accurate” aesthetic 
response in the future. Thus Hume announces:  
[I]n order to pave the way for [the sentiment of beauty], and give a proper 
discernment of its object, it is often necessary, we find, that much reasoning 
should precede, that nice distinctions be made, just conclusions drawn, distant 




Through such careful reasoning, combined with frequent practice, one could achieve “a 
quick and acute perception of beauty and deformity” (“Of the Standard” 835). As with 
the athletic training in Athens that Hawhee discusses, what Hume here describes are the 
conditions for cultivating a capacity for communicative response, a response-ability, that 
will proceed to operate at a preconscious level. For Hume, resembling contemporary 
affect theorists, the bundle of sensations that we posit as “me” is constantly penetrated 
and reworked by sensations from the outside—by communications that move us, but do 
not originate in us. Cultivating taste means developing our capacity to be overtaken by 
this promiscuous “intercourse of sentiments” in the proper way—that is, by experiencing 
them as sentiments of general humanity. As such, Hume’s taste-based ethics is a call to 
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cultivate an ability to be affected by remote sources of otherness without appropriating 
that affect, a lived ecological sensibility that might be moved by forces or 
communications it does not seek to own. This pre-Kantian mode of ethics is encoded in 
our everyday, immediate engagements, rather than our preparatory or belated linguistic 
representations.
9
 As we will see in the next section, rhetoricians influenced by Hume took 
on the task of educating this affectability or response-ability as a rhetorical one. Although 
they did not fully engage Hume’s expanded, affective view of communication or his view 
of taste as a simultaneously moral and aesthetic capacity, their treatments of taste 
indirectly mobilized and developed his connections between affect, communication, and 
ethics.  
Aesthetic Taste and the Transformation of Rhetorical Invention 
The Generativity of Reception 
Hume’s theory of taste and its associated conceptions of communication, sympathy, 
imagination, and vivacity greatly influenced rhetoric’s eighteenth-century uptake of 
aesthetic taste, particularly via Henry Home, Lord Kames (a distant cousin of Hume’s); 
George Campbell; and most especially, Hugh Blair. Following Hume, bellelettrist 
rhetoricians believed taste to have innate components, and yet to be amenable to cultural 
influence and formal instruction. With most eighteenth-century Scottish rhetoricians 
adopting the popular view of taste as an internal sense, the workings of this power were 
assumed to be largely inaccessible to conscious experience.
10
 Also in line with Hume, 
though it operated unconsciously in the moment, they believed taste could be instructed 
and improved via conscious reasoning, conversation, and practice in aesthetic criticism. 
Thus, Hugh Blair explained, the pleasure of a great poem “is felt or enjoyed by taste as an 
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internal sense; but the discovery of this conduct in the poem is owing to reason; and the 
more that reason enables us to discover such propriety in the conduct, the greater will be 
our pleasure” (19, emphasis added). For Blair, improving the sense of taste meant 
cultivating an online readiness for response that evokes Hawhee’s explication of mētis. 
Thus, in one of many comments that follows Hume’s essay “On the Standard of Taste” 
nearly word for word, Blair connects the improvement of aesthetic and physical 
capacities for response: “exercise is the chief source of improvement in all our faculties. 
This holds both in our bodily and in our mental powers.” (18). The significant 
consequence of this perspective on taste was that rhetorical instruction ultimately targeted 
a sense rather than reason—even though instructors regularly invited students to 
consciously reason about objects of art and nature, the ultimate goal was to develop a 
“quick and acute” mental sensibility that operated preconsciously.  
It is commonly noted that rhetoric’s eighteenth-century enthusiasm for taste 
substantially revised rhetorical instruction to target reception as well as production, and 
that it expanded the ends of rhetoric beyond persuasion to include such functions as 
entertaining and instructing. Whereas many have concluded that the classical canon of 
argumentative invention thereby fell out of the realm of rhetoric, others have objected. 
Thus, for instance, Beth Manolescu emphasizes that the aim of Lord Kames’ Principles 
of Criticism is to facilitate the invention of arguments about art, and not simply the 
reception of art. While Manolescu certainly identifies a key strain of argumentative 
invention in the Principles, I follow approaches such as Vincent M. Bevilacqua’s and 
Barbara Warnick’s (10-14) in resisting holding bellelettrists’ contributions to the 
rhetorical tradition to pre-authorized categories of rhetoric that, for instance, would limit 
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invention to the realm of argument in the first place. Proceeding in such a spirit, in what 
follows I suggest that we can discern among bellelettrists the beginnings of a new 
approach to invention, one that involves a play of production and reception and that aims 
at the invention not of arguments, but of affective and sensory realms of being.
11
  
Blair defined taste as “the power of receiving pleasure from the beauties of nature 
and of art” (16). In tracking how invention was reformulated in eighteenth-century 
discourse on taste, we should note that this “power of receiving” was not simply a matter 
of passive consumption, but was itself an active inventional practice. This was evident at 
one level in Kames’ discussion of “ideal presence.” For Kames, the exercise of taste in 
the realm of fictional arts immersed the audience in a vibrant imaginative world, offering 
“a perception of the object similar to what a real spectator hath” (I 74). As an 
accomplishment of great theater, texts, and paintings, ideal presence envelops auditors 
entirely in imaginative sensation: under its sway “we perceive every object as in our 
sight; and the mind, totally occupied with an interesting event, finds no leisure for 
reflection” (I 78). Whereas for Kames taste generated new, imaginative sensory worlds, 
Hume had taken taste’s inventive powers a step further. For Hume taste was also a 
productive power, but its productions impacted actual sensory worlds as well as 
imaginative ones. Thus Hume distinguished taste from what he saw as the merely passive 
power of reason: Reason, he declared, “discovers objects as they really stand in nature, 
without addition and diminution.” Taste, however, is a “productive faculty” which, 
“gilding or staining all natural objects with the colours, borrowed from internal 
sentiment, raises in a manner a new creation” (Enquiry, Appendix I). As such, taste 
generates a product that is difficult to locate in either the subjective or objective realm, 
59 
 
suggesting that it had a constitutive impact on the phenomenal realm of being that would 
be later elaborated by Immanuel Kant and Edmund Husserl. The exercise of taste 
generated not merely individual pleasures and perceptions, but entire sensory worlds, 
whether actual (as for Hume) or “merely” imaginative (as for Kames).12 The eighteenth-
century treatment of taste, then, prefigured the contemporary notion of the “sensorium” 
theorized by Marshall McLuhan, Walter Ong, and others. Rhetoric’s inventions were no 
longer just modes of argument, but modes of actual and possible being. 
But taste did not enter the realm of rhetoric only as a (generative) receptive 
capacity—it also made demands on rhetoric’s traditional domain of discursive 
production. Given the bellelettrist belief that “the public ear [has] become refined. It will 
not easily bear what is slovenly and incorrect” (Blair, 12), good speech demanded rich 
appeals to sensation. Appealing to British audiences’ new level of taste meant appealing 
to the imagination, for which purposes Hume’s notion of vivacity, or the liveliness of 
perception, was central: for Hume, impressions (which included sensations and 
sentiments) were the most vivacious of our perceptions, whereas ideas were faint, and the 
strength of one’s belief increased with the vivacity of one’s mental experience. For 
bellelettrist rhetoricians, vivacity was utterly essential to the practice of taste and the 
engagement of audience taste. This was evident in Kames’ notion of ideal presence. For 
Campbell, the orator’s challenge is to make his appeals to the imagination “resemble, in 
lustre and steadiness, those of sensation and remembrance” (103). And Blair, in his 
critical lectures, praises uses of language that appeal to sight and sound, celebrating 
works for “clothing abstract ideas, in some degree, with sensible colours” (218) and one 
work in particular for a “musical” use of the period that enabled “one of the most 
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melodious closes which our language admits” (217). Though efforts to achieve vivacity 
remained primarily visual and aural (and indeed Kames explicitly limited them thusly), 
the felt need to appeal to audiences’ tastes nonetheless marked a new importance for 
sensory appeal, expanding rhetoric’s constitutive function to the realm of sensation as 
well as that of character, emotion, and reason.  
Resonating with contemporary theorizations of rhetoric’s multidirectionality, the 
turn to taste not only revised rhetorical instruction to target reception as well as 
production, but also substantially entwined the positions of reception and production. 
Thus Kames introduced his Principles of Criticism to the king as a presentation of “those 
principles that ought to govern the taste of every individual” (I viii), suggesting a focus 
on audience receptivity. But shortly thereafter, he shifted attention to artistic production, 
asserting that his “chief aim” is “to establish practical rules for the fine arts, derived from 
principles previously established” (I 160). Likewise in Blair’s treatment, “the same 
instructions which assist [some] in composing will assist [others] in discerning, and 
relishing, the beauties of composition” (13).13 Whereas rhetorical receptivity, then, was 
itself generative, the productive work of rhetoric could not proceed without receptive 
attunement: to successfully appeal to audience taste, the rhetor himself must have good 
taste. Taste, as such, began to break apart the active/passive, production/criticism, and 
rhetor/audience distinctions in ways resonant with the contemporary affective turn.
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In sum, the receptive power of aesthetic taste marked an active, inventional 
articulation of rhetorical receptivity that composed entire sensory worlds, whether actual 
(as for Hume) or “merely” imaginative (as for Kames). As the goals and positions of 
rhetorical practices expanded under rhetoric’s attention to aesthetic taste, its operations 
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came to be understood as less conscious and less grounded in reason than was assumed 
when rhetoric was confined to the realm of argument. Resonant with Hawhee’s and 
Muckelbauer’s rereadings of the sophist, in the eighteenth century, too, rhetorical skill 
was expanded to the capacity to move and be moved in sensory and emotional ways. 
Moreover, to the extent that instructors of taste saw themselves as educating whole 
cultures (as many of their comments suggested), the sense of taste targeted by rhetorical 
instruction was not housed exclusively in an individual. Indeed, as I will suggest next, 
rhetorical instruction enrolled objects themselves in the project of taste education, 
situating rhetorical pedagogy to span entire human-nonhuman ecologies of taste.  
The “Glory” of Objects 
If audiences, artists, cultures, and taste itself were rethought as the complexly 
entwined agents and patients of invention, so also were natural and manmade objects.
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For Hume, breaking with Platonic aesthetics, beauty lay not in the object, but entirely in 
the mind. Particular objects, however, still had mysterious powers that afforded the 
experience of beauty. In their efforts to instruct tasteful production and consumption, 
rhetoricians greatly elaborated on how those powers might be attuned to, resonating with 
Bennett’s call for ecological sensibility.  
The rhetorical vitality afforded by bellelettrists to the nonhuman world was most 
directly evident in Kames’ study of gardening and architecture, which discusses in great 
detail the various powers of objects and spaces to elicit particular emotions, and the 
standards by which emotions ought to be elicited by these material arts. Gardens, for 
instance, can elicit not only “the emotions of beauty from regularity, order, proportion, 
colour, and utility” (II 432), but also “emotions of grandeur, of sweetness, of gaiety, of 
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melancholy, of wildness, and even of surprise or wonder” (II 432). Kames also figures 
nature itself as an inventive force meant to participate in aesthetic effects—the gardener, 
for instance, is advised to work with the existing forces of nature whom, “neglecting 
regularity, distributes her objects in great variety with a bold hand” (II 435).  
In aesthetic education efforts, objects were attributed rhetorical powers not only in 
their capacity to evoke pleasures, but also in their capacity to instruct audiences in better 
or worse taste. Thus Kames asserts that tasteful gardening and architecture both 
“contribute to the same end, by inspiring a taste for neatness and elegance” (II 485). 
What’s more, in the course of educating taste, landscape could in turn inculcate virtue. 
Thus,  
A field richly ornamented, containing beautiful objects of various kinds, displays 
in full lustre the goodness of the Deity . . . . The gaiety and harmony of mind it 
produceth, inclining the spectator to communicate his satisfaction to others, and to 
make them happy as he is himself, tend naturally to establish in him a habit of 
humanity and benevolence. (II 453) 
While maintaining an undoubtedly humanistic orientation to nonhuman vitality, the 
Scottish Enlightenment attention to the rhetorical powers of place nonetheless prefigures 
today’s new materialist focus on nonhuman vitality. Whereas Blair devoted most of his 
attention to writing and speech rather than the other arts, he closely echoed Kames in 
asserting that the natural and manmade objects of taste are the sources of “no less than all 
the pleasures of the imagination” (90). For Blair, “beauty is always conceived by us, as 
something residing in the object which raises the pleasant sensation; a sort of glory which 
dwells upon, and invests it” (53).16 As for Kames, then, objects of taste were attributed a 
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certain “glory” or rhetorical vitality. In promoting a cultivated attunement to nonhuman 
vitality as a part of rhetorical capacity, these rhetorical instructors evoke contemporary 
connections between rhetorical capacity and affectability—and also suggest a connection 
to be drawn between rhetorical affectability and the ecological sensibility discussed by 
Bennett.  
In bellelettrist rhetoric, nowhere was taste’s potential to host an ecological 
sensibility more evident than in the experience of the sublime. Thus Blair directs his 
audience to “the grandeur of earthquakes and burning mountains; of great conflagrations; 
of the boisterous ocean; of the tempestuous storm; of thunder and lightning; and of all the 
uncommon violence of the elements” (33). For Blair, communicating the sublime 
requires, first and foremost, being moved: one must have a “lively impression” and be 
“deeply affected, and warmed, by the sublime idea which he would convey” (39). This 
affectability enables the rhetor properly to deliver the object’s “glory”—a delicate task 
which requires working with the object to let it have its rhetorical effect, and above all to 
avoid undermining that effect. Hume’s view of taste as a mediator of communication thus 
was not only apparent in Blair’s and Kames’ treatments of taste, but also extended to 
affective communication with the world of natural and manmade objects.  
In the end, then, the introduction of taste into rhetorical instruction during the 
Scottish Enlightenment did not merely shift attention to reception, nor did it dispense 
with invention altogether. Rather, anticipating contemporary, affective theorizations of 
rhetoric, it opened new territory for conceiving invention as an ontologically generative 
process of emergence from an inextricable tangle of reception and production, where the 
distinction between active and passive positions of communicative flow breaks down. To 
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the extent that nonhuman powers entered the realm of rhetoric and rhetorical sensibility, 
the foundations can be discerned for a posthumanist conception of rhetorical invention, as 
well as a connection between rhetorical capacity and ecological sensibility.  
Aesthetic Taste and the Rhetoricity of Ethics 
The cultivation of taste was championed by eighteenth-century rhetoricians not merely as 
a means to increase the pleasures of life—it was also a means to stimulate ethical and 
civic being. While rhetoricians did not directly mobilize Hume’s view of ethical capacity 
as itself a kind of taste, they believed their instruction of aesthetic taste to have significant 
moral benefits. Thus, for instance, closely echoing Hume’s view of taste as corrected 
sympathy, Kames announced that from the imaginative state of ideal presence  
is derived that extensive influence which language hath over the heart; an 
influence, which, more than any other means, strengthens the bond of society, and 
attracts individuals from their private system to perform acts of generosity and 
benevolence . . . without it, the finest speaker or writer would in vain attempt to 
move any passion: our sympathy would be confined to objects that are really 
present; and language would lose entirely its signal power of making us 
sympathize with beings removed at the greatest distance of time as well as of 
place. (I 82) 
To the extent that the rhetorical capacity of taste included imaginative capacity, then, 
rhetoric anchored ethics itself. Furthermore, given that aesthetic taste, as I argued above, 
was connected to a sensory conception of the imagination, the path this rhetorical 
capacity forged between communication and ethics articulated in highly sensory terms. 
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The eighteenth-century project of connecting taste to ethics unsettled Platonic 
efforts to install reason at the seat of moral life, a development that was particularly 
significant for rhetoricians. Famously for Hobbes and Hume, the passions dominated 
over reason. And for many concerned with taste, sensation, craving, fantasy, and emotion 
were key drivers of human behavior. Lord Shaftesbury put succinctly how the concern 
for taste altered understandings of ethical being:  
‘Tis not merely what we call principle, but a taste which governs men . . . . they 
may believe ‘this a crime or that a sin; this punishable by man, or that by God’: 




Resonating with contemporary affective approaches from both Deleuzian and 
psychoanalytic traditions, people, Shaftesbury tells us, are driven not primarily by 
“principle,” but by “taste” or “the savour of things.” Blair echoes this affectively attuned 
approach to ethical life in his distinction between convincing—the province of 
philosophy—and persuading—the province of rhetoric: “I may be convinced,” he 
explains, “that virtue, justice, or public spirit, are laudable, while at the same time, I am 
not persuaded to act according to them” (262). The ethical and civic improvement of 
individuals and cultures depends upon intervening in habits of desire and inclination, a 
task that rhetorical education took on in alliance with taste.  
The cultivation of taste for its receptive and productive powers thus made taste an 
important site of virtue, but rhetoricians equally attacked it as a mechanism of vice. 
Resonating with later Marxist approaches to the paradoxical political powers of aesthetic 
taste, taste could be either a weakness (an opening into bad judgment) or a strength (an 
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opening into good judgment). Rhetorical instruction aimed to strengthen taste—and given 
its ethical and civic importance, the stakes were high in determining what this meant. By 
what standard was taste to be improved, given its apparently great variability? This 
question centrally occupied, even plagued, Enlightenment thinkers. With other 
empiricists, Hume wanted to debunk the Neo-Platonist view that beauty was an external 
property of objects available through reason. Since he nonetheless wanted to maintain 
that beauty is both real and true, the question of the standard was a tricky one. Rather 
than turning to principles of beauty, which he saw as too rigid, he turned to experiencers 
of beauty—those, that is, of “strong sense, united to delicate sentiment, improved by 
practice, perfected by comparison, and cleared of all prejudice.” It is the joint verdict of 
these ideal tasters that constitutes “the true standard of taste and beauty” (“Of the 
Standard” 837).18 Hume’s model, then, suggests that the true standards of taste could not 
be known intellectually, though they could be approximated in a lived way by “proper” 
enculturation. Rhetorical education, the means of this enculturation, was thus crucial, 
especially given “how early in life taste is susceptible of culture, and how difficult to 
reform it if unhappily perverted” (Blair 12).  
Implicit in fears of “perverted” taste was the concern for the loss of self-control 
that pervades the entire history of rhetoric. Thus, Blair announces, it is necessary to 
develop “the power of distinguishing false ornament from true, in order to prevent our 
being carried away by that torrent of false and frivolous taste, which never fails, when it 
is prevalent, to sweep along with it the raw and the ignorant” (12). Both evoking 
contemporary “viral” notions of rhetoric and echoing Plato’s worries about rhetoric, Blair 
here figures taste as an avenue by which one risks being “carried away” by the “false and 
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frivolous.” But Blair also locates the means of preventing this risk in taste itself. To some 
extent, this recalls The Republic’s assignment to rhetoric the task of coaxing the values of 
the philosopher-kings into the young via incantation. Like Plato’s proposal, the question 
here arises of how rhetorical instruction anchored in taste (and thus ultimately targeting 
sensation rather than reason), could avoid manifesting simply as brainwashing in 
aristocratic values. This is a concern I will return to in the next section. For now, it is 
important to note simply that rhetoric, located in the receptive/productive realm of 
affectability and response-ability, came to follow the logic of ethics: Rhetorical 
instruction was not a means to manipulate others as it was for Plato and Aristotle, but 
rather a means to develop the capacity to be moved by an other in the “right” ways. 
As a capacity for movement that resists the “false and frivolous,” the bellelettrist 
notion of taste may seem to repeat a Platonic ethics that condemns desire. Yet it is 
important to note that the aim of cultivating taste was not simply to rein in or transcend 
the appetites, as in Plato’s view of the just soul. On the contrary, the objective was to 
enrich the sensations, cravings, and desires that unavoidably animated human life: in 
Blair’s terms, the “exercise of taste and of sound criticism” will “increase our 
acquaintance with some of the most refined feelings which belong to our frame” (13). 
The power of taste was understood as a gift from the benign creator which “widely 
enlarged the sphere of the pleasure of human life” (23). To develop one’s capacity for the 
rich pleasures of taste—a pursuit Blair figures as a rhetorical one—was thus to both 
develop as a human and pay respectful tribute to God. Cultivating taste, as such, was not 
a way to repress desire, but rather a means to nuance and enlarge it, in a Stoic logic that 
anticipated Friedrich Nietzsche’s view of human thriving. 
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In sum, rhetoric’s eighteenth-century foray into taste gave way to a notably 
emotional and sensuous approach to ethics, one that immersed ethical judgment in the 
everyday communicative flow of affect rather than removing it to the throne of reason. 
To the extent that taste mediated affective flow, rhetorical education achieved a new, 
sensory and affective articulation as preparation for moral and civic capability. Given that 
taste, as Hume suggested, was the mental capacity for expanding one’s imaginative 
range, its cultivation offered a means to extend sympathy beyond one’s own experience, 
to open oneself up to impersonal passion—in brief, to support an ecological affectability, 
an attunement to the rhetorical vitality of people and things. Finally, aesthetic taste 
emerged as a rhetorical capacity of both individuals and societies that mediated the 
communicative flow of affect by organizing powers and habits of sensation, sentiment, 
desire, and judgment. Rhetoric’s ethical subject came to be not just a speaking and 
thinking subject, but also a feeling subject—and more than that, a capacity for feeling 
that exceeded singular subjectivities. 
Conclusion 
Despite the theoretical and practical innovations enabled by the Scottish Enlightenment 
celebration of taste, that celebration failed to escape a serious worry that holds for 
gustatory modes of aesthetic taste at least as much as other modalities: the problem of 
elitism. Indeed, the entire Enlightenment discourse on taste has been extensively 
criticized as a troublesome site of pretension, discrimination, and social exclusion. 
Richard Shusterman, for instance, has argued that by Kant and Hume alike, the standards 
of taste were “accorded the status of natural and necessary facts rather than seen as the 
contingent and alterable product of social dynamics and history” (92). Not only did Hume 
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and Kant naturalize taste by appeal to universal principles of human nature, both also 
emphasized alternative taste as “not merely different but diseased or unnatural” (92). For 
R.G. Saisselin, “The man of taste was an aristocrat in spirit if not by race, and the 
judgment of taste was aristocratic rather than democratic, for it was not founded upon the 
likes or dislikes of a majority” (64-5). This held even for Blair, who wanted to locate the 
standard of taste in “the common feelings of men,” and yet excluded outliers on the basis 
that anyone who “should maintain that sugar was bitter and tobacco was sweet . . . .would 
infallibly be held to be diseased” (960). Taste, then, may have been rendered a 
fascinating opening onto ethical being, but it was also practiced as a powerful vehicle for 
normalization. 
Concerns such as these have led some to dismiss taste as a hopelessly elitist mode 
of politics and ethics. For sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, the worry falls specifically to 
gustatory taste, which he understands as a means for individuals to perform and 
accumulate cultural capital, thereby reinforcing class difference. Yet all the same, 
Bourdieu worries that taste cannot be escaped as a modality of political power. Certainly 
today gustatory taste increasingly functions to bifurcate “high” and “low” food cultures, 
not only exacerbating differences in cultural capital, but also propagating nutritional 
disparity. In responding to this reality, we might consider Terry Eagleton’s assessment of 
the paradox of Scottish Enlightenment aesthetics: according to Eagleton, the 
Enlightenment enthusiasm for taste on the one hand dispersed ideological power across 
individuals and invited the participation of “all,” suggesting a positive potential for taste 
as a mode of political and ethical growth. Yet on the other hand, Enlightenment 
aestheticians licensed the powers that be to encode aesthetic ideologies into bodies in the 
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first place—a limitation particularly present in Hume, who turns to the state as an 
apparently legitimate institution to stage the cultivation of taste.
19
 
This tension of democratic potential and oppressive risk succinctly characterizes 
the problem with the Scottish Enlightenment logics of taste and the paradoxes that I will 
suggest continue to haunt taste-based modes of ethics, citizenship, and activism today. 
However, as my explication in this chapter suggests, Scottish Enlightenment thinkers 
offered many of the conceptual means for grappling with the dilemma of taste, even 
though they did not themselves escape it. First, they established taste as an unavoidable 
driver of political and ethical life. Understood as such, taste disturbs models of civic 
being premised on rational deliberation (those, for instance, subsequently offered by Kant 
and Habermas). If we follow Scottish Enlightenment rhetoricians, we must not simply 
situate rational deliberation over and against taste. On the contrary, we must take 
seriously Shaftesbury’s assertion that it is not reason alone, but also a “savour of things” 
which “governs men.” Any form of self-government, of political being, must offer a 
deeper engagement with this “savour of things” than a dismissal or displacement in favor 
of reason. As the work of Scottish Enlightenment rhetoricians suggests, a fuller model of 
civic engagement, one both more effective and more ethical, would not treat taste as 
something to be reined in by reason. Rather it would embrace taste as a fundamental part 
of human-nonhuman life, one to be inhabited in more critical ways—ways which involve 
the participation of reason, to be sure, but do not entail its despotism. It is difficult to 
cultivate and maintain critical relationships with our beliefs, desires, and habits, and 
perhaps especially so in matters of taste, given “how early in life taste is susceptible of 
culture, and how difficult to reform it if unhappily perverted” (Blair 12). But this does not 
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mean that efforts at critical enactments of taste should not be pursued. The question, 
rather, is how to find a better mode of criticality than that offered by Scottish 
Enlightenment thinkers.  
Instructive in such a project is the affective tenor of Scottish Enlightenment 
thought that was itself inspired by the enthusiasm for taste. As I have argued, eighteenth-
century treatments of aesthetic taste invited a distributed, material rethinking of political 
power that contemporary affect theory has elaborated. Hume’s theory of taste and its 
eighteenth-century developments in rhetorical pedagogy resonate with contemporary 
affective views of power that resist simplistic, binary approaches to political change, 
recognizing rhetorical power to operate in viral formations that both shape and are shaped 
by habits of sensing, thinking, and feeling. The perspectives on taste developed by 
eighteenth-century rhetoricians also begin to acknowledge the active public role of 
environments and things, anticipating efforts spanning from Karl Marx to Bruno Latour 
to register and engage the political vitality of nonhuman forces. As such, the Scottish 
Enlightenment treatment of taste situated rhetorical instruction at a powerful point of 
intervention not simply in individual response-abilities, but in the response-abilities of 
larger ecologies of ever-evolving human and nonhuman forces. Perhaps most 
significantly, in his focus on the orientations we cultivate with others, his encouragement 
that we learn to touch the complex networks of human being, Hume’s program in 
particular shares a concern for rhetorical receptivity expressed in today’s calls for 
ecological sensibility and attentive, visceral engagements with otherness (e.g., Bennett, 
Connolly, Rickert, Lipari, Davis).  
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Despite these remarkable theoretical reformulations, however, the bellelettrist 
movement ultimately contained the potential of taste to disrupt understandings, flows, 
and formations of communicative affect that were exclusionary and oppressive. In the 
fervor to discover a standard of taste to ground judgment, bellelettrists overlooked the 
inventional potential of taste that they themselves gestured toward. An embrace of taste 
as first and foremost a site for generating new and unpredictable relations with humans 
and nonhumans would have nudged taste away from a rigid, transcendental kind of 
judgment, and toward a more immanent style of judgment, one immersed in sensuous 
worlds of human-nonhuman contact. In locating the standard of taste in hypothetical 
tasters rather than in the object or in any external principles, Hume moved toward such 
immanence, but his commitment to the notion of ideal tasters, ideal conditions for 
evaluation, judgment remained largely transcendental. The commitment to a standard of 
taste, furthermore, prevented bellelettrists from giving self-critical attention to the 
exclusionary cultures of taste they were helping to create. The quest for a standard, that 
is, distracted from theorizing taste’s connections to power. A final limitation was that the 
discourse on aesthetic taste retreated from a focus on the sensuous dimensions of 
aesthetics. Originally meant to suggest corporeal sensuousness itself, aesthetics was 
turned toward allegedly “higher” senses, such as the sense for beauty. As I have 
suggested here, Scottish thinkers, especially Hume, did not fully break with the bodily 
realm of aesthetics. But in positing bodily experience as a more lowly realm of human 
life, a realm hosting a lesser kind of taste at best, Scottish Enlightenment thinkers 
reinforced elitism: since taste applied the “high” arts rather than the lowly occupations 
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(or knacks) of, say, cooking, its cultivation as a civic, ethical, and rhetorical power 
excluded the “common man” from the beginning.  
To the extent that taste instruction offered a point of intervention in the habitual 
distributions of affect, it might have been mobilized to rework eighteenth-century 
distributions of political power in complex, non-dialectical ways. What’s more, the 
connective it offered to the vitality of objects and environments had the potential to do so 
at materially and ecologically attuned levels. But instructors in taste did not take up the 
transformative potential of taste education, instead containing the ethical and political 
power of taste to classical views of virtue that were rigid, exclusionary, and elitist. In the 
next chapter, I turn to an intellectual and political tradition that did seek to tap the 
potential of taste and sensation to transform material structures of human and nonhuman 
domination: the discourse on “sensory emancipation” that can be traced from Friedrich 
Schiller through Karl Marx and the Frankfurt School thinkers Theodor Adorno and Max 
Horkheimer. This discourse, like the Scottish Enlightenment one, treated aesthetic taste 
as both a rhetorical capacity and a potential rhetorical weakness, but it interrogated that 
capacity as a modality of political change in ways that Scottish Enlightenment thinkers 
conspicuously avoided. Furthermore, this discourse marked a return to the original 
sensory realm of aesthetics, inviting the possibility that the senses could be cultivated by 
all, could be emancipated on the whole, and not just by an elite few. In the process, 
sensation itself further emerged as an ethically and politically significant capacity. The 
Marxist attention to political power and structures of domination transformed the taste 
into not simply a critical capacity, but also a capacity for critique—for registering and 
reworking problematic flows of power. The sensory treatment of taste invited by Marx 
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and critical theory, moreover, shifted away from a transcendental style of judgment and 
toward an immersive, sensuous, and immanent practice of judgment. The currently 
undertreated discourse on sensory emancipation is thus a crucial installment in the 



























 The traditions of psychoanalysis and feminist thought have also been absolutely crucial, 
but for the purposes of this chapter, which elucidates a Deleuzian/Spinozan mode of 
affect in Scottish Enlightenment thought, I confine my brief treatment of the affect turn to 
its Deleuzian dimensions. 
2
 Important exceptions are Donovan Conley’s Pre/Text article, “The Good Body, Skilled 
in Eating,” which similarly defends a materialist reading of David Hume, and political 
scientist Marc Hanvelt’s book-length study, The Politics of Eloquence: David Hume’s 
Polite Rhetoric. See also Hanvelt’s article, “Polite Passionate Persuasion: Hume’s 
Conception of Rhetoric.” 
3
 Adam Smith distinguished “moral sense” from “moral sentiment” theorists, implying 
Hume belonged in the latter category. See McAteer for a discussion of the distinction. 
4
 While the bodily analogy guides his analysis of delicacy, Hume, like most seventeenth- 
and eighteenth-century aesthetic theorists, does not discuss how gustatory taste might be 
cultivated, and he treats “mental” or “aesthetic” taste as superior, reliant for its cultivation 
on a full range of factors, including practice, comparative reasoning, and lack of 
prejudice. However, as I will argue later in this chapter, the bodily senses nonetheless 
snuck back in to the eighteenth century treatment of aesthetic taste. 
5
 In this rendering of Humean sympathy, I follow Neil Saccamano’s compelling 
argument that for Hume sympathetic communication marks the adoption of impersonal 
sentiments rather than, as has often been assumed, the adoption of a sentiment owned by 
another person: Sympathy, Saccamano says, “underwrites the disinterested sociality of 
judgments of taste for Hume not by enabling the spectator to feel a pleasure that 
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corresponds to the owner’s pleasure in beauty but rather by rendering this pleasure as a 
sentiment that does not originally belong to anyone and does not exist prior to its 
sympathetic communication” (37). Such a reading of Hume situates his sympathetic 
communication alongside contemporary Deleuzian views of affective communication. 
6
 Hume says that sympathy “is nothing but the conversion of an idea into an impression 
by the force of imagination” (Treatise 427). He elaborates: “However instantaneous this 
change of the idea into an impression may be, it proceeds from certain views and 
reflections, which will not escape the strict scrutiny of a philosopher, though they may 
the person himself, who makes them” (Treatise 317). 
7
 Hume also refers to corrected sympathy as “extended” or “general” sympathy. 
8
 Here, Hume is specifically discussing moral beauty, which he sees as a species of 
beauty also made available by the faculty of taste. 
9
 However, see Gina Ercolini’s essay, “Ethics Improper: The Embodied Ethics of Kant’s 
Anthropology” for a treatment of the “improper” ethics of Kant’s anthropological 
writings, which engages taste in the setting of the banquet, offered a far more bodily and 
mundane articulation of ethics than the Critique of Judgment. 
10
 Edmund Burke was an exception in rejecting the internal sense view of taste (Dolph 
108). 
11
 This is not at all to say that I do not bring preexisting categories to my reading—quite 
the contrary, I explicitly conduct my reading of bellelettrists from the perspective of 




                                                                                                                                                 
12
 As later chapters will make clear, the imagination connects to ontological work in 
important ways, since it generates the conditions for possible worlds. 
13
 Some have argued that the assumption that the mechanisms of rhetorical production 
and reception were similar was to the detriment of rhetorical education in the eighteenth 
century and beyond. For my purposes, whether or not that was the case, the fact that it 
occurred is testament to the power of taste to multiply the directionality of rhetoric and 
pedagogy. 
14
 It is worth noting that Blair distinguishes taste, “the power of judging,” from genius, 
“the power of executing,” and considers genius a higher rhetorical power (“necessary to 
form the poet, or the orator”) (21). But he is emphatic that despite the native aspects of 
genius, it can be developed through the improvement of taste. 
15
 For more on the vitalistic dimensions of Enlightenment thought, see, e.g., Byron 
Hawk’s A Counter-history of Composition: Toward Methodologies of Complexity, and 
Catherine Packham’s Eighteenth-Century Vitalism: Bodies, Culture, Politics, and Peter 
Hanns Reill’s Vitalizing Nature in the Enlightenment. 
16
 Here Blair seems to stray from Hume’s insistence that beauty lies only in the mind, and 
not at all in the object. For Hume, there must be qualities in the object that makes it 
appear beautiful, but beauty is itself a sentiment. Though the beautiful object is a 
mysterious product of the exercise of taste. 
17
 Advice to an Author Char. II, 265; see also Char. 1, 122, 207, 11, 278, note (cf. 
Townsend 31-2). 
18
 Many have objected to this line of reasoning as circular in a variety of ways—for 
instance, to identify these rare few, Hume appeals to both enduring works of beauty and 
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the principles of the day. One of the qualifications is also experience with beautiful 
objects, but these objects can’t be identified except through appeal to “true” taste in the 
first place. From my perspective, Hume’s standard is necessarily circular, since it defines 
a relational property. In other words, Hume is drawn to ideal tasters not simply because it 
is too hard to articulate a principle of beauty, but because bodily human experience is a 
condition of beauty in the first place—because beauty is emergent in the phenomenal 
space where an object is “gilded” with a subject. Moreover, the encounter is central to the 
emergence of taste at a broader social level as well as an individual one—as Alessandra 
Stradella has argued, and we will see when we get to Hume on extended sympathy, 
beauty is a private sentiment which is corrected by taste, the province of the social. 
19
 As potential avenues for taste education, Hume cites “the artifice of politicians, who, in 
order to govern men more easily, and preserve peace in human society, have endeavour’d 
to produce an esteem for justice, and an abhorrence of injustice” (Treatise 500). and 
private education, where parents are “induc’d to inculcate on their children, from their 
earliest infancy, the principles of probity, and teach them to regard the observance of 
those rules, by which society is maintain’d, as worthy and honourable, and their violation 
as base and infamous. By this means the sentiments of honour may take root in their 
tender minds, and acquire such firmness and solidity, that they may fall little short of 
those principles, which are the most essential to our natures, and the most deeply 








The flaws of Marx and Marxism have been often sung by those associated with the turn 
to “new” modes of materialism. Joining other poststructuralists, for instance, Bruno 
Latour has criticized the Hegelian elements of Marx’s historical materialism, including 
his often dialectical and teleological version of history (by which capitalism was destined 
to provoke its own overcoming), as well as his sometimes essentialist view of human 
nature (by which the communist revolution would enable the emancipation of man into a 
more fully human mode of sensing, believing, producing, and being in the world). Latour 
has further objected to the scientific spirit of historical materialism, focused as it was on 
developing a “a science of politics instead of the total transformation of what it means to 
do politics (so as to include nonhumans)” (“Compositionist” 479). Reading Marx’s 
notion of commodity fetishism as a thesis about the misleading appearances of material 
life under capitalism, Latour also criticizes historical materialism for an idealism by 
which scientific demystification is the central strategy for inciting political change.
1
 
Adopting a similar understanding of Marx’s critique of commodities, Jane Bennett 
charges that critical theory’s associated method of demystification “presumes that at the 
heart of any event or process lies a human agency that has illicitly been projected onto 
things” (xiv). Like Latour, Bennett worries that the exposé-style approach of 




For Bennett and Latour, the project of new materialism is to “advocate for the 
vitality of matter,” as Bennett puts it, to learn to respond to the call of the nonhuman, as 
Latour often puts it, and to rework our politics accordingly. Like Bennett and Latour, 
Thomas Rickert renders this project in rhetorical terms, noting that “things make claims 
on us” in ways that we must learn to register (229). “Why advocate for the vitality of 
matter?” Bennett asks. Her answer is that she suspects that in the modern world, 
the image of dead or thoroughly instrumentalized matter feeds human hubris and 
our earth-destroying fantasies of conquest and consumption. It does so by 
preventing us from detecting (seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, feeling) a fuller 
range of the nonhuman powers circulating around and within human bodies. (ix)  
As Bennett frames it, a new materialist approach opens the way to a richer environmental 
ethic—an ethic whereby things are not simply inert vessels for human agency—objects, 
in Heidegger’s terms—but vital agents with trajectories all their own. This sort of ethic, 
Bennett suggests here, demands a difficult but important change in our sensibilities—we 
must learn to see, hear, smell, taste, and feel things differently if we want to better 
connect to their vitality.  
Taking our cue from Bennett and Latour, it is indeed crucial to be able to locate 
the humanist and determinist assumptions that Marx’s early thought inherits from Hegel, 
as well as where Marx hangs on to notions of objective truth (failing, for instance, to see 
science itself as ideological, and defining ideology in terms of false consciousness). We 
also must note that, led by Bennett, Latour, and Rickert, among others, today’s new 
materialisms offer a view of nonhuman vitality and of the inherently prosthetic, 
nonhuman character of human life that is richer and more explicit than we can find in 
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Marx’s work alone. But efforts to establish the “newness” of today’s materialisms 
sometimes neglect the tools that Marx himself offered for attending critically to 
nonhuman vitality and its penetration of human life, as well as his crucial suggestions 
regarding the social and environmental significance of doing so. Moreover, the emphasis 
on nonhuman vitality can sometimes turn us too far away from human vitality. In the 
spirit of new materialism, Bennett asserts the following: 
It is important to follow the trail of human power to expose social hegemonies (as 
historical materialists do). But my contention is that there is also a public value in 
following the scent of a nonhuman, thingly power, the material agency of natural 
bodies and technological artifacts. (xiii) 
Whereas Bennett helpfully focuses on the latter task, “following the scent of a nonhuman, 
thingly power,” this need not be done at the expense of the former one—and indeed, to 
the extent that human and nonhuman are entwined, we ought not always separate these 
two tasks at all. Retrieving Marx’s own vitalist and posthumanist views, as well as their 
development in Frankfurt School thought, offers a way into conceiving and practicing an 
integrated analysis of and attunement to human-nonhuman power.  
Embarking on such a project, then, we must recognize first and foremost that 
Marx’s materialism was a new materialism in its own right, with vitalist dimensions that 
many recent scholars have noted.
2
 In his dissertation, Marx defended Epicurean 
materialism as “dynamic” (Rose 75). And in German Ideology and the Theses on 
Feuerbach which preceded it, Marx and Engels objected to materialisms from the 
ancients to Feuerbach for maintaining a mechanical determinism by which an objective, 
nonhuman realm of matter (e.g., atoms, forces, substance) undergirded human bodies and 
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minds. This view had inert matter determining humans, rather that recognizing how 
matter is always already imbricated with humans. Thus while Marx and Engels lauded 
Feuerbach’s insistence, contra Hegel, that we must focus on sensuous life in thinking of 
history, they objected that Feuerbach treated sensuous life as an objective, given realm of 
nature cut off from the human, rather than realizing how nature was run through with 
human forces (an objection to be discussed at the beginning of the next chapter). Marx’s 
diagnosis of the problems and potentials of capitalism and his vision for a communist 
revolution elaborated the political significance of the entwined fates of human and 
nonhuman forces. These political takes on the vitality of matter can inform the newer 
materialisms of Latour, Bennett, and others, and can guide rhetoric’s increasing 
engagement with such approaches. 
This chapter argues that, as for Scottish Enlightenment thinkers, the discourse on 
aesthetic education and sensory emancipation that began with Friedrich Schiller and 
extended through Marx and the Frankfurt School elicited vitalist and posthumanist 
currents of thought. Moreover, this discourse offered a theorization of power and a 
political framing for aesthetic education that the Enlightenment discourse had 
emphatically lacked. These Marxist elaborations, then, can be incorporated into the 
rhetorical tradition as complications of the Enlightenment view of taste as a rhetorical 
capacity. They can also inform a contemporary materialist theorization of sensory 
rhetoric. As I will establish, although Marx and the Frankfurt School offer little explicit 
engagement with rhetoric per se, they depict both aesthetic taste and sensory power as 
rhetorical capacities that could harbor critical and resistant modes of being and connect 
people with nonhuman vitality, thereby eliciting human and worldly thriving. In their 
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rendering, sensory and aesthetic dispositions were cast, on the one hand, as rhetorical 
deficiencies—weaknesses in critical and experiential capacity engendered under 
Enlightenment and capitalist dominions—and, on the other hand, as rhetorical powers 
capable of eliciting resistance and liberation. They pointed the way toward an immanent, 
sensory modality of critique that could enhance the environmentalist project of new 
materialism discussed above. 
In what follows I first consider Marx’s call for the emancipation of the senses as it 
developed from Schiller’s vision of aesthetic education. I argue that Marx’s 
phenomenological view of sensation supported an immanent, human-nonhuman notion of 
emancipation and, accordingly, of rhetorical power and its relation to political change. I 
then trace the legacy of aesthetic education and sensory emancipation in Frankfurt School 
thinkers Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer. Together, I will argue, the posthumanist 
reformulation of emancipation enabled by Marx, Adorno, and Horkheimer points toward 
an approach to emancipatory critique that exceeds the intellectual operations Bennett and 
Latour associate with demystification.  
Aesthetic Education and the Project of Emancipation 
With Friedrich Schiller, the Enlightenment project of aesthetic education was turned to 
explicitly political ends. With ethical and social thriving at the forefront of his scholarly 
inquiries, Schiller deployed Kant’s moral theory while developing the attention to 
sensibility that he believed Kant neglected. His On the Aesthetic Education of Man, 
published as a series of letters in 1795, asserts “it is only through Beauty that man makes 
his way to Freedom” (Letter 2). Cultivating aesthetic taste, the letters argue, does not just 
assist ethical development and social justice, but is necessary for it. For Schiller, the 
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specialization of roles under the modern state has led to a situation with “not merely 
individuals, but whole classes of people, developing but one part of their potentialities, 
while of the rest, as in stunted growths, only vestigial traces remain” (Letter 6).3 In 
Schiller’s vision, a “form drive” toward the universal, abstract, and rational and a 
“sensuous drive” toward the particular, concrete, and sensual, can, through the cultivation 
of aesthetic sensibility, be brought into balance in a “play drive.”  
Following Schiller, Marx too connected freedom with aesthetic capacity and 
envisioned aesthetics as a part of a fuller human life.
4
 Yet Marx located emancipation in 
the realm of sensation itself, rather than in a realm such as Schiller’s “play” that would 
mediate between sensation and reason. Schiller, like the Enlightenment thinkers before 
him, saw sensation as fundamentally characterized by this sort of necessity.
5
 For Marx, 
sensation was indeed problematic when turned to “crude practical need” alone, but it was 
not fundamentally characterized by such need (Manuscripts n.p.). Instead Marx, in his 
“new” materialist orientation, saw sensation as a potential site of human thriving, the 
gateway to a visceral, vibrant engagement with things. What’s more, Marx rejected 
Schiller’s Kantian view that “art could represent a non-alienated area outside production 
which was simply able to educate man to a realm beyond his alienated state” (Rose 74). 
As such, Marx treats not only the high arts that concerned Enlightenment conceptions of 
aesthetics, but also the more fundamental (and commonly accessible) realm of aesthetics 
evoked in Baumgarten’s original use of the term—everyday sensory experience.  
Marx’s connection of sensation and emancipation is most elaborated in his early 
work, The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. As he asserts here and 
elsewhere, both the forms of sensation and the forms of material things are not natural but 
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historically constituted, conditioned by an era’s reigning mode of production. 
Specifically, he announces: “The cultivation of the five senses is the work of all previous 
history” (n.p.).6 Marx lamented that via private property—itself an historically contingent 
material form—capitalism had ushered in a dulling of the senses: “Private property has 
made us so stupid and one-sided,” he laments, “that an object is only ours when we have 
it—when it exists for us as capital, or when it is directly possessed, eaten, drunk, worn, 
inhabited, etc.,—in short, when it is used by us” (n.p.). Private property, for Marx, had 
relegated humans’ relations with objects to relations purely of possession and 
consumption, of brute exploitation. As such, man had come to a state of profound sensory 
impoverishment: “In place of all physical and mental senses,” the era of capitalism brings 
“the sheer estrangement of all these senses [by] the sense of having” (n.p.). For Marx, 
humans engage with things through both “physical senses”—sight, sound, smell, etc.—
and “mental senses”—which include desire, love, care, and the sense of “having.” These 
many powers, when practiced and cultivated, potentially enable vibrant, intimate 
connections with things, and consequently with other humans. Yet, Marx believed, with 
the rise of the material form of private property, people had become habituated to engage 
things through only the single, limited “sense of having.” The overturning of private 
property that Marx envisioned in the onset of communism promised to emancipate the 
heretofore oppressed senses and to reconnect people with things.  
Marx’s vision of sensory emancipation provocatively gestures toward the political 
potential of rhetorical training based on bodily responsiveness. Yet, since Michel 
Foucault transformed our understanding of power, the logic of emancipation has been 
rigorously called into question. A Foucaultian perspective suggests that the project of 
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emancipation assumes a repressive view of power by which concentrated, rigid structures 
oppress individuals from the top down. This overlooks the productive, local character of 
power. As Foucault’s life work testifies, power’s fluid, multi-directional, and ever-
morphing constellations cannot be simplified into any binary, top-down, 
oppressor/oppressed configuration. To neglect the always multiple and changing 
character of power in seeking political change risks never really changing anything. 
Moreover, on an emancipatory logic, so the objection goes, the overcoming of these 
oppressive forces tends to be imagined as an escape into some pure, unadulterated realm 
of human spirit. Such a dream situates the unfettered human mind at the center of power, 
overlooking the contingent historicity of human being as well as the fundamental 
imbrications of human and nonhuman forces.  
Marx, especially via Hegel’s early influence, at times engages essentialist logics 
and repressive, binary views of power, yet as will be apparent shortly, in turning to 
sensation as a site of critique, he troubled these logics and significantly reworked the 
notion of emancipation. Unlike typical liberationist projects that target individuals or 
human powers, the aspiration to emancipate the senses produces an immanent sense of 
emancipation that aims to alter the flow of human and nonhuman forces in ways more 
conducive to mutual thriving. From a material perspective, new material modalities 
become possible, and from the perspective of human experience, an enhanced capacity to 
respond to the unpredictable and a commitment to perpetual becoming take root.  
Complicating Emancipation 
Marx’s vision of the emancipation of the senses is summed up in the following dense 
passage from the Manuscripts, which I will continue to unpack throughout this section: 
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The abolition [Aufhebung] of private property is therefore the complete 
emancipation of all human senses and qualities, but it is this emancipation 
precisely because these senses and attributes have become, subjectively and 
objectively, human. The eye has become a human eye, just as its object has 
become a social, human object—an object made by man for man. The senses have 
therefore become directly in their practice theoreticians. They relate themselves 
to the thing for the sake of the thing, but the thing itself is an objective human 
relation to itself and to man . . . and vice versa. Need or enjoyment have 
consequently lost its egotistical nature, and nature has lost its mere utility by use 
becoming human use. (n.p.) 
At face value, this characterization of emancipation appears strikingly guilty of the sort of 
humanism often associated with emancipatory projects. For instance, with the onset of 
communism, Marx predicts, “the eye [will become] a more human eye, just as its object 
[will become] a social, human object—an object made by man for man” (n.p.). Yet we 
must note that Marx was outlining his view of sensory emancipation at a time when he 
had not yet broken with Hegel’s humanism. In the Theses on Feuerbach that follow the 
Manuscripts, this break will become far more clear. There, Marx insists “the human 
essence is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In its reality it is the ensemble 
of social relations” (Thesis IV, Marx-Engels Reader 145). Humanness, that is, is 
something that is performed into being over historical time, and its performance 
necessarily relies on engagements with the material world.  
What then would it mean for the eye to become more human? Part of the answer 
comes in the Manuscripts, where Marx previews the more explicit anti-humanist claims 
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that will emerge in the Theses and later works. Here he declares that “plants, animals, 
stones, air, light, etc., constitute . . . a part of human life and human activity” (n.p.). As 
such, “Nature is man’s inorganic body” (n.p.). It is so both in that nature is “his direct 
means of life,” and “the material, the object, and the instrument of his life activity” (n.p.). 
Resonating with posthumanist views like those of Bennett, Rickert, and Stormer, what 
Marx here offers is not just a fundamentally performative theory of human being, but also 
a fundamentally prosthetic one. As humans, we are prosthetic through and through—
humanness only comes into being in our engagement with material things—with plants, 
animals, stones, air, light, as well as with machines, possessions, commodities, and so on. 
The Manuscripts’ attention to sensation and to the political powers of material form, 
then, was prompting a deconstruction of Hegel’s humanism, with the notion of the 
“social” subtly stepping in to replace that of the “human.” Through Marx’s conception of 
the “social,” we can ultimately read the Manuscripts’ project of sensory liberation as 
aiming not toward a more human world, but toward a vibrant entwining of human and 
nonhuman forces.  
Sensory and Material Form 
This posthumanist strain in Marx emanates at least in part from the complex 
phenomenological view of sensation set forth in the Manuscripts. In Marx’s framework, 
the senses do not simply connect humans to things, but participate in the very constitution 
of things—that is, an era’s sensory forms shape its material forms. Thus “To the eye an 
object comes to be other than it is to the ear, and the object of the eye is another object 
than the object of the ear” (n.p.). What Marx is getting at is most apparent when our 
senses give us contradictory information. A corked wine, for instance, manifests as a 
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quite different object to our eye than to our nose. Thus Marx says, “the peculiarity of 
each [sense] is precisely its peculiar essence, and thus also the peculiar mode of its 
objectification, of its objectively real, living being” (n.p.).7 In other words, each sense 
circumscribes or zones the possible articulations of an object: the unique power of vision 
creates the possibility for visible objects to manifest, that of hearing enables audible 
objects, and so on. Each sensory form gives way to a particular modality of living being, 
a particular form of material reality. Because the human senses and their acuities are 
historically contingent, the very existence and vibrancy of certain object modalities in a 
given historical era—visible objects, for instance, or audible objects, and so on—is itself 
at stake in our sensory capacities. Marx’s view, then, that the multiple, varied senses 
developed by “work of all history” are being dulled and displaced by the single sense of 
having, suggests that the material world itself is increasingly inhabited by a single, 
homogenous material form—private property—and, attendant to this, a single kind of 
relation to objects—consumption (either possession or literal consumption). 
The ontological generativity of sensation works both ways: sensation is shaped by 
an era’s available material forms just as objects are shaped by its available sensory forms. 
Marx expresses this in terms of music: “only music awakens in man the sense of music” 
(n.p.). Music, that is, can “only exist for me insofar as my essential power [sense] exists 
for myself as a subjective capacity” (n.p.). Marx also speaks of good theatre and fine 
minerals as sites where material forms “awaken” sensory forms. Marx’s attention to the 
power of objects to shape sensation brings him to a key conclusion, one that presses 
toward a rejection of humanism: “Only through the objectively unfolded richness of 
man’s essential being is the richness of subjective human sensibility . . . either cultivated 
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or brought into being” (n.p.). Human being and thriving, to the extent that it relies on the 
practice of sensation, is fundamentally a matter of an era’s available sensory and material 
fields, the modalities of being-with available to people and things alike. For instance, the 
sensory experience that comprises human thriving—“a musical ear, an eye for beauty of 
form—in short, senses capable of human gratification, senses affirming themselves as 
essential powers of man”—is zoned by an era’s available material forms (n.p.). As such, 
human (sensory) thriving is entangled with material thriving, and things emerge as vital, 
world-building agents in their own right. This is a new materialist note in Marx that also 
nuances contemporary new materialism by emphasizing the complementary world-
building powers of both sensory form (which tends to be Jane Bennett’s focus, for 
instance) and material form (which tends to be Rickert’s focus): both, Marx suggests, are 
world-building powers, two sides of the same coin.  
Alienation 
Given this ontology, then, Marx’s diagnosis of alienation and his vision for 
emancipation are discernible from two angles—that of sensation and that of material 
form. Considered from the perspective of material form, Marx’s diagnosis is most 
familiar in his later and better-known work, which, taking a slightly different angle, 
highlights the form of the commodity, rather than private property, as the significant, 
world-shaping material form of the capitalist era. Thus, in Volume 1 of Capital, Marx 
argues that under the capitalist mode of production, matter took the commodity form—or 
was “fetishized” as a commodity—when its quantifiable market value was naturalized 
onto it, as what it really was and what moved it, rather than its qualitative relevance to 
humans—its use value and value as a product of labor. The value of the fetishized 
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commodity, in other words, materialized exclusively as its market behavior, where it 
related to money and to other commodities, and not to its human producers or users. In 
this way, the commodity entirely co-opted and enacted the social relations among 
humans that gave it its existence and life in the first place—relations among workers, 
capitalists, and consumers. For this reason Marx characterized the commodity as having 
acquired “grotesquely” human-like aspects (here he speaks of a table being made to stand 
upon its head and think). Meanwhile, the laborer had become alienated in relation to the 
commodity because it had robbed him of his real social relations. The upshot of this 
alienation was a loss of sociability—the only sociability a laborer could experience was 
through material movements dictated by capitalists and encoded into machines, rather 
than a more involved, experimental engagement with the products of those movements, 
where subject and object were both at risk.  
As Hylton White has extensively argued, then, for Marx, commodity fetishism 
does not refer to the illusions we project onto objects—it is not, in other words, an 
instance of “fetishizing” in Latour’s sense, which figures it as a problem of projecting a 
human-like agency onto an object, such as a ball (e.g., “Why Has Critique?”). It instead 
refers to the lived relations with materiality that emerge via a certain historically 
contingent material form, the commodity. The commodity form, Marx argues, effects the 
very schism between nature and culture that concerns Latour, and that Marx proposes we 
must surrender. Via the commodity form, humans are excluded from the life of the 
objects they create and use, thereby alienated in a world that is all-too-human, cut off 
from nonhuman materiality. Meanwhile, the commodity lives and moves “on its own” in 
the marketplace—likewise alienated from humans. The problem of commodity fetishism 
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is not, as Latour explicitly misreads it, a problem of projecting a human-like agency onto 
the ball. It is instead that in Marx’s assessment, the ball is the only player in the game, 
moving about the court of its own accord. Meanwhile, insofar as the worker’s only 
possibility for sociability is “merely” material, it is as if the human is made to run, dart, 
and move alongside other players, every movement dictated from above, with no ball to 
be seized, served, and incorporated into human life, nothing gathering those movements. 
In both cases, the sensual quality of human-nonhuman entwinement is absent.
8
  
With the perspective of material form in mind, we can now return to the 
Manuscripts’ diagnosis of alienation from the perspective of sensory form. As we have 
seen, Marx declares that “private property has made us so stupid and one-sided that an 
object is only ours when we have it—when it exists for us as capital, or when it is 
directly possessed, eaten, drunk, worn, inhabited, etc.,—in short, when it is used by us” 
(n.p.). Just as the commodity form limits human engagements with objects to 
engagements based on their market value, so the closely related form of private property, 
for Marx, had relegated humans’ sensory relations with objects to relations purely of 
possession and consumption, of brute exploitation. As such, a single modality of 
sensation, and thereby of human-object relations, had come to dominate. Rather than 
engaging objects in terms of the traditional five senses, or even the intellectual senses, 
people had become habituated to engage them through only the single, limited “sense of 
having.” The reign of this single, sensory modality has made us “stupid” and “one-sided” 
not only in that, recalling Schiller, it has rendered human experience monolithic, but also 
in that it has rendered lively material things inert and singular objects of possession, 
rather than vibrant and multiple things—rich materializations of sight, sound, and so on.  
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But if the goal is simply for objects to be “ours” in richer ways, isn’t this the sort 
of instrumentalism Bennett is worried about when she welcomes the new materialist 
approach as a turn away from “the image of dead or thoroughly instrumentalized matter” 
(ix)? Not if we understand just how expansive Marx’s idea of “ours” can be. Here, an oft-
quoted remark from Marx’s Capital, Volume III, is helpful. Envisioning that with the 
onset of communism the notion of private property will come to seem “absurd,” Marx 
announces: 
Even an entire society, a nation, or all simultaneously existing societies taken 
together, are not owners of the earth, they are simply its possessors, its 
beneficiaries, and have to bequeath it in an improved state to succeeding 
generations, as [good heads of household]. (911) 
For Marx, things can be “ours” in many other and more vibrant ways than being “our 
property”—for instance, as things that benefit us and deserve our respect, as objects of 
our care (to evoke Heidegger), or of our concern (to evoke Latour). Yet with the 
dwindling of sensory capacity, we have lost the ability to be with things in these 
multiplied and less domineering ways. Private property has thus become a “material, 
immediately perceptible expression of estranged human life,” the “perceptible expression 
of the fact that man becomes objective for himself and at the same time becomes a 
strange and inhuman object” (Manuscripts n.p.).  
Emancipation 
Just as for today’s new materialists, then, in gesturing at alienation Marx is 
gesturing at how people have become cut off from things. Marx also has offered a 
systematic diagnosis of why we are situated toward things in this impoverished way. 
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Through the reigning sensory and material forms of capitalism, things have been situated 
as mere objects of possession or consumption, rather than vibrant beings in their own 
right—as Bennett puts it, matter has been situated as something “dead” or “thoroughly 
instrumentalized.” This more posthumanist perspective on alienation renders 
emancipation something quite different from an expansion of human agency over the 
realm of things, or a transcendence of the material world, as Marx’s view of 
emancipation is sometimes understood (and as the passage quoted in this section’s 
opening would seem to suggest). On the contrary, whereas alienation expresses a certain 
mode of being cut off from things, emancipation entails a freeing of people and things 
into richer and more multiple modes of being and entwining. What is emancipated, in 
short, are complementary flows of energy between human and nonhuman being.  
On the whole, although Marx does not explicitly engage the Enlightenment 
discourse on taste, he significantly shifts its grounds. Like Scottish Enlightenment 
thinkers, Marx gestures toward a rhetoricity that proceeds at the level of affect-ability or 
response-ability, and like them he connects the vision of cultivated affectability to human 
thriving and ethics. Marx also establishes a standard of taste or aesthetics broadly 
understood, in what I have argued is a proto-posthumanist conception of emancipation. 
But this standard is vastly different from that of the Scottish Enlightenment. Unlike 
bellelettrists, Marx returns to the bodily and sensory dimensions of aesthetics, a shift 
which allows his standard to apply to affectability at large. Marx also interrogates 
affectability at an historical level, rather than an individual one, and he expands on the 
participation of the object that I noted in bellelettrist discourse. Affectability for Marx 
abides not just in the individual human, the “man of taste,” or even only in an era’s 
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human consciousness more broadly, but rather in the capacities of both humans and 
nonhumans—the forms that human experience and material reality are able to take in 
(sensuous) relation with one another. In focusing on affectability and response-ability as 
an historical condition, Marx gestures toward a sensory-aesthetic theorization of power 
that Scottish Enlightenment thought sorely lacked. Also unlike many Enlightenment 
thinkers (Scottish and beyond), Marx did not locate value in the object or subject alone. 
Rather, in seeing subject and object, sensory form and material form, as co-constitutive, 
he evaluated an era’s affectability according to its rhetorical powers and effects rather 
than anything intrinsic about its subject or object. In Marx’s notion of sensory 
emancipation, rhetoricity, response-ability, and ethics all abide at a vast ecological level, 
and admit of reworking through interventions in sensory and material form. Finally, Marx 
develops the vitalist notes of the bellelettrist treatment of affectability, connecting 
rhetorical capacity (that is, human-nonhuman affectability) to the ethics—and particularly 
the environmental ethics—of whole eras, rather than individuals. In Marx, ethics 
manifests at an ambient level.  
In an emancipated world, “subjectivity and objectivity, spirituality and 
materiality, activity and suffering, lose their antithetical character, and thus their 
existence as such antitheses only within the framework of society” (n.p., emphasis 
altered). Marx is emphatic that this is not a conceptual dissolution of oppositions, but a 
lived one. In a revolution by which more vibrant material forms and sensory modalities 
become available, subject and object are no longer discrete, opposed entities—that is, 
alienation is overcome because the thing is no longer relegated into being either an inert 
object of possession (an instance of what Latour will term a “fact”) nor a “grotesquely 
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human” commodity whose activity excludes and appropriates human life (what Latour 
will term a “fairy”). In sum, with the onset of sensory emancipation, humans relinquish 
their efforts to dominate objects and objects relinquish their efforts to dominate humans. 
Domination itself, as a human-nonhuman relation heretofore invited by the sensory form 
of “having” and the material form of private property or commodity, recedes.  
Society, then, is a crucial concept in Marx. The core result of Marx’s focus on the 
emancipation of the senses was to shift human life away from the non-social being he 
associated with capitalism and toward the more social being he connected with 
communism. And for Marx, social being and non-social being were not so much about 
more or less humanity as they were about more or less sociability—that is, vibrancy in 
humans’ relations with one another and with nonhuman things. The dream of sensory 
emancipation, then, was a dream of a society of people and things, resonating with Bruno 
Latour’s concept of the social (to be discussed at the beginning of the next chapter). Thus 
Marx says: 
It is only when man’s object becomes a human object or objective man that man 
does not lose himself in that object. This is only possible when it becomes a social 
object for him and when he himself becomes a social being for himself, just as 
society becomes a being for him in this object. (Manuscripts n.p.)
9
  
For Marx, the displacement of the five bodily senses by the sense of having had relegated 
humans to non-social engagements with both each other and things. The emancipation of 
the senses from their subjection to the sense of having would enable things to manifest 
not merely as objects of consumption, but as participants complexly and intimately 
involved in humans’ physical activity and sensuous experience.10 Marx’s focus on the 
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emancipation of the senses, then, is in tension with the humanist assumptions he inherits 
from Hegel and ultimately will discard. What Marx terms the onset of a more human 
world we might equally cast as a step toward a more posthuman world, one that discards 
an alienation from things for an intimate, sensuous interplay of human and nonhuman 
vibrancy.  
What might assist such a development, which after all, today’s new materialists 
still await? While in his moments of economic determinism, Marx locates the mechanism 
of emancipation in the self-overcoming of the capitalist mode of production, he also, in a 
later Grundrisse introduction (1857), recalls Schiller in an implicit suggestion that the 
cultivation of a public “appreciative of beauty” might itself be a means of attenuating 
sensory alienation. In this later work Marx also elaborates the sensory ontology offered 
by the Manuscripts in suggesting that artwork “is able to both produce an object of 
aesthetic value, and to create a subject for its object” (Rose 95). As such, he sees 
production and consumption as entwined practices—practices whose entwinement 
operates at sensory levels. Elaborating the vibrancy of the art object, Marx positions it as 
not only “supplying the want with the material, but the material with a want” (cf. 
Marxism and Art 35). Like Scottish Enlightenment thinkers, Marx sees the art object 
itself as a rhetorical agent capable of cultivating a fuller mode of human-nonhuman 
being.
11
 Beyond art specifically, Marx also points to critique more broadly as a means of 
assisting that self-overcoming, which I will discuss in the final section of this chapter and 
the first section of the next.  
Marx’s vision for sensory emancipation, then, pressed him toward a Foucaultian 
engagement of power as a productive phenomenon immanent to everyday experience. On 
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the one hand, of course, it is precisely Marx’s view of the capitalist system as a higher-
order concentration of repressive power to which Foucault objects in offering his 
alternative vision of power. And indeed we can see this binary, top-down view of power 
at work in Marx’s determinist conviction that a transformation of the economic system 
and its replacement with a new system will accomplish emancipation. However, when 
emancipation is considered as an alternative to the sensory alienation that Marx theorizes, 
an entirely different version of power emerges. Marx’s focus on the senses draws his 
attention to local, productive power, even if he continues to understand the full 
productive potential of that power to be harnessed by larger structures of domination. If 
the senses have become dulled and admit of rehabilitation, this thus points rhetorical 
activity not toward the goal of transcendence, but rather toward an intimate, worldly 
reworking of humans’ sensory relations with things.  
Culturing Emancipation 
The Frankfurt School thinkers who followed Marx—specifically Theodor Adorno and 
Max Horkheimer—elaborated on his sensory diagnosis of alienation and the potential for 
such a sensory reworking of the world. The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts and 
the German Ideology, written in 1844 and 1845 respectively, were not published until 
1932. Their publication revolutionized the understanding of Marx at the time, especially 
among those associated with the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research. Fourteen years 
later, Adorno and Horkheimer published their Dialectic of Enlightenment. This influential 
work and the Frankfurt School ethos more generally have been extensively criticized as 
elitist. While the charge of elitism holds some legitimacy to be sure, in Adorno and 
Horkheimer, as in Marx, vitalist and posthumanist tendencies are discernible that open 
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the way to counteract that elitism (a claim I will develop in chapter 5).
12
 In particular, the 
early Marx’s attention to sensory powers as political powers capable of engendering vital 
human-nonhuman ecologies of life are evident in Dialectic of Enlightenment, especially 
in its criticism of the Enlightenment ethos and its marriage with capitalist production: the 
“program of the Enlightenment,” Adorno and Horkheimer charge, has effected “the 
disenchantment of the world” (3) and its equivalent, “the extirpation of animism” (5). 
The Enlightenment celebration of reason has enthroned man as the master of nature, 
debunking “any illusion of ruling or inherent powers, of hidden qualities,” from nature 
(6). Through its logics, “the multiplicity of forms is reduced to position and arrangement, 
history to fact, things to matter” (7). Through the ruling trope of the number, a once 
vibrant, mysterious, and complex world of “things” is reduced to a single plane of 
homogenous, inert, and exchangeable matter. In exchange for the renunciation of things 
in their vibrant complexity, the human subject is carved out as an “identically persistent 
self” (54).  
Yet, Adorno and Horkheimer assert, the effort to raise man up as a self-sufficient 
master of nature backfires. As in Marx, the disavowal of and triumph over nature deadens 
not just things but also people, whose alienation from the vibrancy of things impoverishes 
their lives, too. Like a “dictator toward men,” the master “knows [things] only insofar as 
he can manipulate them” (9). His thinking is calcified into rigid concepts, since “the 
subjective spirit which cancels the animation of nature can master a despiritualized nature 
only by imitating its rigidity” (57). Echoing Marx’s concern for the shift toward a 
singular sensory modality of human-nonhuman engagement, Adorno and Horkheimer 
lament that under the current articulation of the Enlightenment, the “multitudinous 
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affinities between existents are suppressed by the single relation between the subject who 
bestows meaning upon the meaningless object” (10).  
Adorno and Horkheimer trace this de-vitalization of man and nature alike in the 
figure of Odysseus, “the self who always restrains himself and forgets his life, who saves 
his life and yet recalls it only as a wandering” (55-56). Paradigmatic of the renunciation 
of vertiginous vitality that enlightened man performs in exchange for stable subjectivity, 
Odysseus must renounce all the enticing mysteries he encounters, and pleasures of the 
tongue first and foremost: 
he may not taste the lotus or eat the cattle of the Sun-god Hyperion, and when he 
steers between the rocks he must count on the loss of the men whom Scylla 
plucks from the boat. He just pulls through; struggle is his survival; and all the 
fame that he and the others win in the process serves merely to confirm that the 
title of hero is gained at the price of the abasement and mortification of the 
instinct for complete, universal, and undivided happiness. (57) 
Odysseus’s denial of the pleasures of taste is not mentioned in passing. Instead, Adorno 
and Horkheimer suggest that the eating of the lotus flower is the epitome of the sort of 
ecological engagement that is dismissed as non-productive and even dangerous under 
Enlightenment rationality. Recalling Marx’s and Schiller’s concerns with need-based 
modalities of sensation, Adorno and Horkheimer reflect that flower-eating is 
a promise of a state in which the reproduction of life is independent of conscious 
self-preservation and the bliss of the fully contented is detached from the 
advantages of rationally-planned nutrition. The fleeting reminiscence of that most 
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distant and most ancient pleasure attached to the sense of taste is still limited by 
the almost immediate need actually to consume the food. (63-4) 
The distinction Adorno and Horkheimer establish here between the enjoyments of taste 
and the necessities of mere consumption develops a contrast Marx pointed to in including 
eating under the sense of having, while lamenting at the decline of the bodily senses such 
as tasting. For Adorno and Horkheimer, as for Marx, eating has displaced tasting; people 
no longer have the capacity to attune at bodily levels to the vibrancy of things, but only to 
have them for breakfast. 
This distinction between consumption and taste is developed not just in the realm 
of gustation, but also in aesthetic realm more broadly. Like Odysseus, modern man has 
been made to exchange the capacity for a deep engagement with things for the privilege 
of mere survival in a sensuously and intellectually dull world. In Adorno and 
Horkheimer’s well-known critique, not just capitalism, but the culture industry in 
particular is to blame. In the context of Marx’s earlier works, Adorno’s critique of the 
culture industry in Dialectic of Enlightenment and beyond can be understood to develop 
on Marx’s view that the senses have been dulled by the rise of the single sense of having, 
and its concomitant displacement of physical and intellectual senses alike. The culture 
industry is distinguished by its production of readymade consumables. For Adorno, 
regularly offering gustatory metaphors, its products are “pre-digested”—delivering their 
goods directly to passive body of the consumer, and preempting the intimate joys of 
tasting and digesting. Recalling Marx’s critique of the commodity form, then, the 
commodification of culture situates the product as the active, humanlike agent and the 
consumer as a passive receptacle. As such, each is alienated from the other.  
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Inundated in the realm of commodified culture, people lose not only their sensory 
capacities, but also the “higher” capacity of aesthetic taste, as is made apparent in 
Adorno’s later comment that “taste has become outmoded” (“Fetish” 288). Indeed, for 
Adorno, the capacity for taste has been replaced by the whims of a predilection ruled by 
familiarity—an active, involved enjoyment is being replaced by mere recognition. As 
entertainment replaces autonomous art, seeping into everyday being, the decline of 
aesthetic taste manifests at the more basic level of everyday perception: thus, music has 
become mere background, and people have lost the ability to listen. In the end, people’s 
relations to cultural objects have become nothing more than a matter of recognizing and 
possessing. Overall, then, Adorno develops Marx’s diagnosis of the dulling of the senses 
into a fuller diagnosis of rhetorical decline, wherein response-ability—the active, 
engaged capacity of taste—is receding, and along with it communication and critical 
engagement. In its place is emerging the passive disposition of predilection and the 
presumably non-rhetorical activity of consumption.  
Adorno’s diagnosis is indebted to Kant, according to whom judgments issued by 
taste are disinterested and autonomous from all other judgments (e.g., of knowledge, 
morality, etc.). To Adorno’s rather pessimistic view of things, the last bastion of hope for 
aesthetic taste (and thus for rhetorical capacity) is in the practices and products of 
autonomous artists, who are able to produce their works significantly outside the system 
of commodification. For these few, taste is (recalling Hume) a decidedly productive 
faculty, guiding their artistic creations. As in Adorno’s other discussions, aesthetics and 
the body are not far apart here. The artist’s “aesthetically advanced nerves” undergird 
hair-bristling, flinching disgust against previous taste that drives them forward into new 
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arenas of sensory and aesthetic provocations (Minima Moralia 145). The artist’s taste 
enables an intuitive and inventive engagement with an era’s sensory forms: through a 
“secondary mimesis,” as Adorno terms it, “the artist reacts mimetically not to pure sound 
or color (if there were such a thing) but to the sounds, tones, colors and relations that the 
period sets forth as ‘unavoidable’ and ‘necessary,’ that is, as supposedly natural” 
(Kaufmann 73). Following Marx, then, Adorno recognizes the historicity of sensory and 
aesthetic forms, and situates art as a practical means to engaging and reworking that 
historicity.  
In Adorno’s view, the product that emerges from the artist’s exertion of taste is 
distinct from commodified entertainment in two key ways, both of which can engender 
critical consciousness and social change. First, autonomous art is in tension with reality 
rather than being simply part of it: art “is defined by its relation to what it is not” 
(Aesthetic Theory 3), whereas entertainment has no such tension. As such great art itself 
harbors a critical relationship with the world. Second, and related to this, art is never 
complete or fully self-present, but its energies are only realized in the encounter with 
audiences and their exercise of taste: “Because art is what it has become, its concept 
refers to what it does not contain. . . . Art can be understood only by its laws of 
movement, not according to any set of invariants” (Aesthetic Theory 3). The same, we 
will see, will hold for Adorno’s notion of critique. 
Marx and Adorno’s treatment of sensory emancipation leaves questions. We must 
ask, for instance: Are the senses really dulled? Might an era’s material forms on the 
contrary offer different modalities of sensation through the eyes, ears, mouth, and so on? 
In other words, if capitalism marks the onset of a new, pervasive sense of “having,” 
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might there also be positive and productive articulations of that sense of having? Marx 
provocatively expands the realm of sensation beyond the five traditional senses to 
include, for instance, not just a hearing ear, but a “musical ear,” and to suggest a 
synesthesia of sorts in such specialized senses as a “minearological sense” which he 
believes the dealer in minerals must lack in his singular concern for the commercial value 
of the mineral. But why should the sense of having, the concern for commercial value, be 
limited to a single expression? Might there not be additional modes of sensation that have 
cropped up as variations of the single sense of having, and that promote more vibrant 
relations to things than were possible before? These questions will certainly be worth 
recalling in future chapters—but we can thank Marx for bringing us to them.  
Meanwhile, Adorno’s elaborations of Marx’s sensory diagnostics can be of 
assistance in addressing the problem of elitism, as the next two chapters will argue. Of 
course, Adorno’s diagnosis of the rise of passivity among the masses (and the attendant 
decline of taste, which he sees as an active mode of reception) has been much criticized, 
and often with good grounds. Indeed, it seems that Adorno’s hard-and-fast distinctions 
between activity and passivity, production and consumption, are both limiting and 
untenable—especially if we follow Adorno himself in envisioning a field of subject-
object relations where subject and object are not so alienated. As the Birmingham School 
of cultural studies has established, there is much opportunity to complicate Adorno’s 
views and to uncover local flows of consumer power.  
Adorno is certainly limited by his commitment to a Kantian definition of taste, by 
which taste necessarily operates autonomously and is primarily the property of an 
individual. His considerable pessimism regarding the potential for change, as well as the 
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elitist dimensions of his thought that dismiss the masses as the site of any real change, 
can be traced to this Kantian standpoint. Yet despite these limitations, Adorno’s 
conception and diagnosis of taste has much to offer a theorization of sensory rhetoric, 
especially when we interpret it as an elaboration of Marx’s call for sensory liberation. For 
one thing, his elaboration of the imbrications of taste with the commodity form, while 
admittedly rigid, is not necessarily so. If we dismiss his totalizing view of 
commodification, his diagnosis still challenges us to attend to the mechanisms of 
passivity in more nuanced ways. Moreover, Adorno offers a political standpoint by which 
to diagnose and imagine the political potentials of taste considered as a rhetorical 
capacity: For Adorno, developing Marx’s latent environmentalism, a healthy capacity for 
taste opens one onto a more vital connection with human and nonhuman life that registers 
its actualities and its potentials. The distinction he offers between the dispositions for 
passive, non-digestive consumption and active, digestive enjoyment also offers a 
potential means for distinguishing rhetorically empowering from rhetorically 
disempowering tastes, a distinction which I will put to the test in my final two chapters. 
Finally, Adorno also points us further than did Marx toward a bodily, sensory 
understanding of critical capacity. Unlike the Kant of the Critique of Judgment, taste for 
Adorno was both a bodily and sensory capacity whose cultivation and operations were 
not fully conscious and which thus opened an alternative pathway for connecting with the 
multiplicity of the material world that countered the tide of Enlightenment thought. If we 
can recuperate from Marx and the Frankfurt School a posthumanist notion of 
emancipation, then, we can also start to unpack the potential of their emancipatory 
methods of “immanent critique” to join the environmentalist project of new materialism. 
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In the next section, I will offer a brief genealogical sketch of the notion of immanent 
critique, which I contrast with a Kantian, transcendent style of critique. Then I will argue 
that a re-engagement of the concept of immanent critique promises to inform 
contemporary material and rhetorical theory. The next chapter goes on to explore this 




In his well-known public essay on the topic, Immanuel Kant defines Enlightenment as 
“man’s emergence from his self-imposed immaturity”—the inability and lack of courage 
“to use one’s understanding without guidance from another” (n.p.). Michel Foucault 
praises this essay, whose practice of critique, he believes, is distinct from that of Kant’s 
three formal Critiques in functioning as an “ontology of the present” (cf. Hendricks 222). 
Kant’s essay, Foucault enthuses, functions as “an act of defiance, as a challenge, as a way 
of limiting these arts of government and sizing them up, transforming them, of finding a 
way to escape from them or, in any case, a way to displace them” (44-5). Despite its 
dissensual spirit, however, Kant’s practice of critique is problematic in that it continues to 
rely upon an analytic of truth that “appeals to the conditions of possibility of true 
knowledge and universally valid moral laws” (Hendricks 223). Kant’s vision of 
Enlightenment as a freedom “to use one’s understanding without guidance from another” 
in fact limits freedom to a pre-existent, universal grounds of understanding, one not 
admitting of variation or participatory reworking. It is a similar, transcendental style of 
critique that Diane Davis objects to in Kenneth Burke, arguing that Burke’s commitment 
to critique “retains an almost absolute faith in the power of reason” (33), overlooking 
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Sigmund Freud’s insight that “no flex of reason, no amount of proper critique, can secure 
the interpersonal distance on which Burke had pinned his hopes” (35).14  
For Davis and Foucault alike, we must resist many of the impulses of 
transcendent critique, including the dichotomy it strikes between subject and object, its 
commitment to universal standards of evaluation, its faith in reason as the primary 
modality of analysis, and its aspirations for, as Davis puts it, “interpersonal distance.” 
Foucault distinguishes his own, immanent practice of critique from Kant’s transcendental 
approach. Rather than proceeding from a stable, universal grounds of knowledge or moral 
law, Foucault continually emphasizes the historicity of any such grounds—indeed, his 
genealogical style of critique quite directly examines the historical conditions of various 
articulations of power-knowledge. Foucault further departs from a transcendent, Kantian 
style of critique in resisting the tendency to prescribe actions, refusing to take on the role 
either of the “prophet” who declares “here is what you must do—and also: this is good 
and this is not” or of the “universal intellectual” who claims the right to speak for others 
(cf. Hendricks 212). This critical attitude is part and parcel of Foucault’s overall view, 
discussed in chapter 1, that political change must proceed immanently.  
Foucault’s commitment to immanent critique as an alternative to transcendent 
critique can be traced back to Marx, who himself developed the concept from Hegel. For 
Marx, “immanent critique evaluates reality not with alien principles of rationality but 
with those intrinsic to reality itself” (Buchwalter 254). As in the later genealogical 
approaches of Foucault, Nietzsche, and others, in Marx, “rather than providing the 
sources of critique, value systems, conceptions of human nature and allegedly scientific 
discourses are themselves turned into objects of critique” (Celikates 113, emphasis 
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added). As such, the criteria for immanent critique “are not derived abstractly by 
appealing to moral principles, an a-historical human nature or scientific truths” (Celikates 
113). Departing from Kant, Marx held that political evaluation cannot rely on concepts 
alone: “Just as one does not judge an individual by what he thinks about himself,” he 
says, “so one cannot judge . . . a period of transformation by its consciousness, but, on the 
contrary, this consciousness must be explained from the contradictions of material life, 
from the conflict existing between the social forces of production and the relations of 
production” (Contribution n.p.). Instead of attending to an era’s self-consciousness alone, 
Marx sought a different source of immanent critique, one seeking out contradictions and 
tensions in existing reality. As such, he attended, on the one hand, to the contradictions 
within material reality (and between the forces and relations of production), and on the 
other hand, those between material reality and reigning ideals. Marx also departs from the 
Kantian commitment to a stable standard of critique, which situates an emancipator in a 
privileged, transcendent position of knowledge and power in relation to the emancipated: 
“The emancipation of the working class,” he announces, “must be the work of the 
working class itself” (cf. Celikates 105). Marx explicitly rejects the idea that “workers are 
too uneducated to emancipate themselves and must first be freed from above by 
philanthropic big bourgeois and petty bourgeois” (cf. Celikates 105). For Marx, an 
evaluative standard must emerge from a people’s attention to the tensions and 
contradictions of reality. 
That said, Marx’s vision of sensory emancipation outlined above does seem to 
offer a somewhat external (if not transcendent) standard of critique. Still, the generality 
and vagueness of that standard (which, I argued, distinguished it from Enlightenment 
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elitism), admits of countless potential ways of articulating emancipation. As such, the 
notion of sensory emancipation well supported Marx’s commitment to an experimental, 
inventive relation to the future. Articulating the mission of a journal for which he was an 
editor (the Deutsch-Franzosische Jahrbucher), Marx declared “we do not attempt 
dogmatically to prefigure the future, but want to find the new world only through critique 
of the old” (cf. Celikates 115). The critique Marx invites for his journal, then, is far from 
the transcendent, prescriptive kind toward which Kant gestures: “Up to now the 
philosophers had the solution of all riddles lying in their lectern, and the stupid 
uninitiated world had only to open its jaws to let the roast partridges of absolute science 
fly into its mouth”(cf. Celikates 115). For Marx, critique does not position itself apart 
from some “stupid uninitiated world,” and nor are premade “roast partridges” its proper 
aim or product: “the designing of the future and the proclamation of ready-made 
solutions for all time is not our affair”(cf. Celikates 115). Quite in contrast, Marx 
announces, “we can express the credo of our journal in one word: the self-clarification 
(critical philosophy) of the struggles and wishes of the age”(cf. Celikates 115). For Marx, 
there are two components to “the self-clarification of the struggles and wishes of the 
age”: critique takes as its object both human experience and material relations. As Seyla 
Benhabib characterizes Marx’s critique of political economy, it is “both a critique of a 
specific mode of theoretical and social consciousness, and a critique of a specific mode of 
social production”(cf. Celikates 112). As we have seen above, Marx held that an era’s 
modes of consciousness (e.g., its sensory forms) and its modes of production (e.g., 
material forms) work in tandem to generate the world, and the task of critique is to 





Marx’s notion of immanent critique greatly influenced critical theory. As 
Horkheimer and Adorno lament, the culture industry’s reduction of the masses “to mere 
objects of the administered life . . . preforms every sector of modern existence including 
language and perception,” (cf. Antonio 334). Yet this condition cannot be evaluated and 
reworked from the outside. Rather, available linguistic and perceptual forms must be 
turned to critical work: “Again and again in history,” Horkheimer notes, “ideas have cast 
off their swaddling clothes and struck out against the social systems that bore them” (cf. 
Antonio 338). Marx offers a similar heuristic for critique, pointing us toward how not just 
existing ideas, but also existing sensory forms and their attendant material forms might be 
reworked with emancipatory effects. By attending to the transformative potential of 
existing forms of thought, sensation, and material life, immanent critique recognizes and 
affirms the potential of the given world to rework its own givenness. Defined in a 
nutshell, immanent critique “attacks social reality from its own standpoint, but at the 
same time criticizes that standpoint from the perspective of its historical context” 
(Antonio 338). This style of critique “exposes the way reality conflicts not with some 
‘transcendent’ concept of rationality but with its own avowed norms” (Buchwalter 254). 
To this extent, it rests not on stable grounds but grounds that are continually being 
appropriated and reworked. 
Many critical theorists follow Marx in their approach to immanent critique, 
drawing out the “contradiction between the existent and ideology,” which in turn 
“transforms legitimations into emancipatory weapons” (Antonio 338). Adorno, however, 
believed that the potential to trace those contradictions had been lost with the unfolding 
of late capitalism and the rise of the culture industry. For Adorno, the possibility for 
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today’s reigning ideals to conflict with today’s realities of suffering—a possibility that 
Marx’s mode of immanent critique had exploited—has receded as capitalist ideology has 
seeped into every arena of consciousness and culture. We have become so pervasively 
deluded in our concepts, logics, and even sensory capacities that we can no longer draw 
out contradictions between consciousness and material reality. Adorno thus dismisses as 
“naive” the thought that “unflinching immersion in the object will lead to truth by virtue 
of the logic of things” (cf. Freyenhagen 177).  
Transformative critique calls for something other than “unflinching immersion in 
the object,” and Adorno offers at least two ways for critique to help us “flinch,” as it 
were. First, as my explication in the previous section suggests, Adorno follows Marx in 
implicitly offering a usefully underarticulated, vitalist vision of human-nonhuman 
emancipation that could guide critique—Adorno and Horkheimer, like Marx, critique the 
current conditions of reality for the alienation it effects between people and things. 
Second, and more broadly, Adorno locates a critical orientation in our ability to discern 
suffering. As Horkheimer states, critical thought is “grounded on the misery of the 
present” (cf. Freyenhagen 178). Although “this misery does not provide the image of its 
abolition,” reckoning with it does offer the potential for change (cf. Freyenhagen 178). It 
is such a reckoning that Adorno calls for repeatedly in his work, most famously in his 
declaration that there can be no poetry after Auschwitz. For Adorno, the pressing task of 
critique is to reveal how the current conditions of consciousness and material life could 
enable evils such as Auschwitz. The gesture of critique in this vein is not so much 
judgment as explanation: Auschwitz is not offered as a source of a transcendent standard 
by which to judge the present. Rather, it is given as an evil, and critique is turned to the 
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task of explanation, of tracking how such an evil could occur. Adorno’s notion of 
critique, while not transcendent, differs from Marx’s immanent critique in that “it does 
not require that there is a gap between a social world and the norms used to defend it” 
(Freyenhagen 186). Rather, Adorno’s “critical standard consists in the objective bads 
generated by this world and is independent of whether or not these bads are recognised as 
such by its defenders” (Freyenhagen 186).16 For Adorno, those who are suffering may not 
be able to recognize their own suffering, or emancipate themselves.  
 Whether highlighting Marx’s model of immanent critique or Adorno’s 
complications thereof, critical theory has supported a distinctly un-Kantian, non-
transcendent vision of critique. As Robin Celikates puts it in a recent edited volume on 
critique: 
Theories can only claim to be critical if they are aware of their own historicity, 
avoid dogmatic and idealist appeals to abstract norms, and self-reflexively 
question their own status as well as their political implications. . . . a second 
lesson for contemporary critical theory is that it cannot proceed in a purely 
normative way, but has to aim at integrating philosophical, historical and 
sociological aspects. Focusing on obstacles to individual and collective practices 
of self-understanding and empowerment, it has to encompass both the diagnosis 
and the critique of current forms of socially induced suffering. If critique is to 
understand itself as a form of self-reflection anchored in the actual experiences 
and struggles of our times, it has to avoid constructing an asymmetrical 
opposition between science and critique, on the one hand, and the purportedly 
naive perspective of “ordinary” agents, on the other hand. (Celikates 114-115) 
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Despite the promise here, there are limitations to critical theorists’ embrace of immanent 
critique. For one thing, the dream of immanent critique is not easily realized—critics 
regularly revert to assuming a transcendent attitude even while attempting to resist it—
Foucault perhaps protests too much in his repeated disavowals of the role of the prophet. 
Further, and especially in Adorno’s case, once the project of immanent critique is 
reworked in response to the conditions of late capitalism, the object and addressee of 
critique alike become unclear.  
Perhaps most disconcerting, the vision of immanent critique laid out in the 
passage above often tends to fall short of its potential to rework existing power dynamics 
because of its reliance on a negative movement that situates it in opposition to the status 
quo, dominant thought, or some other reigning force. John Muckelbauer helps us to see 
this. As he characterizes it, much “postmodern” critique seeks to effect change while 
emphasizing its own immanence:  
Against the privileging of a universal truth, it emphasizes the contingency of 
opinion. Against the privileging of the object, it promotes things like point-of-
view and perspective. It denies the possibility of unmediated facts (and highlights 
interpretation), criticizes the concept of universality (and accentuates 
contingency), censures the western tradition’s privileging of the mind (and praises 
a renewed interest in the body), etc. (7) 
Despite all this, Muckelbauer notes, such critique most often interpolates an “other” to 
which it remains in binary opposition. Operating oppositionally, postmodern critique 
attempts to “change the traditional privileges, to overcome the conventional power 
structure by inverting the valence within any given binary” (7). This doesn’t ultimately 
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effect much change: “through this response, the concept that has traditionally been 
negated and refused becomes dominant”—but such a movement merely repeats the 
allegedly oppressive logic, rather than reworking it (7).  
In light of the failures of contemporary critique, Muckelbauer forwards a 
reorientation to critical practice: “The challenge,” he announces, “is to invent a practical 
style of engagement that doesn’t just repeat the structure of negation and refusal” (12). 
Such a style of engagement would not, of course, be a subversive “other” or alternative to 
dialectical kinds of criticism, which would orient to dialectic in the same way as 
oppositional critique. Rather, it seeks a different style of dialectic: 
if the negative movement of dialectical change cannot be overcome and can only 
be repeated, this does not mean that all repetition is the same or that all repetition 
necessarily reproduces the same. Instead, it only means that everything hinges on 
how one repeats . . . in any particular encounter, everything depends on one’s 
orientation within repetition. (12-13, emphasis altered) 
Muckelbauer offers “affirmative repetition” as an orientation to repetition that is at once 
less oppositional and more productive than the postmodern style of critique he describes. 
Working from Deleuze, the principle move of affirmative repetition in approaching its 
object is to ask not what it is, but what it can do. Rather than advocating, critiquing, or 
developing a concept, that is, affirmative repetition engages that concept as a relay to 
another place. An “affirmative inclination,” Muckelbauer says, marks “an 
experimentation, an attempt to explore, for instance, what a particular concept can 
become capable of by connecting it elsewhere” (43). It is not that negativity is entirely 
gone in affirmative repetition. As Muckelbauer notes in the passage above, “the negative 
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movement of dialectical change cannot be overcome and can only be repeated.” 
Affirmative repetition is simply a different orientation to the negative movement of 
dialectic, one that is not oppositional, but rather receptive. Though affirmative repetition 
does not transcend negativity, it is also not reducible to a movement of negation, in that it 
adopts a receptive stance to the status quo.  
 Bennett likewise objects to the oppositional stance characteristic of critical 
theory’s practices of demystification and exposé. She worries, in particular, about their 
rhetorical efficacy: demystification, she says, “does not reliably produce moral outrage,” 
and even if it does, “this moral outrage may or may not spark ameliorative action” (xv). 
“A relentless approach toward demystification,” Bennett asserts, “works against the 
possibility of positive formulations” (xv). For Bennett, it is not that we must throw out 
critique, but rather that we must resist its “relentless” negativity. To do so, we must 
supplement critique with another kind of response: “we need both critique and positive 
formulations of alternatives, alternatives that will themselves become the objects of later 
critique and reform” (xv, emphasis added). Echoing Muckelbauer’s vision (and 
performance) of affirmative repetition, Bennett says, “the capacity to detect the presence 
of impersonal affect requires that one is caught up in it. One needs, at least for a while, to 
suspend suspicion and adopt a more open-ended comportment” (xv).17  
As a rejection of the negative, oppositional valences of “critique” and an embrace 
of the receptive, generative and inventional valences of “affirmation” and “response” has 
taken root among rhetorical theorists like Muckelbauer, Davis, Hawk, Rickert, and many 
others, discussion of critique has waned. This is particularly so on the English studies 
side of the field, perhaps given its traditional emphasis on the generative work of 
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invention and composition. But critique, to my mind, has been too readily abandoned, 
especially as the field turns to an interest in the rhetoricity of affect, sensation, and 
materiality—points where a tradition of critique reaching at least as far back as the 
Enlightenment can offer insight. It may indeed be the case, as Muckelbauer charges, that 
much work presenting under the label of “immanent” or “postmodern” critique falls into 
a limiting, oppositional relation with the privileged side of a binary. Certainly many 
efforts at demystification break with the commitments of immanent critique to an 
analysis based on unstable, changeable standards and to resisting binaries of emancipator 
and emancipated. Nonetheless, it should be clear from my brief genealogy that the 
concept of immanent critique reaches beyond this—a simple repetition of binaries is not 
what immanent critique seeks, but rather a richer reworking of the world on the world’s 
own (problematic) terms. 
To the extent that demystification reverts to the adoption of a transcendent, 
privileged perspective on the world and a commitment to revealing truth, it is not an 
instance of immanent critique (though as I will argue in the next chapter, there is often an 
immanent critique to be discerned even in such transcendent posturing). If the vision of 
immanent critique has failed to be realized to the extent that it might, this is not grounds 
to abandon it altogether. Rather, we would do well to return to the concept of immanent 
critique, and to continue to ask how this difficult style of engagement can be practiced. 
Indeed, today’s contemporary projects of attuning to nonhuman agency, of affirmative 
repetition, of generative response, can be assisted by a (re)engagement with the legacy of 
immanent critique—with its failures and successes alike.  
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If immanent critique has often degenerated into an orientation of negativity and 
disavowal, this is perhaps largely due to the care that it takes to avoid the tyrannies of 
specific, positive prescription. As we saw above, Adorno focuses on negative response 
exactly because of an impulse to resist pre-programming positive change. Sometimes, a 
negative orientation is needed (for these or other purposes). Still, as Bennett and 
Muckelbauer maintain, it is important not to get caught up in a wholly negative, 
oppositional attitude, as critical theory, and Adorno most especially, often seem to. Here, 
a return to Marx can be instructive. Even if, as Adorno believes, we are no longer at a 
point where our era’s values conflict productively with realities of suffering, Marx 
continues to offer resources for an immanent kind of critique that is not so wholly 
negative and pessimistic as Adorno’s. First, as my work in this chapter has suggested, 
Marx, in his commitment to immanent critique, has left us valuable and underutilized 
evaluative tools, such as the examination of co-implicated sensory and material forms. 
Though these forms might provide a heuristic for oppositional critique, they could 
equally do so for an affirmative orientation that attends, as Muckelbauer suggests, to their 
“singular rhythms,” the potential of these forms to relay us elsewhere. (The next chapter 
will argue that such an affirmative orientation is partly at work in contemporary food 
exposés, even those that suspiciously take industrial food as their target.) Second, Marx 
has left us a broad, productively underarticulated and positive standard of critique in his 
posthumanist vision of emancipation, prompting critique to seek out more vibrant 
relations among humans and nonhumans. Marx, like contemporary new materialists, 
invites us not only to oppose problematic forms, but also to rework existing sensory and 
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material forms to emancipatory ends. I will note how Fast Food Nation and Super Size 
Me alike do so.  
Another crucial reason to retain a scholarly engagement with the legacy of 
critique is that people still do it. Critique, demystification, and exposé remain a 
widespread mode of public rhetoric, whether we look to documentaries (as I will in the 
next chapter), blogs, Facebook exchanges, or the like. These forms of critique are 
recognized and embraced as part of a long rhetorical tradition—they have sparked, or are 
believed to have sparked, real, concrete, and positive change in the past (Upton Sinclair’s 
The Jungle, which inspired legal change, offers an example, which the next chapter will 
discuss). As such, critique, demystification, and exposé carry with them a certain 
rhetorical energy that might be tapped even while reworking their problematic 
tendencies. In embodying “traditional,” even sometimes rather Kantian, performances of 
critique, these interventions should not be dismissed as passé and impotent. Rather, as my 
next chapter will model, we might turn affirmatively to critique itself, asking what it is 
capable of, what it relays us to, rather than (only) where it has failed. 
Conclusion 
An attunement to critique in a sensory, generative key can assist with the project of 
affirming critique. Through a critical practice of sensation, both scholars and activists can 
revivify immanent critique, moving away from a solely negative orientation even while 
maintaining the commitment of Marx, Foucault, Adorno, and many others to resisting a 
prophetic stance, resisting a tendency, as Marx put it, “dogmatically to prefigure the 
future.” In this, it is worth noting that immanent critique has its efficacy exactly if the 
thought of new materialism is correct—the belief that we can and should cultivate our 
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response-ability to nonhuman vitality. If we cannot get outside of our sensory worlds to 
evaluate them, we can deploy Marx’s emancipatory standard to enrich them, seeking out 
sensory and material forms that promote human-nonhuman intimacy—even while 
acknowledging that we cannot describe and call for such forms in advance. A sensory 
approach to critique can, in short, enable a positive, affirmative orientation that yet 
remains committed to the risks and uncertainties of invention.  
As I will argue in the next chapter, Marx, put in contact with Latour, can point the 
way to a sensory practice of immanent critique, one which, to use Latour’s terms, is 
eminently “compositionist.” For the task of affirming critique to be begun in the next 
chapter, I propose and work from a broad definition of critique, one that encompasses 
more than intellectual interventions alone. With Adorno’s vision of art and critique in 
mind, I provisionally define critique in general as any performance or practice (sensory 
practices included) that strikes up a tension with reality, that brings us to “flinch.” This 
tension could be sparked immanently or transcendentally, negatively or affirmatively, 
oppositionally or appropriatively, suspiciously or erotically—or, more likely, as some 
mix of these supposed “poles.” Tension with reality could be sparked through judgment, 
description, or intervention, though these three cannot be cleanly separated out from one 
another. Critique could proceed, as Kant’s did, from a fixed emancipatory standard, 
judging reality in connection to that standard. It could proceed from a more open-ended 
emancipatory standard, like Marx’s. Critique, for example, could generate tension by 
figuring reality as something constructed rather than natural or given, a movement 
characteristic of both genealogy and the Latourian network tracing to be discussed in the 
next chapter. Tensions with reality could likewise emanate from an inquisitive or 
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questioning orientation, or a suspicious one, or a curious one. An affirmative orientation 
to reality is also a means by which a tension could be struck up—in this sense, we can 
understand affirmative reading as a kind of critique insofar as it experiments with how a 
concept, logic, or object in the world might relay us elsewhere.  
Narrowing in from this conception of critique in general, I will frame my next 
chapter by articulating specifically a sensuous style of critique that is immanent, 
compositionist, and emancipatory in Marx’s proto-posthumanist sense. Both Marx and 
Latour, I suggest, point us to this sort of critique, which strikes up its tensions with reality 
through an everyday practice of sensation that registers the constructed (rather than 
natural) status of the world and that thereby cultivates a compositionist orientation to it. 
This kind of sensuous critique, I propose, is increasingly emerging out of the more 
traditional, exposé style of American food journalism. While industrial food exposés such 
as Fast Food Nation explicitly situate themselves as gestures of demystification and at 
times adopt a transcendental approach to critique, their contact with their object of food 
brings them toward a more sensuous style of critique, and one that is notably immanent, 
compositionist, and posthumanist. While this critique may adopt an oppositional or an 
affirmative orientation, in either case, it carries a compositionist energy.  
Although I will focus on the transformative potential of sensuous critique as it is 
emerging in today’s publics, I want it to be clear that I am not simply championing this 
style of critique as some ultimate best practice. In proposing that we affirm critique, I am 
proposing that we re-orient to critique on the whole. Critique may be more oppositional 
or more affirmative in its orientation. It may be more transcendent or more immanent. 
And typically it is a mix of these. What I want to do with my case study in the next 
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chapter is to attune us to one instance of what critique can do, where it can relay us, with 
the multiple and even conflicting orientations it adopts.  
The dilemma posed at the end of the previous chapter was whether sensation 
could be a viable rhetorical site for resistance and revolution. Considered together, 
Schiller, Marx, Adorno, and Latour answer with an emphatic yes and offer a rich set of 
ways into theorizing sensation and taste as such. As I will suggest in the final two 
chapters, we can locate a new materialist, posthumanist elaboration of this “yes” in 
contemporary food activism. These efforts inform a theorization of sensory rhetoric and 
develop the potential for an immanent, sensory critique that could draw from both 
“traditional” and “new” materialist sources. However, we will see, troubling challenges 
of elitism and paternalism continue to haunt today’s latest articulations of sensory 
rhetoric. My final chapter will consider how a compositionist approach to sensory 













                                                 
Chapter 3 Notes 
1
 For these criticisms, see “Compositionist Manifesto” and We Have Never Been Modern. 
2
 See, e.g., Henning 2014. 
3
 Schiller calls upon the state to address this problem by carefully balancing the needs of 
individuals and particular problems with the needs of larger systemic problems. 
4
 See McLellan for an elaboration, Marx Before Marxism, 92, cf. Rose 74. 
5
 See Rose 74, who makes a similar point. 
6
 Unless otherwise noted, this and all the quotes that follow from The Economic and 
Philosophic Manuscripts, are drawn from the primary, Benton translation made available 
on Marxists.org (https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/epm/3rd.htm). No 
page numbers are available. This line is also translated: “the forming of the five senses is 
a labor of the entire history of the world down to the present,” (n.p.) by the alternative, 
Mulligan translation provided on Marxists.org. 
7
 One might resist Marx on this point in light of the inescapably synesthetic character of 
the senses. But Marx’s objective is not to so much to draw hard and fast distinctions 
between each sense—which after all he believes exists in its distinctness only thanks to 
“the entire history of the world.” Instead, his point should be taken as a means to draw 
out the fact that each of the five, relatively distinct senses that has emerged out of human 
history open us onto its own, distinct plane of being—even if those planes of being 
overlap. Marx is enthusiastic about the richness of human-nonhuman relations that the 
five relatively distinct senses enable—his dismay over the dominance of “the single sense 
of having” seems to come not only from the way that sense severs human and objective 
realms, but also from the singularity of that sense. For clarity, I here used the alternative, 
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Mulligan translation provided on Marxists.org. The Benton translation renders this 
passage: “The specific character of each essential power is precisely its specific essence, 
and therefore also the specific mode of its objectification, of its objectively actual, living 
being” (n.p.). 
8
 It is true that Marx expresses horror at the prospect of an object’s taking on 
“grotesquely” human-like qualities. Indeed, it often seems that, for all Marx’s emphasis 
on the vitality of nonhuman things, this vitality always emanates from human relations, 
rather than also from objects themselves. Still, to the extent that Marx’s vision of 
emancipation relies on a deeper engagement with material life, he opens the way for the 
more vital views of the object emergent in new materialist thought today—while yet 
reminding us that the vitality of the object is not always something to be celebrated. 
What’s more, in articulating the nature/culture schism which worries Latour in terms of 
the historically conditioned material form of the commodity, Marx offers a more material 
diagnosis of the problem, and thus potentially has much to offer Latour’s vision of a 
Dingpolitik than Latour, who focuses on our attitudes about things, and less on how we 
might change our historically conditioned possibilities for engaging them in the first 
place. 
9
 Again, I use the alternative, Mulligan translation for clarity. The Benton translation 
renders this passage:  “We have seen that man does not lose himself in his object only 
when the object becomes for him a human object or objective man. This is possible only 
when the object becomes for him a social object, he himself for himself a social being, 
just as society becomes a being for him in this object” (n.p.).  
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10
 Marx is undeniably speciesist in characterizing the non-social existence of man as an 
animalistic mode of being. However, his attention to the senses begins to lead him away 
from an essentialist view of human nature, which unsettles any fast and sharp distinctions 
between humans and animals. 
11
 For an elaboration of this, see Rose 95. 
12
 For other vitalist readings of Adorno and especially the Dialectic of Enlightenment, 
see, e.g., Jay 1984; Rentsch 2000, cf. Henning 2014. 
13
 Indeed, Adorno himself explicitly elaborates a notion of immanent critique that could 
be put in conversation with that of Marx and Latour outlined below. 
14
 For the brief genealogical sketch of critique in this paragraph and the several that 
follow, I am greatly indebted to Karin de Boer and Ruth Sonderegger’s 2012 edited 
volume, Conceptions of Critique in Modern and Contemporary Philosophy. The 
arguments about Foucault in this and the next paragraph are elaborated in Christina 
Hendricks’ essay in that volume, “Prophecy and Parresia: Foucauldian Critique and the 
Political Role of Intellectuals.” 
15
 I am grateful to Celikates for the sketch of Marx’s view of immanent critique in this 
and the previous paragraph. 
16
 See Freyenhagen for an elaboration of the argument that Adorno’s critique is neither 
immanent nor transcendent. In contrast to Freyenhagen, I suggest that Adorno points us 
toward a different mode of immanent critique, rather than fully breaking from it.  
17
 As mentioned at the start of this chapter, Bennett also worries that demystification 
“presumes that at the heart of any event or process lies a human agency that has illicitly 
been projected on things” (xiv). As my explication of Marx and the Frankfurt School 
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above suggests, however, this objection can be complicated when we consider the anti-
humanist stance that Marx, Adorno, and Horkheimer shared, seeing human being as 
having no fixed essence, but rather emergent in fundamental entanglement with 







REASSEMBLING THE SENSES 
Like the Scottish bellelettrists, today’s American public is undergoing a taste craze—this 
time, returning to the original, bodily realm of taste. In popular books, TV shows, films, 
and websites, cooking and tasting are emerging as respected arts, sciences, and hobbies. 
A vibrant digital food culture is emerging and thriving, with recipes and images of food 
and cooking circulating on websites, personal blogs, and all forms of social media.
1
 
Consumers are increasingly valuing foods that are local, organic, sustainable, and 
natural.
2
 With the explosion of “foodie” culture, direct-to-consumer food sales have 
surged, and great enthusiasm proliferates around local restaurants, food trucks, and 
farmer’s markets.3 My final two chapters will track how today’s public embrace of taste 
extends the thinking and enactment of the sensory arena of rhetoric traced in the previous 
three chapters, marking a new installment in the sensory history of rhetoric.  
The current chapter examines the turn to taste in the realm of food journalism. 
Growing as it has out of a reaction to the industrialization of food production, exposé-
style food journalism in the United States can be traced at least as far back as Upton 
Sinclair’s 1906 The Jungle. Yet the more recent explosion of food writing and 
documentary can be roughly dated to the publication of Eric Schlosser’s Fast Food 
Nation. Serialized in Rolling Stone in 1999, published as a New York Times bestseller in 
2001, and rereleased with a new afterword in 2012, Fast Food Nation has been adapted 
into a children’s book, a 2006 fiction film of the same name, and more closely rendered 
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in the 2008 Oscar-nominated documentary Food, Inc. This chapter examines the text as 
paradigmatic of a new approach to critique that taps the inventive rhetorical powers of 
sensation. In what follows, I will engage Fast Food Nation in this key, demonstrating 
how it develops on previous rhetorical treatments of sensation from Hume to Latour, and 
helps us progress in the question of the evaluation of taste. I frame this inquiry by culling 
a sensuous, compositionist style of critique from an engagement with Marx and Latour. I 
will then turn to Fast Food Nation as an example of such a critique at work, one that at 
once contributes to a sensory theory of rhetoric and models a sensory practice of rhetoric 
as compositionist critique. 
Sensuous Critique 
In The German Ideology, Marx and Engels, speaking of their predecessor Ludwig 
Feuerbach, lament that Feuerbach’s important attention to material life was ultimately 
limited by the logics of idealism. Feuerbach, like Hegel, envisioned emancipation in 
purely intellectual terms, as a freeing from material and ideological shackles into full 
intellectual self-possession. As a counterpart to Feuerbach’s “idealist” materialism, Marx 
and Engels situated communism as a “practical materialism,” that aimed to conduct 
emancipation at the concrete, worldly level explored above. Thus they famously 
remarked,  
it is only possible to achieve real liberation in the real world by employing real 
means . . . slavery cannot be abolished without the steam engine and the mule and 
spinning-jenny, serfdom cannot be abolished without improved agriculture, and 
 . . . in general, people cannot be liberated as long as they are unable to obtain 
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food and drink, housing and clothing in adequate quantity and quality” (German 
Ideology 61).  
To achieve the vibrancy of human-nonhuman relations that Marx associates with 
emancipation, then, requires not only a shift in human thought and values, but also a 
complex transformation in human-nonhuman relations. 
Critique, Marx believed, could assist both movements. Though implicit in Marx’s 
work, an immersive, sensory practice of immanent critique is discernible. This potential 
manifestation of immanent critique we can locate (perhaps ironically) in the more 
traditional, negative critique Marx and Engels perform in their disavowal of their 
predecessor, Feuerbach. As becomes clear in Marx and Engels’ critique of Feuerbach’s 
inadequate sensory attunement, practical materialism, oriented as it is to “practically 
attacking and changing existing things” (62), depends on a certain sensory disposition. 
Marx and Engels complain that Feuerbach gleefully celebrates the natural world as a 
place of intellectual retreat and spiritual healing in a way that essentializes it, failing to 
register its fundamentally contingent and historical character: 
He does not see how the sensuous world around him is not a thing given direct 
from all eternity, remaining ever the same, but the product of industry and of the 
state of society . . . . an historical product, the result of the activity of a whole 
succession of generations. (62) 
Feuerbach, in short, lacks a perception of the sensuous world as something that is 
composed by specific economic and social relations, and that might be composed 
differently. In a series of imaginative examples, Marx and Engels elaborate on 
Feuerbach’s limited sensory capabilities. First, they note that  
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the cherry-tree, like almost all fruit trees, was, as is well known, only a few 
centuries ago transplanted by commerce into our zone, and therefore only by this 
action of a definite society in a definite age it has become “sensuous certainty” for 
Feuerbach. (62) 
Just as Feuerbach perceives the cherry tree to be a fixed given rather than a contingent 
historical composition, so even does he see the obviously built environment as an inert 
backdrop, rather than a lively, collaborative, and contingent manifestation of human-
nonhuman relations:  
in Manchester, for instance, Feuerbach sees only factories and machines, where a 
hundred years ago only spinning-wheels and weaving-looms were to be seen, or 
in the Campagna of Rome he finds only pasture lands and swamps, where in the 
time of Augustus he would have found nothing but the vineyards and villas of 
Roman capitalists. (63) 
The same holds, finally, for Feuerbach’s perception of people: 
when . . . he sees instead of healthy men a crowd of scrofulous, overworked and 
consumptive starvelings, he is compelled to take refuge in the “higher perception” 
and in the ideal of “compensation in the species” at the very point where the 
communist materialist sees the necessity, and at the same time the condition, of a 
transformation of both industry and the social structure. (64) 
Lacking a perception of the world as a contingent construction of economic and social 
relations, Feuerbach fails at a basic, sensory level to see it as something deserving of 
questioning and re-composition. In other words, what Feuerbach lacks in Marx and 
Engels’ view is a compositionist modality of sensation. It is this limitation in his sensory 
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capacities that keeps Feuerbach from moving toward a more practical sort of 
materialism: “he never manages to conceive the sensuous world as the total living 
sensuous activity of the individuals composing it” (64, emphasis altered).  
Though Bruno Latour does not explicitly engage the Marx outlined above, 
Latour’s overall project can be understood as an effort to “conceive the sensuous world as 
the total living sensuous activity of the individuals composing it.” Like Marx and Engels, 
Latour emphasizes the world as something continually being built, and his explication of 
the value of the concept of “construction” has marked resonance with Marx and Engels’ 
statements about Feuerbach. Like Marx and Engels, Latour embraces the notion that 
phenomena are constructed not to suggest that they are false, but rather to indicate that, 
like any construction site, they have a traceable origin that invites investigation. As he 
points out: 
the great advantage of visiting construction sites is that they offer an ideal vantage 
point to witness the connections between humans and non-humans . . . [to be] 
struck by spectacle of all the participants working hard at the time of their most 
radical metamorphosis. . . . Even more important, when you are guided to any 
construction site you are experiencing the troubling and exhilarating feeling that 
things could be different, or at least that they could still fail—a feeling never so 
deep when faced with the final product. (Reassembling 88-9) 
For Latour as for Marx, perceiving the world as something constructed means seeing it as 
composed rather than natural or given; as composed by a rich, ever-evolving 
entanglement of human and nonhuman forces; and as a composition that admits of being 
otherwise. Echoing Marx’s concern for a practical materialism, Latour insists that a sense 
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of the world as something constructed is crucial, since “if it’s already there, the practical 
means to compose it are no longer traceable” (Reassembling 163). In other words, if we 
cannot perceive change and the potential for change, we cannot begin the practical, 
generative work of politics (what Latour conceives as “the progressive composition of the 
common world,” Reassembling 254).  
In his well-known declaration that we have never been modern, Latour elaborates 
on a compositionist orientation to the world by developing the view shared by Marx and 
Engels that the distinction between nature and culture is untenable. As thinkers and doers, 
Latour maintains, we cannot isolate human and nonhuman realms of reality, but rather 
must engage them in their complex entanglements. As he argues in “Why Has Critique 
Run Out of Steam?” the practice of critique thus far has failed to do so, instead falling 
into two tired and impotent critical gestures: one that situates certain objects as “fairies,” 
mere phantasms invented by a powerful human imagination, and another that declares 
particular objects to be “facts,” hard-and-fast determinants of the world and human being 
(237). Echoing Marx, Latour argues that both gestures diminish rich, worldly things into 
mere objects exerting or receiving a brute, deterministic force. The consequent 
worldview, Latour maintains, is particularly ill-fitted for addressing contemporary 
problems, such as global warming.  
In place of these critical habits, Latour calls for a “second empiricism,” a “return 
to the realist attitude,” that would not distance us from objects, but bring us closer to 
them—so close that they become no longer isolated, recalcitrant matters of fact, but 
rather complex, vibrant matters of concern—matters which gather a complex array of 
associations and admit of participatory intervention (232). The new critical intimacy that 
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Latour envisions recalls Marx’s practical materialism in that it would be generative rather 
than negative. It would involve “multiplication, not subtraction” (248), not exposing or 
debunking, but assembling “arenas in which to gather” (246). Such a critical practice, in 
short, would be a compositionist one, amounting to the continual construction and care of 
a political space, rather than the continual destruction of possibilities for political action.  
Latour offers his text, Reassembling the Social, as a guidebook for this new, 
compositionist style of critique as he sees it embodied in actor-network theory (ANT).
4
 
Here he choreographs a reconception of the “social” notably reminiscent of that offered 
by Marx and explicated above: in Latour’s view, the social sciences have fallen into a bad 
habit of generating “social” explanations as a way of “owning” objects of study, 
protecting them from the encroachment of the natural sciences. But in all-too-common 
appeals to “larger” social forces, from oppression to capitalism, the specific activity of 
the social is never actually explained. Meanwhile, complex phenomena such as global 
warming are artificially split into two parts—a social or human part and a natural or 
material one (83-4). To avoid this bifurcation and better register the contingent and 
changeable character of the world, Latour proposes we abandon a conception of the 
social as “a special domain, a specific realm, or a particular sort of thing”—such as the 
realm of human relations, for instance (7). Rather, he proposes we retrieve the term’s 
older sense, which indicates “a very peculiar movement of re-association and 
reassembling” (7, emphasis added). For Latour, the social is not a preexistent substance, 
item, or power whose presence explains a given phenomenon, but rather an associating 
activity that demands description and explanation in its own right. Like Marx, then, 
Latour urges attention to how sociability pervades and composes people’s concrete 
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engagements with things in ways richer than simple determinism, so that those relations 
may be questioned and recomposed. 
Tracing the social—what Latour terms “network tracing”—requires a 
commitment to a flat ontology. To explain an object of interest, rather than gesturing 
toward “larger” social forces, the investigator must simply follow actors as they associate 
and reassociate, generating new actors, associations, and assemblies. In Latour’s view, 
actor-network theory’s project of tracing associations not only entails greater knowledge 
of them, but also performs an associating or assembling function of its own. This is 
because any description of associations is always also an affirmation and enactment of 
them—as Latour puts it, “to study is always to do politics in the sense that it collects or 
composes what the common world is made of” (256). The academic disciplines each 
have a role to play in examining and thereby reassembling the common world, just as 
“different professions—electricians, carpenters, masons, architects, and plumbers—work 
. . . on the same building” (254). Because it engages the social as an activity of 
associating or assembling into collectives, network tracing can return scholars to the 
“mission of collecting” that was abandoned when the social came to be seen as an already 
assembled thing (a society). It can also overcome the bifurcation of nature and culture by 
attuning us to nonhuman entities in a new way—not as simply passive objects onto which 
human power is projected or as brute, deterministic forces (holdovers from certain 
interpretations of Marx), but rather as complex gatherings, continually evolving and 
exercising a range of generative effects in the world.  
Recalling Marx and Engels’ suggestion that one must perceive and inhabit the 
world critically in order to change it, for Latour, this new practice of critique is immanent 
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rather than transcendent (“Compositionist” 475). As such, it demands a certain 
readjustment and refinement of sensation. Critique that tends to divide the world into a 
field of objects either passive or oppressive is accompanied by a wide-angle, long 
distance, and removed gaze—the sort of gaze that Marx and Engels attribute to 
Feuerbach, that Foucault expresses in the figure of the panopticon and that Kant figures 
in the sublime gaze. The alternative sensory disposition solicited in Latour’s version of 
ANT, on the contrary, supports an immersive, intimate kind of perception—one 
embodied in the figure of the ant itself. As Latour puts it, the antlike network tracer is “a 
blind, myopic, workaholic, trail-sniffing, and collective traveler” (Reassembling 9). The 
blindness of the network tracer is not an outright lack of vision, but rather a myopia, a 
narrowness and shortness of sight that demands a close engagement with one’s object—
or more to the point, that demands engagement with only those objects that are close. 
Myopia likewise draws out the more intimate sensory modalities of smell and touch: the 
network tracer “sniffs” out a trail of associations, seeking to maintain an “empirical 
grasp” of them in their fleeting, transformative becoming (Reassembling 118, 159).5  
For the work of network tracing, then, myopia marks an enhanced sensory ability 
rather than a disability. The myopic sensorium allows the network tracer to inhabit the 
world as constructed—to register things not as complete, self-present, and independent 
entities, but quite the contrary, as actor-networks. The network tracer’s sensory apparatus 
is thus calibrated to change—a crucial concern of network tracing, since the social, being 
a movement and not a thing, is “visible only when new associations are being made” 
(Reassembling 79). At the same time that it enables the network tracer to perceive the 
world as constructed, myopia enables her to participate in the construction of the world. 
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A narrow and shortsighted style of vision enables one, like an ant, to forge what Latour 
terms a “flat ontology”—a single, continuous trail—rather than leaping to new, “larger,” 
levels of explanation. As such, the myopic sensorium is generative, not passively 
receptive: receiving and generating come together in the act of tracing, which both 
follows and forges a path. The perception of the network tracer is an action-based 
perception—one that is grounded in a mobile, constitutive engagement with the world, 
rather than a removed gaze from afar. 
The myopic sensorium also means a new kind of attunement to power. To build 
new kinds of collectives, collectives that better represent the human and nonhuman 
agencies of the social world, we must attune our senses to a kind of agency that the entire 
“modern” era has taught us to filter out. This is a task that Latour often codes in terms of 
audibility. From Latour’s perspective, the modern turn and Kant specifically have 
conducted “a process of desensitization to the call of nonhumans,” (“Morality” 313, 
emphasis added) that we are now challenged to reverse. As he concludes Reassembling 
the Social, “So many other entities are now knocking on the door of our collectives. Is it 
absurd to want to retool our disciplines to become sensitive again to the noise they make 
and to try to find a place for them?” (262). 
Marx and Latour, then, gesture toward a style of critical activity that is intimate, 
immersive, and generative. Both see sensation as a site for harboring this sort of critique 
and for recomposing the world. Both also hope for a decline in a limited perceptual field 
wherein humans and nonhumans encounter one another as isolated, alienated entities 
merely interacting, rather than as mutually constitutive entities engaged in what Karen 
Barad terms intra-action. They envision an alternative world where the generative, 
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evolving, intra-active relations between humans and nonhumans are continually 
registered, embraced, and reassembled. Whereas Marx ultimately dreamt of a total 
revolution conducted by systematic economic transformation, Latour puts more stake in 
the local power of patient, myopic compositionist critique to slowly reassemble the 
world.  
In Latour’s view, constitutive debate about what composes and ought to compose 
the world should not be limited to academics, but be opened to broader publics—publics 
that might have significant nonhuman members (257). He helps to build such an opening 
in public art exhibitions (see, e.g., Making Things Public, Iconoclash). Latour also notes 
that, in a promising new development, the objects of public attention are increasingly 
being transformed into things (“Why Has Critique”). The remainder of this chapter will 
explore how contemporary food writing is not only participating in the critical 
transformation Latour notices and encourages, but also developing a broader, 
compositionist style of critique in distinctly sensory terms. In the next two sections, I will 
argue that in its genealogy and diagnosis of fast food, Fast Food Nation at once 
elaborates the rhetoricity of the sensory-material form of fast food and models an 
instructive compositionist critique of that form, following out a wealth of associations 
between fast food and other worldly formations. I will then take stock of what new 
assemblies of human-nonhuman publics Schlosser and other food documentarians have 
forged in their evolving articulations of the exposé and of compositionist critique more 
broadly. I will also return to the question of the standard of taste that concerned the 





In Fast Food Nation, Schlosser is concerned to make sensible—to make visible, audible, 
touchable, smellable, and of course, tasteable—the rapid changes that have characterized 
the American food system over the last half century. In this he evokes Latour’s and 
Marx’s views that the most promising political analyses track the “social” as a movement 
of associations. Also in line with Latour’s warning away from appeals to “larger” social 
forces to explain the composition of reality, Schlosser’s critique does not focus on a 
single entity, such as “corporate power,” neoliberalism, or even fast food itself, as the 
driving agent of damaging change, but rather on the complex sensory-material networks 
in which these and many other formations co-emerge in harmful ways. Although he 
highlights taste and sensation to a lesser extent than subsequent food writers and activists 
will, his investigation does much to establish fast food as an historical form that is at once 
sensory and material. At the same time that he takes on what we can recognize as a new 
materialist project of network tracing, then, he demonstrates how attention to the 
ontological connections Marx made between sensory and material form can help us 
understand sensory rhetoric in an ambient sense. As such, Fast Food Nation offers a 
stage for elaborating, tracking, and critiquing sensation as a rhetorical, world-building 
power.  
Echoing Marx and Engels, Fast Food Nation establishes sensory and material 
forms as emergent from historical forces rather than being natural and fixed. Eliciting this 
“compositionist” perspective, Schlosser’s opening image is not of McDonald’s, but 
Cheyenne Mountain, a peak of Colorado’s Front Range that appears beautiful and 
untouched from a distance, but is in fact hollowed out within, the site of a 4.5-acre, high-
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security combat operations complex for the U.S. Air Force. Like Cheyenne Mountain, the 
reporter implies, today’s food may appear natural: “Fast food is now so commonplace,” 
he notes, “that it has acquired an air of inevitability” (7). And yet, his investigation will 
invite us to re-see fast food, like Cheyenne Mountain (and like Marx and Engels’ cherry 
tree), as nothing fixed and pristine, but rather an emergent historical outcome of a 
contingent play of forces, from Reagan-era economic policy to the form of the 
automobile—an historical outcome that now reproduces and reinvents many of those 
forces at least as much as it is composed by them. In Latourian terms, then, Schlosser 
emphasizes fast food not as a final product but as something constructed—something 
whose origin is traceable, whose sturdiness is remarkable, and whose composition admits 
of reassembly.  
In the genealogical spirit, Schlosser narrates the origins of fast food not as a 
discrete birth but an emergence in a complex ecology. For instance, he establishes early 
in the book, that the sensory-material form of fast food co-emerged with the form of 
automobility—with both the automobile itself and the built environments prompted by 
the automobile. In the 1920s and 30s, cars became more affordable, and new federal 
support for road building was prompted by oil and automobile interests. Helping literally 
to forge the way for the automobile, General Motors purchased trolley systems in cities 
across the country, tearing up the tracks and establishing GM-supplied bus systems. The 
result of these and other developments was a pervasive spread of automobility throughout 
the habits and physical structures of everyday life. The shift toward automobility was 
particularly notable in southern California, where, in distinction from major Midwestern 
and Eastern cities, urban development was occurring in conjunction with the automobile 
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rather than public transit systems. “By 1940,” Schlosser reports, “there were about a 
million cars in Los Angeles, more than in forty-one states” (16). As automobility spread, 
inspiring the country’s first motels and drive-in banks, so also “a new form of eating 
place emerged”—the drive-in restaurant with its flashy, eye-catching exteriors and 
attractive, costumed carhops (16). 
The material form of the drive-in restaurant would eventually take a significant 
turn, evolving into the drive-thru restaurant that is today paradigmatic of fast food. As 
Schlosser narrates it, this development involved a reassembly of material relations, one 
that McDonald’s itself took on: in 1948, the McDonald Brothers Burger Bar Drive-In 
“fired all their carhops” and revamped their wares: “they got rid of everything that had to 
be eaten with a knife, spoon, or fork. The only sandwiches now sold were hamburgers or 
cheeseburgers. The brothers got rid of their dishes and glassware, replacing them with 
paper cups, paper bags, and paper plates” (20). Fast food, then, emerged as a new form of 
eating, one that gathered things and was gathered by them in a novel way. Schlosser’s 
genealogy demonstrates the intra-active character of the sensory-material form of fast 
food, which both emerged from and helped feed new articulations of transportation and 
resource use.  
As Schlosser traces the marketing of this new form, sensation emerges as 
rhetorical in several capacities. The large scale marketing of McDonald’s, he reports, 
began during the Baby Boom years. Ray Kroc, who had taken over from the McDonald 
brothers, developed the company’s existing family focus with a specific concentration on 
children. With television and Hollywood on the rise, Kroc “liked to tell people that he 
was really in show business, not the restaurant business” (41). And the company did 
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embrace show business, developing the Ronald McDonald mascot for their TV 
commercials, a personality who eventually rivaled Mickey Mouse in recognition value. 
As one children’s advertising expert notes, “The key is getting children to see a firm . . . 
in much the same way as [they see] mom or dad, grandma or grandpa” (44). Such an 
accomplishment can mean a longtime customer—as Schlosser explains, “the growth in 
children’s advertising has been driven by efforts to increase not just current, but also 
future, consumption. Hoping that nostalgic childhood memories of a brand will lead to a 
lifetime of purchases, companies plan ‘cradle-to-grave’ advertising strategies” (43). 
McDonald’s established its child-friendly ethos and its nostalgic allure not only in 
the spectacle of commercials and mascots, but also in the materiality of play. Kroc, an 
admirer and friend of Walt Disney, once envisioned a Disneyesque theme park dubbed 
“McDonaldsland,” a dream that transmuted into a sea of restaurant playgrounds across 
the country—with McDonald’s alone operating over 8 thousand playgrounds at the time 
of Fast Food Nation’s publication: “Every month about 90 percent of American children 
between the ages of three and nine visit a McDonald’s. The seesaw, slides, and pits full 
of plastic balls have proven to be an effective lure” (47). However, “when it gets down to 
brass tacks,” as Schlosser relates from a Brandweek article on fast food marketing, “the 
key to attracting kids is toys, toys, toys” (47). Partnering with major toy brands to create 
collectibles, fast food companies have lured in children and adults alike, provoking the 
major “toy crazes” of recent years, including Pokemon cards, Cabbage Patch Kids, 
Tamogotchis, Furby, and Teenie Beenie Babies (47). A 1997 Teenie Beenie Baby 
giveaway, indeed, skyrocketed McDonald’s Happy Meal sales from its typical 10 million 
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per week to 100 million Happy Meals in ten days—packaging food and fun for child and 
adult collectors alike.  
All of these rhetorical efforts are cemented by the food product itself. As 
Schlosser notes, “During the two years I spent researching this book, I ate an enormous 
amount of fast food. Most of it tasted pretty good. That is one of the main reasons people 
buy fast food; it has been carefully designed to taste good” (9). Evident in Schlosser’s 
visit to the flavorist discussed in chapter 1, the sensory allure of fast food is indeed 
carefully designed—in fact, it is in a sense co-designed by consumer and marketer: the 
flavorist does not simply conjure new sensory experiences out of whole cloth, but rather 
develops flavors in conjunction with consumer research. The child consumers targeted by 
fast food form the primary target market, and children’s marketing techniques include 
shopping mall surveys, focus groups with children as young as 2, observation, child 
development literature, dream research, and internet surveys (44-5).  
Key to cultivating lifetime consumers is not only the visual brand recognition 
enabled by consistent store appearances and mascots, but also a commitment to 
uniformity of flavor. Schlosser’s investigation elaborates on the tremendous efforts of the 
fast food industry to maintain sensory uniformity in their products. Potatoes, for instance, 
are sweetened in the fall and desweetened in the spring, to “correct” for seasonal 
variation (131). In such manner, carefully designed food products available for purchase 
across the globe go on to remain a part of a consumer’s sensorium for years, possibly a 
lifetime. 
Marketing also seeps into lived environments, with fast food chains “now gaining 
access to the last advertising-free outposts of American life”: public schools (51). 
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Schlosser captures the spirit of this move in its own rhetoric. As one marketer put it, 
“Influencing elementary school students is very important to soft drink marketers . . . 
because children are still establishing their tastes and habits” (53-4). Another marketing 
text urged: 
Discover your own river of revenue at the schoolhouse gates. . . .Whether it’s 
first-graders learning to read or teenagers shopping for their first car, we can 
guarantee an introduction of your product and your company to these students in 
the traditional setting of the classroom. (52) 
As this rhetoric suggests, public schools serve a powerful locale for sensory rhetoric not 
only because they are where those who “are still establishing their tastes and habits” 
spend most of their day, but also because they are material sites of authority and 
education, offering an ideal environment for the interested sensory pedagogies of food 
corporations. And decreased public support for education is creating just the opening 
marketers need. Schlosser traces the growing number of marketing deals being 
established between fast food marketers and school districts strapped for cash—deals 
which include advertisements on school news stations, corporate-sponsored teaching 
materials, and annual sales quotas. Speaking to this last point, Schlosser relates that when 
Colorado Springs District 11 fell short of its sales quota of 70 thousand cases of Coca-
Cola products, selling only 21 thousand, a memorandum was sent threatening school 
revenues and urging that Coke machines be made more readily accessible and students be 
allowed to bring Coke products into class. “Research shows that vendor purchases are 
closely linked to availability,” the memo advised. “Location, location, location is the 
key” (57).  
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As Schlosser implies, through larger built environments, fast food has a rhetorical 
power in that it helps to invent location as much as it simply exploits it:  
The fast food chains feed off the sprawl of Colorado Springs, accelerate it, and 
help set its visual tone. They build large signs to attract motorists and look at cars 
the way predators view herds of prey. The chains thrive on traffic, lots of it, and 
put new restaurants at intersections where traffic is likely to increase. . . . Fast 
food restaurants often serve as the shock troops of sprawl, landing early and 
pointing the way. (65)  
Fast food restaurants are militant in their ambient marketing, planning their stores with 
GIS technologies that one marketing publication touted as means to “spy on . . . 
customers with the same equipment once used to fight the Cold War” (66). The careful, 
high-tech selection of restaurant locations marks a further manipulation of the material 
world as a vehicle of persuasion and identification. But like food products, playgrounds, 
and schools, built environments do not simply conduct rhetorical forces, but also generate 
them. Here Thomas Rickert’s view of rhetoric as “not just played out in an environment 
but embedded complexly in and through it” (254) resonates. Elaborating on an example 
of the speed bump offered by Latour, Rickert argues that the speed bump does not simply 
persuade the driver to slow down in a more-than-symbolic way; it calls for a response in 
a way that helps invent the world—inviting some actions and ways of being and 
foreclosing others. The rhetoricity of the speed bump, then, is not locatable in the speed 
bump itself, but emergent from the worlds it enables and disables as it comes into contact 
with other things. Like the speed bump, the fast food restaurant does not simply persuade 
drivers to stop and purchase fast food, but shapes driving so that purchasing fast food is a 
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fitting and welcome part of it. Like the speed bump, fast food also does not do this of its 
own: as Latour notes, “the speed bump is ultimately not made of matter” but rather “full 
of engineers and chancellors and lawmakers, commingling their wills and their story lines 
with those of gravel, concrete, pain, and standard calculations” (208). In tracing the 
roadways, cars, subdivisions, sprawl, and marketing efforts that come together to make 
up fast food, Schlosser affirms this networked view. Rather than figuring the form of fast 
food as some centralized, domineering force that alone effects the mingling of eating and 
driving, he forges a flat ontology, tracing how multiple actors call each other into being 
and becoming, thereby inventing the world.
6
  
Schlosser’s genealogy of fast food also demonstrates how sensory-material form 
can be implicated in invention not as a concentrated site of power, but rather as a 
qualitative field of being and becoming. In rhetorical terms, the sensory form of fast food 
invents not through its discrete location and physical properties—a level of invention 
connected with topoi—but instead through a generative field prior to location—a level of 
invention connected with chora. As Rickert explicates it, chora can be understood not as 
place itself (like topoi), but instead as either the material and matrix which gives rise to 
place (resonating with the ancient connection to the countryside surrounding the polis) or 
the operations of place-making (resonating with chora’s ancient connection to dance).7  
In Schlosser’s genealogy, then, fast food is a sensory-material form characterized 
by its connection to childhood, car culture, speed, uniformity, and “readymade” 
consumables (to evoke Adorno). In the course of tracing what composes fast food, 
Schlosser also unpacks rhetoric in a sensory key. As fast food marketing suggests, 
sensory discernment or recognition marks a sort of bodily remembrance that may reach 
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back as far as childhood (indeed, that may be intimately connected with childhood), 
rendering sensory rhetoric a modality of human-nonhuman identification that shapes 
affect, desire, and craving. Exceeding the individual body of the perceiver, sensory 
rhetoric acts as a generative persuasive and ontological power emergent from and 
constitutive of food products, eating environments, built landscapes, and even cars and 
roadways.  
Schlosser’s genealogy of fast food also suggests that as a choric field not 
locatable in any one place, but itself giving rise to place, we cannot point to sensory 
rhetoric, assess and judge it as a discrete object with a removed, uninvolved gaze, but can 
only sense it in a myopic, immersive, and involved way. As such, sensory rhetoric poses 
a host of challenges, especially when it comes to seeking a standard of critical evaluation. 
Rising to these challenges, Schlosser’s focus on fast food is not an attempt to point at a 
source or concentration of power, but rather an opening for tracing out a path—indeed, 
many paths—with results that are not merely descriptive, but also evaluative, 
interventionist, and compositionist. Unlike Enlightenment thinkers who tended to locate 
value in the object or subject alone, Schlosser sees subject and object as co-generators of 
value, operating not as independent powerhouses, but rather in intra-action with one 
another. Since he does not conceive of fast food as a self-present, isolated, and fixed 
identity, Schlosser evaluates fast food by tracing its effects and associations, rather than 
highlighting its internal flaws. Schlosser’s focus on sensory-material form, moreover, 
offers an instructive guide for a practice of network tracing, evoking the diagnostic spirit 





As Schlosser’s initial genealogy indicates, the form of fast food has articulated with the 
forms of automobility and disposability in ways that pose a threat to human-nonhuman 
thriving, shifting sensory-material formations away from the more sustainable worlds 
invited by, for instance, public transportation and reusable dinnerware. In what follows, I 
isolate a number of additional connections Schlosser traces out from fast food in an 
investigative journey across the country—one that literally performs the myopic, trail-
sniffing work of the network tracer, composing a map of fast food’s questionable and 
harmful entanglements. Specifically, I consider the associations Schlosser’s journey 
draws between the sensory-material form of fast food and altered forms of business, 
labor, production, bacteria, and animality. If taste is to be evaluated not for its internal 
properties (as many Enlightenment standards would suggest) but in terms of the 
generative ecologies it enters, the worlds it invites or composes (as post-Enlightenment 
standards suggest), the evaluation process will be necessarily detailed and slow. In the 
slow work of network tracing, Schlosser trains the reader to perceive fast food in the 
compositionist modality unpacked above, and an instructive sensory-material style of 
critique is modeled.  
Uniformity 
For Schlosser, fast food epitomizes the triumph of a certain aesthetic of 
uniformity, and this triumph proceeds ambiently, in the sensory-material environment 
that extends beyond food per se. Like the taste of food, the American landscape is 
increasingly mechanized and homogenized, as evident in Schlosser’s drive through 
Colorado Springs:  
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The houses seem not to have been constructed by hand but manufactured by some 
gigantic machine, cast in the same mold and somehow dropped here fully made . . 
. . Every few miles, clusters of fast food joints seem to repeat themselves, Burger 
Kings, Wendy’s and McDonald’s, Subways, Pizza Huts, and Taco Bells, they 
keep appearing along the road, the same buildings and signage replaying like a 
tape loop. (60)  
Here, the often separated aesthetic domains of beauty and flavor come together, with 
Americans’ tastes for food reflecting the same appreciation of familiarity and comfort as 
evident in their taste for residential landscapes.  
Like Schlosser’s Cheyenne Mountain or Marx and Engel’s cherry tree, there is a 
sensory critique at work here—Schlosser asks us to see uniformity and sprawl as 
something both constructed (rather than natural) and problematic, inviting reassembly. 
Closely echoing Marx and the Frankfurt School, Schlosser is concerned that the sensory-
aesthetic impact of fast food mitigates against a more diverse, inventive, and mutually 
vibrant relations between people and things. But the trouble with uniformity is not merely 
a decline in vibrancy and sociability. The aesthetic of uniformity attendant to fast food 
has also characterized a business model that Schlosser connects to a resurgence of 
monopolistic power: “The basic thinking behind fast food has become the operating 
system of today’s retail economy, wiping out small businesses, obliterating regional 
differences, and spreading identical stores throughout the country like a self-replicating 
code” (5). Whereas in the late 1960s, for instance, McDonald’s purchased its beef from 
175 suppliers, “a few years later, seeking to achieve greater product uniformity as it 
expanded, McDonald’s reduced the number of beef suppliers to five” (136). As these and 
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other moves toward uniformity took root in business, the anti-trust measures that had 
been in play during most of the twentieth century were steadily undone. As Schlosser 
notes, “in 1970 the top four meatpacking firms slaughtered only 21 percent of the 
nation’s cattle” (137). After Reagan-era mergers, that figure has risen to 84 percent. With 
the revival of corporate enterprise of this scale, big business gains influence over 
government as well as governing powers of its own. Smaller competitors are pushed out, 
and a friendlier environment is created for the problematic forms of production, labor, 
contagion, and animality that Schlosser will gesture toward. 
Production  
As on the distribution side, the production of fast food typically involves a dearth 
of vibrant relations between humans and nonhumans, as demonstrated by Schlosser’s 
visit to another Latourian “construction site”: a massive potato processing facility. The 
pure size of the operation has a sublimely alienating effect for the reporter:  
On the top floor, the staircase led to a catwalk, and beneath my feet I saw a 
mound of potatoes that was twenty feet deep and a hundred feet wide and almost 
as long as two football fields. . . . In the dim light the potatoes looked like grains 
of sand on a beach. This was one of seven storage buildings on the property. (130) 
Schlosser explores the massive operation not only from the sublime and alienating gaze 
afforded by the catwalk, but also in the more myopic attitude of the network tracer, 
sniffing out the lively path of the potatoes through the facility. Here, Schlosser begins to 
echo Marx’s concerns about the “fetishism” of commodities: 
Outside, tractor-trailers arrived from the field, carrying potatoes that had just been 
harvested. . . . Conveyer belts took the wet, clean potatoes into a machine that 
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blasted them with steam for twelve seconds, boiled the water under their skins, 
and exploded their skins off. Then the potatoes were pumped into a preheated 
tank and shot through a Lamb Water Gun Knife. They emerged as shoestring 
fries. Four video cameras scrutinized them from different angles, looking for 
flaws. When a french fry with a blemish was detected, an optical sorting machine 
time-sequenced a single burst of compressed air that knocked the bad fry off the 
production line and onto a separate conveyer belt, which carried it to a machine 
that precisely removed the blemish. And then the fry was returned to the main 
production line.  
Sprays of hot water blanched the fries, gusts of hot air dried them, and 
25,000 pounds of boiling oil fried them to a slight crisp. Air cooled by 
compressed ammonia gas quickly froze them, a computerized sorter divided them 
into six-pound batches, and a device that spun like an out-of-control lazy Susan 
used centrifugal force to align the french fries so they all pointed in the same 
direction. The fries were sealed in brown bags, then the bags were loaded by 
robots into cardboard boxes, and the boxes were stacked by robots onto wooden 
pallets. Forklifts driven by human beings took the pallets to a freezer for storage. . 
. . Near the freezer was a laboratory where women in white coats analyzed french 
fries day and night, measuring their sugar content, the starch content, their color. 
(130-1) 
Recalling Marx’s table standing upon its head and thinking, the choreography of things 
here is eerily human, while lacking visible human agents except at the first and last steps 
of the process. At the same time, recalling Latour, Bennett, and Rickert, Schlosser’s 
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description calls attention to a vibrant agency of things. To this extent it highlights a new 
set of actors in the collective of taste, inviting the reader to attune to the heating, wetting, 
slicing, inspecting, blemish-removing, and aligning that characterizes the specific, 
dynamic associations between the mobile, evolving potato and its constellation of 
encounters. While things are recognized as having a life and agency of their own, that life 
is characterized by a certain violence. Tracing the (re)assembly of the potato into the 
french fry highlights the fry as something constructed rather than given, and the particular 
tenor of the construction—of the associations among actants—is called into question: 
commodities are not here “standing on their heads and thinking,” but rather proceeding 
through a series of rapid, urgent, and even brutal transformations, fully objectified by the 
relentless, churning machinery of their transformation.
8
  
Still, at the end of the potato’s path, as in his visit to the flavorist lab, Schlosser’s 
taste experience is once again full of wonder and ambivalence:  
A middle-aged woman in a lab coat handed me a paper plate full of premium 
extra longs, the type of French fries sold at McDonald’s, and a salt shaker, and 
some ketchup. The fries on the plate looked wildly out of place in this laboratory 
setting, this surreal food factory with its computer screens, digital readouts, shiny 
steel platforms, and evacuation plans in case of ammonia gas leaks. The French 
fries were delicious—crisp and golden brown, made from potatoes that had been 
in the ground that morning. (131) 
Despite the alienated and even angry choreographies that gave rise to it, the industrial 
french fry has an undeniable aesthetic allure. Isolated as it may be in production, 
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distribution, and consumption, it “has been carefully designed to taste good,” to express 
its vitality to the human eater.  
Labor 
In Schlosser’s narration, not only did car culture create a material space for 
highway-side and drive-thru dining, but the very production model of the automobile 
inspired the workplace design of early fast food restaurants. “For the first time, the 
guiding principles of a factory assembly line were applied to a commercial kitchen,” 
Schlosser remarks: “to fill a typical order, one person grilled the hamburger; another 
‘dressed’ and wrapped it; another prepared the milk shake; another made the fries; and 
another worked the counter” (20). In food’s transformation from drive-in to drive-thru, 
tasks such as carhopping were offloaded to customers, who adjusted to waiting in line to 
receive their food at counters and drive-thru lanes; many cleaning tasks were eliminated 
with the turn to disposable materials; and the need for skilled labor in the restaurant itself 
was drastically reduced. Even for the restaurant manager, Schlosser reports, “the job 
offers little opportunity for independent decision-making. Computer programs, training 
manuals, and the machines in the kitchen determine how just about everything must be 
done” (74). 
As in the potato facility, Schlosser directs us toward a certain commodity 
fetishism. Describing a particularly cutting edge, “postmodern” McDonald’s in Colorado 
Springs, he reports:  
The drive-thru lanes had automatic sensors buried in the asphalt to monitor the 
traffic. Robotic drink machines selected the proper cups, filled them with ice, and 
then filled them with soda. Dispensers powered by compressed carbon dioxide 
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shot out uniform spurts of ketchup and mustard. An elaborate unit emptied frozen 
French fries from a white plastic bin into wire-mesh baskets for frying, lowered 
the baskets into hot oil, lifted them a few minutes later and gave them a brief 
shake, put them back into the oil until the fries were perfectly cooked, and then 
dumped the fries underneath heat lamps, crispy and ready to be served. Television 
monitors in the kitchen instantly displayed the customer’s order. Advanced 
computer software essentially ran the kitchen, assigning tasks to various workers 
for maximum efficiency, predicting future orders on the basis of ongoing 
customer flow. (66) 
As for Marx, the material (and temporal) arrangement that Schlosser critiques here is 
problematic not in that machines have appropriated human tasks, but in that generative 
human engagements with other human and nonhuman entities have been foreclosed. In 
the postmodern McDonald’s, human laborers are robbed of the chance to work more 
intimately and creatively with the foods, machines, and techniques of their labor, while 
finding increasingly less interaction with customers as well. While laborers become less 
skilled and more alienated from people and things, the labor process is increasingly 
standardized and narrowed. As a Burger King executive put it, “there are many different 
ways today that employees can abuse our product, mess up the flow,” but this danger can 
be attenuated: “We can develop equipment that only works one way. . . . If the equipment 
only allows one process, there’s very little to train” (71-2). The unskilled character of the 
labor force, then, is linked to a static relationship with the technologies of labor—in stark 
contrast to the flavorists, for instance, whose status as elite artist-scientists rests on their 
interesting, experimental, compositionist engagements with the technologies of flavor.  
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A general lack of leverage also characterizes the new forms of labor emergent 
with the form of fast food, emanating in part from the high turnover rate of fast food 
restaurants. “The typical fast food worker quits or is fired every three to four months,” 
Schlosser reports (73). Fast food laborers have little momentum or leverage to organize, 
and when they do, they are threatened, subjected to lie detector tests, or let go. While this 
story is a familiar one that Marx himself tells, the networks by which worker organization 
is resisted are notably different with the rise of fast food and the decentralized 
corporation more broadly. For instance, because individual restaurant locations are nearly 
as disposable as individual laborers, fast food can easily resist workers’ organizing 
efforts: if a given store begins to organize, companies will simply close that location and 
reopen elsewhere, neglecting to rehire those suspected of participating in union efforts. In 
this manner, when Schlosser published Fast Food Nation, no McDonald’s worker in 
North America had union representation (77).  
A similar but still more unsettling situation holds for meatpacking jobs after the 
rise of fast food. As Schlosser relates it, after the publication of The Jungle and a 
subsequent 30-year struggle for union representation, meatpacking was established as a 
stable, middle class job, one requiring a good deal of skill. As meatpacking became more 
consolidated with food’s growing uniformity, however, those companies vying to be at 
the top took measures to deskill the workforce. In place of the mix of tasks established in 
unionized facilities, now “each worker stood in one spot along the line, performing the 
same simple task over and over again, making the same knife cut thousands of time 
during an eight-hour shift” (153). As one official bragged, “we’ve tried to take the skill 
out of every step,” (154). Meatpacking has since abandoned its historic home of Chicago, 
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relocating from urban centers to poor rural towns, cutting wages roughly in half, and 
adopting some of the same transitory spirit of fast food. Meatpackers, Schlosser relates, 
“have successfully pitted one economically depressed region against another, using the 
threat of plant closures and the promise of future investment to obtain lucrative 
government subsidies. No longer locally owned, they feel no allegiance to any one place” 
(163).  
Whereas Chicago meatpacking after the reform years eventually helped 
immigrant families establish new lives as middle class Americans, the laborers recruited 
for meatpacking today are impoverished citizens, illegal immigrants, homeless 
individuals, and refugees—people who are targeted for their vulnerable status, and whose 
vulnerability is more often worsened than improved by the job. As one meatpacking 
executive quipped, “If they’ve got a pulse, we’ll take an application” (162). And 
meatpacking jobs rarely help workers acquire anything other than a pulse—quite the 
contrary, meatpacking, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, is today “the most 
dangerous job in the United States” (172). Despite efforts to deskill it as much as 
possible, the job of meatpacking does not admit of the mechanization possible in fast 
food restaurants, potato processing plants, or even poultry processors. As Schlosser notes, 
whereas the poultry chicken’s body has been standardized and thus admits of being 
“killed, plucked, gutted, beheaded, and sliced into cutlets by robots and machines,” cattle 
bodies resist such mechanization, coming “in all shapes and sizes, varying in weight by 
hundreds of pounds” (172). As such, “in one crucial respect” meatpacking work has not 
been altered with the rise of fast food: still today, “the most important tool in a modern 
slaughterhouse is a sharp knife” (173). Meatpacking, then, continues to demand a fair 
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amount of skill, even when divided into discrete steps. Companies’ concerns to deskill 
the job and speed up the line are thus closely connected to a range of acute and 
progressive ailments among workers, from knife wounds to advanced carpal tunnel 
syndrome, slipped disks to amputations (173; 175). Despite meatpacking’s documented 
status as the most dangerous job in the country, injuries are systematically and grossly 
underreported. For workers at the bottom of the ladder, Schlosser notes, injuries are more 
than physically debilitating—they can ruin one’s means for survival, especially among 
widespread company resistance to providing health insurance and worker’s 
compensation. 
The sensory-material form of fast food, then, thrives on and cultivates an 
increasingly contingent laborer: unskilled, obedient, employed “at-will,” underpaid, 
temporary, replaceable, and economically, legally, and culturally vulnerable. This 
laborer, of course, shares much in common with many post-industrial laborers, but 
Schlosser shows how the sensory-material form of fast food has shaped the particular 
decline of certain contemporary forms of labor.  
Bacteria 
The sensory-material form of fast food has also helped to cultivate a dangerous 
new form of bacteria, undergirding what Schlosser figures as a new era of widespread 
food contamination: 
A generation ago, the typical outbreak of food poisoning involved a church 
supper, a family picnic, a wedding reception. Improper food handling or storage 
would cause a small group of people in one local area to get sick. Such traditional 
outbreaks still take place. But the nation’s industrialized and centralized system of 
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food processing has created a whole new sort of outbreak, one that can potentially 
sicken millions of people. (195) 
While many pathogens thrive in the new environments of food growing, processing, and 
handling, Schlosser focuses on one that is particularly ominous: E. coli 0157:H7.  
E. coli 0157:H7 is a mutated version of a bacterium found abundantly in the 
human digestive system. Most E. coli bacteria help us digest food, synthesize 
vitamins, and guard against dangerous organisms. E. coli 0157:H7, on the other 
hand, can release a powerful toxin—called a “verotoxin” or “Shiga toxin”—that 
attacks the lining of the intestine. (199)  
Those infected range from being unsymptomatic to developing life-threatening 
“hemolytic uremic syndrome.” About 4 percent or reported cases take the latter path, and 
about 5 percent of the children who develop the syndrome die from it, with E. coli 
0157:H7 constituting the leading cause of kidney failure among American children. 
E. coli 0157:H7 is a powerful pathogen. Antibiotics are ineffective in treating it, 
and it requires a remarkably low amount of exposure to have an effect: “To be infected 
by most food borne pathogens, such as Salmonella, you have to consume a fairly large 
dose—at least a million organisms. An infection with E. coli 0157:H7 can be caused by 
as few as five organisms” (201). This makes the pathogen particularly threatening in 
conjunction with the massive size of major growers and meatpackers. As Schlosser 
relates,  
The cattle now packed into feedlots get little exercise and live amid pools of 
manure. . . . Feedlots have become an extremely efficient mechanism for 
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“recirculating the manure,” which is unfortunate, since E. coli 0157:H7 can 
replicate in cattle troughs and survive in manure for up to ninety days (202).  
E. coli 0157:H7 is also invited by contemporary meatpacking practices, whose 
commitments to minimal training and maximal line speed support ongoing gut spillage, 
the major cause of infectious bacterial spread. By Schlosser’s calculations, “a single 
animal containing E. coli 0157:H7 can contaminate 32,000 pounds of [a large processing 
plant’s] ground beef” (204). “Three or four cattle bearing the microbe are eviscerated at a 
large slaughterhouse every hour. . . . At the IBP slaughterhouse in Lexington, Nebraska, 
the hourly spillage rate at the gut table has run as high as 20 percent, with stomach 
contents splattering one out of five carcasses.” (203). That gut spillage is commonplace 
in large-scale meatpacking operations is strongly suggested by the findings of a 1996 
USDA study concluding that 79 percent of “ground beef samples taken at processing 
plants” contained microbes “spread primarily by fecal matter” (197). 
In any scenario, of course, the handling and consumption of raw meat involves 
contact with potentially harmful pathogens. What Schlosser highlights is not a new onset 
of pathogens, but a new material network that significantly changes the forms and scale 
by which they are spread: “E. coli 0157:H7 was most likely responsible for some human 
illnesses thirty of forty years ago. But the rise of huge feedlots, slaughterhouses, and 
hamburger grinders seems to have provided the means for this pathogen to become 
widely dispersed in the nation’s food supply” (196). 
Animality 
The constellating, world-composing force of fast food is perhaps most evident in 
Schlosser’s discussion of a particular form of fast food: the Chicken McNugget. As the 
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president of ConAgra Poultry remarked, “the impact of McNuggets was so huge that it 
changed the industry. . . . Twenty years ago, most chicken was sold whole; today about 
90 percent of the chicken sold in the United States has been cut into pieces, cutlets, or 
nuggets” (139). And as Schlosser notes, 
Although many factors helped revolutionize the poultry industry and increase the 
power of the larger processors, one innovation played an especially important 
role. The Chicken McNugget turned a bird that once had to be carved at a table 
into something that could easily be eaten behind the wheel of a car. It turned a 
bulk agricultural commodity into a manufactured, value-added product. And it 
encouraged a system of production that has turned many chicken farmers into 
little more than serfs. (139) 
And the Chicken McNugget keeps turning: it also “helped turn Tyson Foods into the 
world’s largest chicken processor,” a development which has had a major impact on the 
life of the poultry chicken (139). What’s more, the Chicken McNugget has turned out an 
altogether new form of poultry chicken—a new breed of large-breasted chicken 
nicknamed “Mr. McDonald.”  
Schlosser here subtly attends to an operation that well characterizes the rhetorical 
power of sensory-material form: the turn. Embodied as trope, strophe, or figure, the turn 
has been connected with rhetoric since the classical period as a turning of meaning, 
thought, conviction, or word. Schlosser (elaborating George Kennedy) suggests how 
rhetoric’s turning can proceed at a sensory-material level. Here, the Chicken McNugget 
does not simply “turn” in a semantic or pathetic sense, but also in a broader ontological 
sense—the Chicken McNugget turns a bird into a thing, a bulk commodity into a 
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readymade product, farming into serfdom. In the development of this seductive menu 
item, one form of being gives way to another, more problematic one. Implied but 
(perhaps strategically) sidelined in Schlosser’s treatment is that the form of fast food has 
ushered in new modalities of animal mistreatment and animal suffering. Indeed, since the 
publication of Fast Food Nation, the violent turnings of poultry and livestock animals 
have been well-documented.  
Turning Toward Taste 
As the figure of the turn emphasizes, the connections Schlosser traces between the 
sensory-material form of fast food and new kinds of harm are not necessary ones, but 
they are strong ones. Indeed, the ecology that Schlosser traces is a vibrant one. The 
sensory-material form of fast food, he demonstrates, has emerged and thrived in 
conjunction with new forms of labor, politics, and corporate power. This is a healthy, 
thriving ecology, but one whose welfare is premised on an array of problematic harms. 
This returns us, then, to the questions posed in the previous chapter. Marx and the 
Frankfurt School pointed us toward vibrancy as a standard by which to measure the 
health of human-nonhuman entanglements, and their suggestion that vibrancy is needed 
for a healthy, emancipated world seems convincing. But Schlosser has pointed us toward 
contemporary articulations of vibrancy that seem problematic. Food technologies, he has 
shown, can inspire vibrant relations among some things that cause harm to others. This 
suggests that vibrancy alone may not be enough to make a given instance of sensory 
rhetoric desirable. What is vibrant for the hamburger and human taste may not be vibrant 
for glucose systems and cattle. It is the vibrant connections between McDonald’s and 
people, many experts believe, that support diabetes, animal suffering, and environmental 
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pollution. It is exactly that vibrancy, primarily manufactured and sustained by ingenious 
marketing and production practices, that makes these formations of suffering so 
entrenched. What this tells us is that vibrancy is not a sufficient standard of taste, even if 
it is a necessary one. Adorno’s attention to suffering as a further means of evaluation, at 
the very least, is needed to supplement it. 
Schlosser’s investigations also seem to call into question Marx’s assessment that 
the sense of having has come to rule among consumers, displacing the joys of tasting 
with the mere transaction of eating. On the contrary, the marketing and development of 
fast food, as it has churned out new flavors and eating environments, has enabled rich 
new sensory experiences. The thriving of fast food is premised on the fact that food has 
been carefully designed to taste good. At the same time that Marx’s diagnostics seem to 
fall short, perhaps Adorno’s elaborations are of assistance. As discussed in the previous 
chapter, for Adorno, the proliferation of readymade consumables—a category to which 
fast food certainly deserves membership—has rendered consumption a passive activity 
on the part of the eater. In Adorno’s terms, enjoyment is replaced by mere recognition. 
Likewise in Schlosser’s narration, the sort of taste cultivated among consumers is 
removed and passive—the object exercises an agency, to be sure, but the eater is little 
invited into the co-composition of what Donna Haraway terms a “contact zone” between 
eater and eaten (to be further discussed in the next chapter). Taking Haraway and 
Adorno’s perspectives to heart, what we need is a compositionist modality not only of 
critique, but also of everyday sensory practice, everyday involvement with the human-
nonhuman world. Schlosser has suggested that fast food might thwart the rhetorical 
powers of the senses, even if it has not “dulled” them to the extent that Marx believed. 
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In the attitude of the network tracer, Schlosser highlights what Latour terms the 
durability of these harmful formations, and yet, as for Latour, this durability is not a 
given—there is room for better intra-actions of business, labor, bacteria, and animal 
welfare even working within the basic arrangements of mass production, distribution, and 
consumption that characterize fast food. Fast Food Nation thus is not purely oppositional 
in its orientation to its object of fast food, but rather points the way toward an affirmative 
reworking of this form that might mitigate the harms currently associated with it. For 
instance, even if feedlots and slaughterhouses continue to operate at large scales, E. coli 
0157:H7 levels need not be so high. Indeed, as Schlosser reports, these levels have been 
successfully lowered by fast food companies motivated to protect their reputations. 
Following major outbreaks, companies such as Jack in the Box have begun pressuring 
their meatpacking suppliers to raise health standards, thereby indirectly improving 
working conditions. Yet these limited improvements do not trickle down to the individual 
consumer or even the federal school lunch program, who continue to receive a far lower 
grade of meat than demanding fast food companies.  
The disparity has to do with the fact that fast food companies have a power in 
relation to meatpackers that the federal government and the individual consumer lack, but 
it is also crucially related to the complexities of traceability. As Schlosser documents, 
“According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), more than a 
quarter of the American population suffers a bout of food poisoning each year. Most of 
these cases are never reported to authorities or properly diagnosed” (195). In cases where 
a certain bacterial infection is diagnosed, authorities are rarely able to trace an 
individual’s affliction back to a particular food item—a crucial step in providing 
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incentive for fast food companies like Jack in the Box to seek safer meat. When 
outbreaks are traced to a food item, a different traceability problem emerges: that of 
connecting a given food item to a processor of origin—let alone a grower. If this is 
achieved, traceability to the contaminated lot and its likely contact with other lots 
depends on how good the internal record keeping of the supplier has been. Massive 
amounts of uncontaminated product may require recall, depending on how good those 
records are. But even in cases where a product has been traced back successfully enough 
for a recall, the federal government does not have the authority to require processors to 
participate (or it did not at the time of Fast Food Nation’s publication). Instead, 
companies have the option to conduct voluntary recalls. And these, when they occur, 
typically come too late. When E. coli 0157:H7 was associated with a Hudson foods 
frozen hamburger patty, for instance, the sluggish recall that began with 20 thousand 
pounds of ground beef eventually extended to 35 million pounds—“most of which had 
already been eaten” (211). As Schlosser relates via his interviews with experts, this 
problem is fixable, or at least manageable, even in conjunction with the mass production 
model of fast food. 
In a similar spirit, Thomas Rickert has argued that while automobiles have 
participated in composing an unsustainable world, we must recognize that the form of 
automobility is not necessarily unsustainable—to assume it is to forget that things are 
never fully present to human intellect or sensoriums, but always have withdrawn 
affordances and potentials. Schlosser’s treatment of fast food parallels Rickert’s 
treatment of the automobility. In withholding appeals to larger forces exercising top-
down power, in doing the patient work of network tracing, Schlosser opens the space for 
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exploring and experimenting with alternative sensory and material articulations of fast 
food. Efforts to improve food traceability, for instance, perhaps open up the more positive 
affordances of fast food, such as its low cost or appealing taste. A sensory re-orientation 
to fast food that registers its constructed and changeable character, meanwhile, 
potentially enables fast food itself to participate in more critical publics.  
Fast food, then, is not interpolated as an eternal enemy, but critiqued in a 
compositionist manner, as a gathering force that co-emerges with other formations, often 
but not necessarily in problematic ways. But just because it only has its impact in concert 
with other formations, this does not mean Schlosser’s choice of focus is arbitrary. In 
choosing to center his study on this new form of food rather than, say, new forms of 
bacteria, Schlosser situates sensation as a potential site of intervention—a site where the 
world might be intimately recognized as something contingent and continually 
composed, and where affective, bodily, and physical fields might invite its re-
composition. It is exactly because sensation is rhetorically powerful in the ways revealed 
by the marketing of fast food that it marks a prime modality of intervention. And indeed, 
many food writers and documentarians since Schlosser have taken up taste as a domain 
for the reassembly of the world—including Michael Pollan, Barbara Kingsolver, Morgan 
Spurlock, Alice Waters, Barry Estabrook, and Michael Moss. These and many others 
have continued with a compositionist activity of network tracing centered on sensory-
material form. In tracking how sensation fields or zones worldly associations, these 
writers show how it might participate in a different composition of the world. With their 
efforts, sensation is increasingly emerging as an ambient, rhetorical, world-building 
force. Publics are becoming ever more sensible to the agencies and vitalities of the plants, 
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animals, technologies, and things that participate in foodways, opening—rather, 
assembling—the space for new kinds of politics as well as new kinds of ethics. These 
food writers develop on the aesthetic interventions of the Frankfurt School and even, in 
some ways, Latour, by embracing a reworking of taste that is at once sensory and 
material, subjective and ambient—one in which food products and food environments, 
along with many other things and environments, are invited to participate. They turn to 
taste for many of the reasons that Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment thinkers did—
for its affective and pathetic powers. But they supplement this work by further 
recognizing and inviting the participation of nonhuman agents in reworking the world. 
Sensory (Re)Exposure 
Schlosser and many who follow him present their project in the traditional garb of the 
exposé, whose role in the critique of industrial food reaches back to Upton Sinclair’s The 
Jungle. Schlosser, for instance, declares “I’ve written this book out of a belief that people 
should know what lies behind the shiny, happy surface of every fast food transaction” 
(10). Meanwhile, reporter Barry Estabrook suggests his 2012 Tomatoland will reveal a 
“parallel world unto itself, a place where many of the assumptions I had taken for granted 
about living in the United States are turned on their heads” (xx). The revelation of the 
origins of American food is implicated in a unveiling of the nation itself, also apparent in 
Schlosser’s subtitle, “The Dark Side of the All-American Meal.” But as my study of Fast 
Food Nation suggests, the exposures of the industrial food exposé exceed a modernist 
epistemological intervention—what Latour terms an effort to reveal “powerful agents 
hidden in the dark acting always consistently, continuously, relentlessly” (229). Rather 
than exposing the truth (as they claim to), these exposés expose the body of the reader to 
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new ways of sensing, new response-abilities. The exposé, in other words, like rhetoric 
itself, always remains at the level of appearance. Schlosser asks us to notice how fast 
food normally appears, and to perceive it differently. Contrary to Schlosser’s exposé-
style promise to reveal “what lies behind the shiny, happy surface of every food 
transaction” (10), the rhetorical power of fast food cannot be reworked by a simple 
exposure to reality, but rather a re-exposure of reality—a movement that Schlosser and 
the many taste-oriented food writers who follow him indeed make, often without 
highlighting it. Schlosser’s investigation demonstrates that the sensory rhetorical power 
of fast food—operating as it does in concert with technologies, bodies, desires, aesthetics, 
things, and built environments—is an immersive rhetorical power. Any intervention into 
it will be necessarily immanent, rather than transcendent. The “fast food nation” that 
Schlosser traces cannot be overturned, overcome, but only sensed, inhabited, and 
composed differently. As for the Scottish Enlightenment, then, attention to taste (and now 
food) troubles what we typically see as Enlightenment logics. 
In the end, and recalling Socrates, Schlosser is closer to the flavorist, closer to the 
sophist, than he would like to admit. It is, after all, Schlosser’s own rhetorical magic that 
renders the flavorist so queer. Schlosser, ultimately, engages in the very sorcery that he is 
suspicious of—he seeks to effect not just conscious knowledge, but certain kinds of 
affectabilities and knacks in his audience; he intuitively, myopically, shifts the realm of 
appearances, (re)assembling sensory worlds. Schlosser, in short, acts as a rhetorical 
educator, intervening in the response-ability of his audience at extra-rational, extra-
conscious levels as well as rational and conscious ones.  
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The reworking of the exposé is not unique to Schlosser, but at work in many 
industrial food exposés. Indeed, Sinclair famously lamented that readers disgusted by the 
meatpacking scenes in The Jungle responded not out of a concern for the workers, whose 
terrible plight he sought to communicate in the style of the sentimental novel, but rather 
out of concern for their own food: “I aimed at the public’s heart,” he regrets, “and by 
accident I hit it in the stomach” (xiii). The misfire perhaps emerged from the fact that 
Sinclair’s object involved food, which is of course the site of some of the subject’s most 
intimate sensory experiences with the “outside.” But what Sinclair hit upon in his poor 
aim was the power of sensory rhetoric—a power that exceeded both that of the heart and 
that of representational knowledge. Though it took time, the re-sensing of food that 
Sinclair effected in his exposé sparked concrete change—change that slowly but 
eventually revolutionized the conditions of meatpacking—at least until the developments 
that Schlosser connects with the rise of fast food. Sinclair then demonstrated Bennett’s 
view that a modernist style of intervention into representational knowledge, where “truth” 
is supposedly unveiled, indeed is not sufficient to “reliably produce moral outrage,” or 
“inspire ameliorative action” (xv). But at the same time, The Jungle demonstrated that the 
exposé exceeds its own modernist frame, not simply reworking representational beliefs, 
but altering entire sensoriums.  
The sensory-rhetorical potential of the exposé is perhaps best demonstrated in a 
recent activist performance, documented in Morgan Spurlock’s 2004 blockbuster film, 
Super Size Me. In what we can recognize as a performative articulation of the exposé 
(and of affirmative critique), Spurlock commits himself to a month-long, McDonald’s-
only diet. In the documentary, he introduces his project as an intervention into 
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knowledge, but not of the modernist sort, suggesting that we know fast food is bad for us, 
but we don’t really know that—not well enough to prompt needed change. Spurlock’s 
project will be to encode that knowledge not at a cognitive, conscious level alone, but 
rather (also) at a visceral, bodily level which he hopes will offer more potential for 
change. Sacrificing his own body to the powers of fast food, Spurlock performs an 
intervention into his audience’s sensorium that, not unlike Sinclair’s and at times 
Schlosser’s, operates at the level of disgust.  
At the same time, however, Spurlock’s sacrificial gesture problematically others 
those who are imagined to indulge in fast food, and alongside this, problematically 
stigmatizes weight. Enlightenment elitism, then, re-emerges in this sensory exposé, this 
performative form of immanent critique, but there is a potential for the exposé to unwork 
such elitism as it develops and embraces its sensory-rhetorical powers. This Spurlock 
demonstrates in modeling the incredible allure of fast food—emphasizing food’s vitality, 
he craves and delights in it, even though it makes him feel bad, suggesting how the “cruel 
optimism” described by Lauren Berlant manifests today at a sensory level. Spurlock’s 
performative demonstration of how sensation shapes desire ultimately complicates, rather 
than answers, one of the questions with which he frames his documentary: “Where does 
personal responsibility stop, and corporate responsibility begin?” Spurlock suggests, in 
fact, that the question of responsibility cannot be precisely answered, since fast food 
penetrates desire and interferes with personal agency. In line with Bennett, he points us 




Spurlock’s performance also intensifies the affirmative potential I noted in Fast 
Food Nation. In his performance, Spurlock fully embraces the sensory-material form of 
fast food according to its own logics (e.g., its nutritional claims, its suggestion to “super 
size,” etc.), surrendering to the force of fast food and performing as the ideal consumer, 
to see what would happen. Spurlock experiments in particular with how fast food can be 
prompted to rework itself—indeed, as Super Size Me notes, soon after the film’s release, 
McDonald’s quietly removed the “Super Size” option from its menu. To this extent, 
Spurlock may be understood to have conducted an affirmative, sensory critique, and ont 
that reworked fast food, and supersizing specifically, from within its own logics.
9
  
The exposé then has the potential to relay us not only to a sensuous and immanent 
modality of critique, but also toward the investment in response-ability and affirmative 
repetition of contemporary rhetorical theory. The evolution of the exposé also reminds us 
that these investments do not free us from the problem of elitism that haunts taste. 
Considered and enacted in sensory terms, the exposé asks us to reckon with how the 
projects of new materialist and affective approaches to rhetoric (that is, their concern to 
seek worldly intervention at the level of response-ability to human and nonhuman others) 
bring us back to the very problems of elitism associated with Enlightenment taste (and 
the problems of paternalism associated with Frankfurt School critique). It also points us 
toward how the exposé, at a sensory level, might reckon with and move through those 
obstacles.  
As such, popular exposés of industrial foods such as Schlosser’s, Estabrook’s, and 
Spurlock’s complicate recent critiques of “conscientious consumption.” These exposés, 
and the slow food and organic movements in which they participate, have surely played a 
169 
 
role in the rise of what social theorists have called “cultural” or “lifestyle” capitalism in 
the post-Civil Rights era. In this new phase of late capitalism, consumption has become 
not merely a matter of acquiring a material product, but of making a lifestyle choice—
associating oneself with an ideal, a community, or an identity. Schlosser rhetorically 
embraces just this sort of consumerism in his epilogue, “Have It Your Way,” issuing a 
motivational call for consumers to recover their agency and exercise what has been 
termed the “dollar vote.” He says:  
Nobody in the United States is forced to buy fast food. The first step toward 
meaningful change is by far the easiest: stop buying it. The executives who run 
the fast food industry are not bad men. They are businessmen. They will sell free-
range, organic, grass-fed hamburgers if you demand it. They will sell whatever 
sells at a profit. The usefulness of the market, its effectiveness as a tool, cuts both 
ways. The real power of the American consumer has not yet been unleashed. 
(269) 
The sensory exposure of Schlosser’s text, then, has culminated in a call to change the 
system from within by exercising the kinds of agency it admits. Yet on closer 
consideration, this sort of agency—the liberal subject that Schlosser here addresses—is 
only available if one has knowledge of the origins of potential food purchases. The 
reason “the real power of the American consumer has not yet been unleashed” is that 
consumers are not well informed, at intellectual and sensorial levels alike. A book like 
Schlosser’s certainly helps to temper consumer ignorance on some level, and for some 
consumers. At a general level, the affluent reading public likely to complete Schlosser’s 
book may be better able to exercise a dollar vote by declining to buy fast food 
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altogether—a trend which indeed seems to be taking root as a gap widens between food 
cultures in this country. But the amount of ignorance Fast Food Nation has revealed 
disturbs any richer form of lifestyle capitalism. To exercise a dollar vote with any sort of 
precision, a consumer would require specific knowledge of the origins of each product 
they encounter. As I have suggested, Schlosser’s investigation emphasizes that such 
knowledge is at best difficult to obtain, and often fundamentally impossible. Even 
improved traceability along the lines implicated above would not necessarily assist a 




Another objection to dollar voting arises from a more systematic condemnation of 
cultural capitalism. Slavoj  i ek has criticized the transformation to cultural capitalism as 
one which attempts to ameliorate social problems in capitalist gestures, such that buying 
a cup of coffee can at one and the same time be an act of consumption and an act of 
charity. For  i ek, pursuing this kind of consumer choice merely cultivates the ills of late 
capitalism by reinforcing the systems that cause poverty to begin with. “It is immoral,” he 
declares, “to use private property to alleviate the horrible evils that result from the 
institution of private property.”11  i ek calls for a certain type of misanthropy, a “soft 
apocalypticism” which would ask how to reconstruct society on such a basis that poverty 
would be impossible.  
Whether one believes that this sort of revolution is possible or desirable,  i ek’s 
critique of cultural capitalism resonates, highlighting a significant danger zone for 
popular food critique. However, my suggestion is that popular food critique has been 
evolving through neoliberal “conscientious consumer” models to a far more contagious 
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and far more potent reconfiguration of human-nonhuman relations. Returning to the 
apparent contradiction in Schlosser’s conclusion, I suggest that the tension it taps is more 
productive than damaging. Schlosser opens his book remarking “no other industry offers, 
both literally and figuratively, so much insight into the nature of mass consumption” (10). 
But Fast Food Nation leaves ambiguous whether the problem with mass consumption is 
a problem with the system or with the particular manifestation of the system—a little 
question that has been quite troublesome to scholars for the past several decades.
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Leaving that dilemma in its proper place, then, his provocation works at both levels—as 
any instance of food activism that hopes to be effective probably should.  
The really potent force, I suggest, is not Schlosser’s address of the American 
consumer, but his address of sensation more broadly. In his final paragraph, Schlosser 
continues his call to citizenship by offering his readers a choice—while at the same time 
asking them to surrender to affective work that prefigures choice: 
Pull open the glass door, feel the rush of cool air, walk inside, get in line, and look 
around you, look at the kids working in the kitchen, at the customers in their seats, 
at the ads for the latest toys, study the backlit color photographs above the 
counter, think about where the food came from, about how and where it was 
made, about what is set in motion by every single fast food purchase, the ripple 
effect near and far, think about it. Then place your order. Or turn and walk out the 
door. It’s not too late. Even in this fast food nation, you can still have it your way. 
(269-270). 
On one level, this is clearly a call for consumers to exercise the dollar vote by choosing to 
buy or not to buy fast food. However, this paragraph carefully circumscribes the choice it 
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offers its reader: in this hypothetical scenario, whether or not the reader chooses to order 
fast food, her sensibilities have been reattuned. The experience of walking into a fast food 
restaurant, let alone of eating a burger, has been re-assembled for readers of Fast Food 
Nation—the sensorium of fast food has been altered. And that sensorium is not solely the 
province of the reader. Indeed, if sensation has been addressed—and I believe it has—
then an alternative agency to that of the discrete individual has been addressed. Unlike 
the liberal subject, Fast Food Nation has demonstrated, taste is the province of a whole 
host of individuals and factors, a rhetorical ecology in and of itself. A politics operating 
in the contact zone of taste operates at a collective level that transcends—or rather 
reworks—the individualism of cultural capitalism.  
As such, my comparison of Schlosser to the flavorist is not accidental, but central 
to my assessment of sensory rhetoric. Like Latour’s exhibitions, Fast Food Nation helps 
to assemble new publics of human and nonhuman entities by cultivating a new, more 
intimate and immersive sensorium. Its attention to eating in particular—which is, in a 
sense, the most intimate of sensory activities—helps to further articulate an immersive, 
bodily mode of compositionist critique. And like Latour’s exhibits, it does so by 
displaying the nonhuman things that participate in composing our worlds. As such, Fast 
Food Nation and the exposés that follow, in their address of sensation as an ambient 
contact zone, enable new kinds of publics to form, publics that include actors both human 
and nonhuman. In so doing, they also demonstrate the value of Marx’s focus on sensory-





I have focused on Schlosser’s mostly negative critique of the food industry in part to 
draw out how we might discover the generative work of composition even in critique that 
objects to the status quo or, as I portrayed it in the opening of this project, that takes on a 
suspicious attitude. But the food activism that has followed Fast Food Nation has 
involved a considerable portion of still more affirmative, positive performances of 
critique as well, pointing toward promising new sensory-material forms and practices that 
might enable more vibrant, healthy collectives of taste. The most prominent example is 
the work of Michael Pollan, which turns away from the classic tropes of the exposé form 
more fully, even while more actively embracing the task of re-exposing the reader to the 
world. Pollan’s bestselling texts, Omnivore’s Dilemma and Botany of Desire (the latter of 
which was made into a documentary) in particular quite explicitly invite a new materialist 
sense-ability, training audiences in a perspective shift by which, for instance, the 
affordances of corn, rather than the choices of people, explain our current economic 
conditions. Pollan invites his readers to attune to how foods—through their tastes, 
economic values, portability, and so on—prompt us to do the things we do. To this extent 
he more affirmatively experiments with Marx’s emancipatory standard, exploring how 
we might take up richer co-articulations with food.  
Beyond the page and the screen, the sensory enactment of critique and 
intervention that I have here located in Fast Food Nation has been developed still more 
explicitly in recent food movements that actively reassemble taste through interventions 
in both sensory and material formations. Through these efforts, publics are primed to 
move away from a neoliberal logic and, through taste, to rework the world in an ambient 
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way. These initiatives are far from perfect, with perhaps the least developed aspect of this 
new rhetoric of taste being a sensitivity to differences in class and opportunity. Taste, in 
short, continues to pull in an elitist direction. But today’s mobilization of taste is a start 
toward a new political sensibility that could mitigate against neoliberal attitudes and 
worlds in an immanent, immersive way, turning them toward new forms and assemblies. 
My final chapter will elaborate and evaluate this potential where it has become most 
explicit—in on-the-ground (and with-the-ground) interventions into human-nonhuman 


















                                                 






 From 1992-2007, direct-to-consumer food sales through farmers markets and other 
venues tripled, growing twice as fast as overall agricultural sales. (USDA 2007 Census of 
Agriculture.) 
4
 Latour has been read to disavow critique altogether in this piece. In my reading, 
however, he calls for a reworking of critique into what we might term a “compositionist 
critique.” 
5
 As Latour puts it, “The definition of a social science I have proposed here by building 
on the sociology of science should be able to reclaim an empirical grasp, since it travels 
wherever new associations go rather than stopping short at the limit of the former social” 
(251). 
6
 This is not to say that explicit marketing efforts do not play a role in enhancing the 
sensory pull of fast food, but only that nonhuman things and environments also play a 
role that exceeds human intention, that nonhuman entities participate in the dominance of 
the fast food sensorium and in ways that exceed explicit planning. For instance, fast food 
executives have a role to play, but so also do Cold War information technologies—it is a 
network of forces that come together to compose and sustain the sensory-rhetorical space 
of fast food. Schlosser’s origin narrative offers perhaps the best example: GM did not 
anticipate the rise of fast food, but the landscapes it shaped came to exercise a rhetoricity 
of their own, welcoming fast food while being less hospitable to other forms of eating, 
such as the sit-down or even drive-in restaurant.  
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7
 As Rickert notes, the grounds of place being less stable and identifiable than place 
itself, chora is often repressed, approachable only in brief glimpses through “bastard 
discourses” (and here Rickert cites Kristeva). As opposed to topical invention, which 
relies on preexisting ideas as generative sites, choric invention embraces the originary, 
affective realm that precedes topics and language, where place is not stable, but still 
coming to be. As I am suggesting in this chapter, Fast Food Nation helps to situate 
sensation as a bastardized access point for intuiting the choric invention that undergirds 
problematic worldly arrangements. 
8
 Schlosser’s tour of a meatpacking operation (169-72) raises interesting contrasts—he 
moves from the sliced and processed meat product backwards through the line, whose 
similar brutality to the potato plant is exacerbated by the carnival of blood, manure, and 
grey-matter Schlosser sees on the floor, the machinery, and the hands and faces of the 
workers. Whereas Schlosser was able to trace the potato along a coherent path, in the 
meatpacking facility his efforts break down. 
9
 Indeed, Spurlock generates from the logics of fast food itself a number of “rules” for his 
experimental performance.  
10





 For a clear overview of the question and a sense of one strategy at a “third,” Deleuzian 








In Inessential Solidarity, Diane Davis calls our attention to a subterranean, onto-ethical 
realm of rhetoric. Whereas rhetoric is traditionally thought in terms of a subject’s acts of 
meaning, persuasion, or identification, Davis points us to a rhetoricity that comes before 
all of these, and even before the subject. Following Martin Heidegger, Jean-Luc Nancy, 
and Emmanuel Levinas, Davis notes that a subject’s being is first and foremost 
relational—“I” am only insofar as I respond to an other. My identity is not something I 
bring my relations with others, but rather something given me in those relations. In 
Davis’s Heideggerian rendering, “there is no being that is not already being-with” (4)—a 
view that echoes Marx’s anti-humanism. As such, being and becoming are premised on 
“an affectability or persuadability . . . that is the condition for symbolic action” (2). It is 
this “originary” affectability, this constitutive capacity for response, where Davis locates 
rhetoric at its most basic. Rhetoric, then, is not only or first an art of persuasion or 
identification, but also comes before these, as the existential condition that grants their 
very possibility: “By definition, communication can only take place among existents who 
are given over to an ‘outside,’ exposed, open to the other’s affection and effraction” (2). 
With Nancy, Davis understands community not as something composed among 
individuals, but rather a fundamental condition of exposure that precedes the articulation 
of any individual or group. Rhetoricity, in her framework, is that very exposure.  
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This presubjective view of rhetoric has significant implications for rhetoric’s 
relation to ethics. Following Levinas, Davis sees the subject’s ontological and rhetorical 
debt to the other as an ethical debt as well: “the existent (the ‘subject’) emerges as such 
only in response to alterity and therefore exists for-the-other (nonindifference) before it 
ever gets the chance to exist for-itself (indifference)” (14). Subjects are, in their very 
ontologies, at once response-able and responsible to others. This means that ethics, like 
rhetoric, abides neither with the individual nor with the other. In the realm of ethics, “it’s 
always already too late for my spontaneity, my choices, my heroism. Will, initiative, 
interpretation . . . all trail behind my being-for-the-other, which is not a decision I make 
but a predicament that gives me to be” (111). Rather than being a matter of the subject’s 
choice, character, or actions, ethics lives before the subject and inheres immediately with 
her (rhetorical) relation to the other, her self-constitutive response to alterity.  
Davis, then, draws out the ethical implications of what Hawhee describes as 
“invention in the middle,” situating rhetoricity as a kind of ethical potency that operates 
between and before consciousness and identity. In Rickert’s terms, Davis attunes us to 
ethics and rhetoric as a choric realm of emergent energies, the “matrix of all becoming” 
(Rickert 55). Her focus on an originary sociality echoes Marx’s treatment of society, for 
whom human being was also always relational—though Marx emphasized the nonhuman 
things and technologies that called subjects into being as well as the people. We can also 
hear resonance with Latour’s view of the social as not a glue that binds individuals 
together, but rather a movement of associations. Davis focuses on how any associative 
movement is premised on a fundamental, rhetorical, “associability” that situates emergent 
agents in ethical relation.  
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While Davis concentrates on affectability in the abstract, as the ontological 
condition of ethical being, my project has emphasized the historicity of that 
affectability—how the ability for existents to affect and thus compose one another, the 
range of possible affectations, varies across times and cultures. Following Davis (and 
recalling Scottish Enlightenment thought), this contingent, variable, affectability 
circumscribes not only a culture’s possible ontologies, but also its possible ethics. As my 
treatment of taste has suggested, if we are, as Levinas suggests, fundamentally beholden 
to the other, or as Nancy says, characterized by exposure, we are always beholden and 
exposed within a particular, sensorially and materially circumscribed field of 
affectability. Sensing beings can only see the world in so many colors, register so many 
smells and sound frequencies, and this sensory range varies with times and cultures. As 
such, certain fields of response-ability and responsibility are invited by our particular 
sensory world, and other possible ethical fields are withdrawn. Davis, then, opens the 
way for developing on the instinct of Scottish Enlightenment thinkers that sensory, 
rhetorical, and ethical capacity are closely linked, and she develops the move they begin 
to make toward an understanding of this linkage as a presubjective one, one where the 
divide between subject and object is blurred.  
In addition to departing from Davis in my attention to the historicity of 
affectability, I have also focused on a particular dimension of affectability: while Davis 
examines affectability in a general sense, my focus has been how affectability and 
response-ability manifest in a sensory key specifically. Davis’s view that a presubjective 
rhetorical response-ability comprises or hosts ethics can, I believe, guide a more specific 
inquiry into how sense-ability precedes subjective and objective identities and composes 
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ethics. This demands an understanding of sense-ability/sensibility, like affectability more 
broadly, as a rhetorical capacity or vulnerability that is not only or fundamentally the 
province of the sensing subject, but rather inheres between and before the subject and the 
sensuous object that emerge in the sensory event. Such an understanding, I argued in 
chapters 2 and 3, was under development during Scottish Enlightenment and Marxist 
treatments of taste and sensation, and it can be further developed via Davis’s notion of 
affectability.  
The previous chapter, “Reassembling the Senses,” articulated a practice of 
compositionist critique that intervened in affectabilities understood in these terms. 
Journalist Eric Schlosser, I argued, demonstrated an instructive reassembly of the senses 
in his genealogy of fast food. In keeping with Latour’s vision of compositionist critique, 
Schlosser approached fast food as a construction site—as a thing not natural and 
inevitable, as it may sometimes seem, but rather painstakingly assembled over time and 
space, and admitting of reassembly. Through genealogy and other practices of network 
tracing and exposure, Schlosser associated the sensory-material form of fast food with a 
host of problematic contemporary forms, inviting and inaugurating its reassembly.  
This chapter, “(Re)Zoning Ethics,” explores food activism from a slightly 
different angle. Rather than attending to the practice of network tracing, I attend to a 
somewhat different critical-compositionist practice, whereby sensation is explicitly 
engaged as a modality of ethico-rhetorical contact among people and things. In the next 
section, I frame this inquiry with a consideration of how we might think the ethical realm 
of rhetoric Davis describes in the arena of sensation specifically. A collective’s sense-
ability, I will propose, hosts or “zones” ethics, and it inheres not with the individual but 
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with evolving zones of contact among emergent sensing and sensuous beings. I then turn 
to two food movements growing today at a national and multinational level—the “slow 
food” and “farm to school” movements. I offer a consideration of how these interventions 
enact rhetoric and ethics at a sensory-material level, at the level of the contact zone. 
Finally, I return to the problem of immanence to draw some overall conclusions.  
Toward A Sensory Ethics 
If, as Davis has it, ethics consists in a fundamental, presubjective capacity for response, a 
basic ability to be affected, this means that an era’s sensibilities are crucial to its ethical 
theories and practices. This point is underscored in Emilie Hache and Bruno Latour’s 
essay “Morality or Moralism?: An Exercise in Sensitization.” Like Davis, Hache and 
Latour understand ethics in terms of the practice and imperative of response. For them, 
this makes rethinking or revamping ethics an inherently sensory project, one that requires 
reworking existing fields of sensibility, of sensory affectability. According to Hache and 
Latour, modern(ist) ethical sensibility has been heavily conditioned by Kant, who, 
through the concept of the sublime, took on the laborious task of desensitizing humans to 
the clamor of both external and internal nature. For Kant, a sublime attitude, where the 
enormity of nature could be appreciated via a safe, distant gaze, was necessary in order to 
attend to “the little music of morality within us” (325). Kant’s humanist ethics, then, was 
premised on a dulling or suspension of our sensory connection to the nonhuman, and a 
sharpening of a different, supposedly human, inner sense.  
However, Hache and Latour argue, the “glass” that Kant was able to insert 
between sensing humans and sensuous nonhumans has been shattered as the earth’s 
health has come more perceptibly to implicate human health. With this, diverse thinkers 
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from the philosopher Michel Serres to the scientist James Lovelock have opened up a 
space for reversing the Kantian desensitization of modern and modernist ethics and 
ushering in an ethics based on a sensitivity to all classes of things, human and nonhuman. 
This sensitivity is solicited, for instance, in Serres’ rereading (or, more properly, 
reseeing) of the Myth of Sisyphus to focus not on the man but on the rock: “For Serres, 
the falling rock is active, repulsed but each time returning; whereas the rest of us see a 
man with a rock that does nothing, that is passively displaced, and that falls by itself 
without reason” (319). From Serres’ perspective, it is not Sisyphus in his labor who is the 
primary figure of absurdity, but rather the rock in its perpetual return. In his reading of 
the myth, Serres “become[s] the eyes and voice of a rock,” reversing the perceptual 
distancing from nature demanded by Kant and modern ethics (319). This performative 
intervention into modern(ist) sensibilities—our sense-abilities in relation to rocks—marks 
an intervention into the fields of response-ability that enable and disable potential 
environmental ethics.  
Lovelock likewise develops on the tools we have to effect a resensitization to the 
nonhuman in his metaphorical personification of the earth as Gaia. As he asserts, “unless 
we see the Earth as a planet that behaves as if it were alive, at least to the extent of 
regulating its climate and chemistry, we will lack the will to change our way of life and to 
understand that we have made it our greatest enemy” (cf. Hache and Latour 322). Even 
while Lovelock takes care to emphasize that he is not figuring the earth “as alive in a 
sentient way, or even like an animal or bacterium” (cf. Hache and Latour 321), he does 
invite what Hache and Latour take to be a productive anthropomorphism—one that can 
resist the dangers of anthropocentrism. The personification of earth, that is, stages what 
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Lovelock terms a “promising misunderstanding” of the earth as a person that could 
counteract the Kantian desensitization to nature. For Hache and Latour, “the inducement 
to treat Gaia as a person may . . . commit us to take an interest in it, to think of 
ourselves—of her and us—in terms of interaction and reaction” (322).  
Lovelock’s “promising misunderstanding” surely has its limits. Still, Hache and 
Latour, in conjunction with Davis, help us to track the rhetoricity of ethics at a sensory 
level. As Hache and Latour tell us (recalling Marx), modern ethical thought and practice 
has been limited by a decline in our sense-ability, our response-ability, to the call of the 
nonhuman. Davis’s framework allows us to see this as a rhetorical decline. From this 
perspective, the reworking of modern(ist) ethics for which Hache and Latour call 
demands an experimentation with new kinds of rhetoricities, richer and more nuanced 
response-abilities that engage the nonhuman. In applauding and encouraging this shift, 
Hache and Latour suggest how Davis’s rhetorical affectability can live and evolve at a 
sensory level. They also, like Davis, invite an expansion of the “with” of being-with. 
Davis extends the notion of a prior rhetoricity to nonhuman animals whose being is, like 
that of humans, chiefly communal, emergent only in response to others. Following Hache 
and Latour (and likewise Thomas Rickert and Graham Harman), we might further extend 
this sort of prior rhetoricity to nonhuman things—to tomato plants, hamburgers, 
restaurants and so on—which also have their being only in response to others. Through 
such an expansion, ethics emerges as a play of call and response across a field of 
affectability or sense-ability.  
While Hache and Latour situate us to build on Davis in asking after the ethical 
dimensions of sensory rhetoric, I want to note a certain limitation in their brief critical 
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history of ethics. In Kant, as Hache and Latour argue, the nonhuman became insensible in 
a certain way—it was silenced behind glass. Yet in this selfsame gesture, we might note, 
nonhuman vitality was also made overwhelmingly vivid. Indeed, the extraordinary 
amount of cultural energy that went into developing the possibility of sublime experience 
both before and after Kant made nonhuman vitality not just visible, but brilliantly, even 
blindingly, so. As such, the sublime acted as a kind of sensory form that enabled an 
intensification of our visual experience of nature—and, concomitantly, Marx would 
remind us, an intensification of nature’s visibility. Kant, then, offered the sublime as a 
sensory form even when he wanted to situate it as an affectability that transcended 
sensation and penetrated into the realm of reason. Moreover, literary and artistic 
enactments of the sublime both before and after Kant would in fact seem to shatter the 
Kantian “glass” that Hache and Latour trouble—enabling the natural world to manifest, 
for instance, in loud and vertiginous and visceral ways as well as in bright ones. My point 
is not at all that Kant’s (extra)sensory form of the sublime is sufficient for an 
environmentalist ethic, but merely that it offers a certain rich modality of human-
nonhuman contact, a certain realm of environmentalist affectability, that we must 
appreciate even as we object to its limitations, note what kinds of affectabilities and 
sensitivities it closes off.  
If Hache and Latour neglect a more balanced treatment of the Kantian sublime, 
their sensory treatment of ethics is also limited by a fairly subjective approach to 
sensation and sensitization. In their short essay, sensation is at times treated in a modern 
framework that Hache and Latour would ultimately like to undermine: as a pre-composed 
subject’s reception of objective information or stimuli, rather than a transformative 
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engagement among co-constitutive actors. (In this they echo a common relegation of 
rhetoric to the transmission of information or meaning.) As my project has suggested, the 
work of diverse thinkers, including Hume, Marx, Bennett, and Latour himself, urges us to 
attend to how the (emergent) sensuous object participates in the constitutive movements 
of sensation and the realm of the sense-able. As we think the rhetoricity of ethics in 
sensory terms, we must consider not only the sensitivity of the human subject, but also 
the sensuous vitality of human and nonhuman “objects” of sensation—a vitality that is 
enabled or disabled by an era’s available sensory and material forms (the sublime being a 
case in point). Davis offers an opening onto such a project in her emphasis on the 
betweeness and beforeness of affectability, her view that affectability—and by 
implication rhetoric and ethics—precedes and gives rise to individuals, groups, objects, 
and meanings.  
In her notion of the “contact zone,” Donna Haraway offers a useful heuristic for 
tracking, at a sensory level, the betweeness and beforeness that Davis connects to ethics. 
Haraway unpacks the notion of the contact zone in discussing her and her dog Cayenne’s 
sport of “agility.” Premised on many of the conventions of horse training, agility is an 
occupation where practiced, human-dog partners work through an acrobatic course 
complete with various jumps, tunnels, weave poles, and “contact obstacles.” Haraway 
began attending to the contact zone as a concept when she and Cayenne ran up against 
failure in one such obstacle—the “A-frame.” In this exercise, the competing dog is tasked 
with scaling a jump of about 6 feet and landing on the other side with her two rear feet in 
an area painted yellow (a color easily recognizable by dogs). Failing to land in the zone 
brings a significant penalty, one that long kept Haraway and Cayenne from advancing 
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beyond beginner competitions. The painted yellow zone, then, initially barred contact 
between Haraway and Cayenne:  
The problem was simple: we did not understand each other. We were not 
communicating; we did not yet have a contact zone entangling each other. The 
result was that she regularly leapt over the down contact, not touching the yellow 
area with so much as a toepad before she raced to the next part of the course, 
much less holding the lovely two-rear-feet on the zone, two-frontfeet on the 
ground until I gave the agreed-on release words (all right) for her to go on to the 
next obstacle in the run. I could not figure out what she did not understand; she 
could not figure out what my ambiguous and ever-changing cues and criteria of 
performance meant. Faced with my incoherence, she leapt gracefully over the 
charged area as if it were electrified. It was; it repelled us both. (215-6) 
Haraway and Cayenne “did not yet have a contact zone entangling each other,” and they 
needed to compose one. This initial communicative impasse, however, is also what made 
the contact zone a contact zone—as distinct from, say, a comfort zone (a contrast 
Haraway suggests, 217). The contact zone is eminently rhetorical in Davis’s sense, 
marking a generative arena of affectability. Resonating with Hawhee’s discussion of 
metis, for Haraway, a contact zone is a provisional, inventional space that demands 
“shape-shifting skill” (217) as entities come in and out of being-in-relation to one 
another. It is at once limited and electrified by misunderstandings, misdirections, and 
power imbalances. Evoking Lovelock’s notion of the “promising misunderstanding” we 
might want to embrace in reworking our environmental ethic, it is this potent mix of 
communication and miscommunication, power and vulnerability, that enables 
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invention—the contact zone is where “most of the transformative things in life happen,” 
(219).  
And Haraway means transformations of all sorts. Genealogizing the concept of 
the contact zone beyond the agility course, she notes Mary Pratt’s original use of the term 
in Imperial Eyes, which explored the cultural arenas where people come into linguistic 
and extra-linguistic contact, where “subjects are constituted in and by their relations to 
each other . . . often within radically asymmetrical relations of power” (cf. Haraway 216). 
Contact zones also emerge in science fiction, where “aliens meet up in bars off-planet 
and redo one another molecule by molecule” (217). But contact zones are not limited to 
humans, animals, and aliens. Beyond these parties, Haraway notes, they can be found in 
countless areas of scientific study, such as “ecotones,” areas of high biodiversity and 
complexity where ecologies of different regions intermix. Co-developmental relations 
among “taxonomically distinct organisms” also form a kind of contact zone, as in the fact 
that “human gut tissue cannot develop normally without colonization by its bacterial 
flora” (220). The contact zone, then, is not merely an arena for intra-action among human 
and nonhuman animals, as in the example of Haraway and Cayenne. This example, 
rather, is instructive as we think the generative sensory modalities of contact among 
humans, things, and environments as well. In their various investigations of the contact 
zone, the humanities and sciences alike tell us that “co-constitutive companion species 
and coevolution are the rule, not the exception” (220). 
As the realm wherein organisms and ecologies call upon each other for a 
response, the contact zone stages potential ethical relations among co-emergent, 
contacting bodies, and admits of their reworking. As Haraway learns through the 
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troubling yellow area dividing herself and Cayenne, authority in contact zones is 
“asymmetrical but often directionally surprising” (225), demanding that the human 
surrender her instinct to control and mistrust her nonhuman partner, allow that partner a 
space to contribute to mutual becoming. Haraway discovers this with the help of a fellow 
agility trainer, who encourages her to take a step back from the A-frame competition with 
Cayenne and to embrace more rigorous training. In this, Haraway and Cayenne forge a 
new arena of contact. And yet not without some loss. After their more intensive training, 
Haraway notes, 
I had to face the need for many more “I pay attention to you; you pay attention to 
me” games to fill Cayenne’s and my not-so-leisure hours. I had to deal with my 
sense of paradise lost when Cayenne became steadily and vastly more interested 
in me than in other dogs. The price of the intensifying bond between us was, well, 
a bond. I still notice this; it still feels like a loss as well as an achievement of large 
spiritual and physical joy for both Cayenne and me. Ours is not an innocent, 
unconditional love; the love that ties us is a naturalcultural practice that has 
redone us molecule by molecule. (227-8) 
The contact zone thus is not to be confused with some utopic space among co-
constituting others. The emergence and cultivation of a contact zone is not a good thing 
in and of itself; it does not get us out of many of the most recalcitrant problems of ethics 
and power.  
However, an ethic attentive to contact zones as a particular realm of response-
ability, as a generative space for ethical and unethical relations, can be quite productive. 
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For one thing, it poises us to reckon with problematic limitations of the realm of 
communication and ethics: 
To claim not to be able to communicate with and to know one another and other 
critters, however imperfectly, is a denial of mortal entanglements (the open) for 
which we are responsible and in which we respond. Technique, calculation, 
method—all are indispensible and exacting. But they are not response, which is 
irreducible to calculation. Response is comprehending that subject-making 
connection is real. Response is face-to-face in the contact zone of an entangled 
relationship. Response is in the open. (226-7)  
In exploring how the face-to-face of response is enabled (and disabled) by emergent 
zones of contact, Haraway helps direct us toward an ethic of the contact zone. Here, the 
fundamental arena of affectability preceding ethics is not a given, wide open space of 
infinite potential. Quite the contrary, it is a highly particularized, qualitative field that is 
built, painstakingly, and with sacrifice, among intra-acting agents—a field that hosts and 
welcomes a certain range of responses, scorning, prohibiting, and displacing others 
(Cayenne’s contact zone with other dogs, for instance). Read with Davis, then, Haraway 
helps us see that an ethico-rhetorical field, a field of evolving response-abilities and 
affect-abilities, is staged not at the site of, say, the sensing human (as Hache and Latour 
sometimes suggest) or the site of solely human intra-action (as Levinas insists), but rather 
unfolds as a dynamic zone where human-nonhuman comforts and contacts succeed and 
fail, are enabled and disabled.  
Although Haraway does not emphasize it, there is more than just herself and 
Cayenne who are invested and transformed in the contact zone. The strange sort of 
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“naturalcultural,” cross-species connections that Haraway and Cayenne are able to make 
are made in a lively engagement with the obstacles of the agility course as well. Recalling 
Serres’ attention to the rock that keeps returning, the painted yellow contact zone, for 
instance, participates in their play/work—initially as an “electrified,” repellent realm, and 
later re-emerging as a welcoming realm of joy and success. Haraway, Cayenne, and the 
painted zone all make transformative contact, contact that re-fields ethics.  
The figure of the contact zone, then, helps us to rethink sensation as a modality of 
mutual relation and co-constitution among actors, rather than only a subjective reception 
of bodily or mental information. And it helps us think affectability in a material, 
ecological key, as a capacity, disposition, or dynamis of human-nonhuman ecologies. As 
a generative space preceding ontological and semiotic differentiation, contact zones share 
much in common with the choric realm discussed in chapter 4, and yet invite us to think 
about how sensation participates in the emergence and energy of a choric space. 
Haraway, for instance, gestures toward the sensory register in which contact zones might 
emerge in discussing the phenomenon of “isopraxis,” by which skilled horses and 
horseback riders enter a “zone” wherein “homologous muscles fire and contract in both 
horse and human at precisely the same time” (229). In the process, “Both, human and 
horse, are cause and effect of each other’s movements. Both induce and are induced, 
affect and are affected” (Barrey, cf. 229). The contact zone offers a way to inquire after 
the fields of sensory intra-actions that exist or could exist among human and nonhuman 
participants.  
Both Davis and Haraway explore how response-ability emerges between and 
before human and nonhuman animals, expanding the realm of ethics beyond the human. 
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In attending to food activism, we can extend such explorations to consider the response-
abilities that inhere between eater and eaten. Eating offers a notably dynamic example of 
a contact zone where life is at various stages of becoming—where plant and animal have 
become or are becoming not typically recognizable life forms, but objects, and then not 
objects, but sugars and fats and proteins. Eating is also perhaps the paradigm of 
appropriation—of the sort of miscommunications and power imbalances that Davis, 
Hache and Latour, and Haraway all trouble. To ask after sensory contact zones emergent 
among eater and eaten is to ask after the field of affective or responsive relations that are 
or might become possible—it is, in short, to ask after the zone of rhetoricity that grounds 
environmental and animal ethics. I am, then, inquiring into how nonhuman plants and 
animals and things participate in the realm of ethics—or, more precisely, in the pre-
originary, sensory, rhetorical response-ability that zones ethics.  
If agility training marks a space where relations of response can be developed and 
enriched in mutually beneficial ways, where others can come to (mis)communicate 
productively, today’s activist efforts to train taste offer a similar opening. In these, 
response-ability and responsibility become a matter of co-operative play/work and 
(mis)communication between eater and eaten. As the next two sections will consider, 
recent food activist efforts, in addition to creating new publics (as discussed in chapter 4), 
also participate in cultivating ethics at the sensory level, at the level of the contact zone—
and in ways that hearken back to the Enlightenment connections of taste and ethics. As 
we will see, these projects continually run up against the sort of elitisms and paternalisms 
that plagued the Scottish Enlightenment, but they also offer some promising openings for 
avoiding and reworking those power imbalances.  
192 
 
Sensory Activism and Slow Food International 
As the origin myth goes, Slow Food International was born in Rome in 1986 when Italy’s 
first McDonald’s was planning to open near the Spanish Steps in the Piazza di Spagna 
(Pietrykowski, 310). This threat brought protestors together who chanted in favor of slow 
food over fast, and who instead of holding up signs, held out bowls of penne pasta to 
passersby. Slow Food’s founder, Carlo Petrini, was an Italian leftist who, opposed to the 
violence of 1970s radical politics, endorsed an alternative politics based on pleasure 
(Pietrykowski 311). The organization does not explicitly reference Marx, but Marx’s 
vision of sensory emancipation is alive and well in their founding, 1989 manifesto, which 
opens as such: 
Born and nurtured under the sign of Industrialization, this century first invented 
the machine and then modeled its lifestyle after it. Speed became our shackles. 
We fell prey to the same virus: ‘the fast life’ that fractures our customs and assails 
us even in our own homes, forcing us to ingest “fast-food.” (n.p.) 
Echoing Marx’s diagnosis of sensory alienation, for Slow Food “the fast life” is to blame 
for the impoverishment of the co-implicated realms of custom, sensation, and 
environmental well-being. Emancipation, meanwhile, is envisioned as a sensuous 
reconnection with nonhuman vitality: for Slow Food, the cure for the virus of the fast life 
is “the vaccine of an adequate portion of sensual gourmandize pleasures, to be taken with 
slow and prolonged enjoyment” (n.p.). The manifesto also evokes elements of Frankfurt 
School Marxism, insofar as the culprit and the cure are cultural, and Slow Food figures 
itself specifically as “the avant-garde’s riposte” (n.p.). 
193 
 
Of course, not unlike the avant garde politics with which Slow Food identifies, 
the organization’s vision of a “real culture” shielded from the presumably “false” culture 
of the masses is dangerously elitist. In a further conservatism, Slow Food’s manifesto 
situates “the machine” as the counterpart to the human, with the “true” mark of humanity 
connected to “old-fashioned food traditions” (n.p.). This gives way to the rather un-Marx-
like suggestion that there is a separate, natural realm that traditional food traditions, slow 
food, somehow fails to sully. As this section will argue, as for Marx and the Frankfurt 
School, attention to the senses brings Slow Food into tension with some of its own 
problematic assumptions, in a way that the organization itself has not yet realized. Still, 
the slow food movement is instructive as we think the ethics and politics of sensory 
rhetoric. Slow Food, I will show, develops Marx’s vision of sensory emancipation to cast 
the senses as a distinctly rhetorical power, one that situates sensation as a rhetorical 
capacity or response-ability that “zones” a space for a rich and vibrant environmental 
ethics. As such, Slow Food offers an instructive example of both the powers and the 
dangers of rhetorical mobilizations of the senses.  
Sensory Education  
To establish how Slow Food situates taste as a rhetorical capacity, I will begin 
with an activist approach the organization terms “sensory education,” and a look at one of 
the online curriculum materials Slow Food provides for sensory education efforts 
targeting children—a 76-page document entitled “In What Sense? A Short Guide to 
Sensory Education.” Recalling Marx’s diagnosis of sensory alienation, this curriculum 
guide charges that the senses have become dulled by industrialization and urban 
development—it cites, for instance, research suggesting that city pollution has weakened 
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the sense of smell and that the use of artificial flavors has overstimulated and dulled the 
sense of taste (4-5). All this, the guide charges, has “transform[ed] us into ‘robot’ 
consumers, guided by senses which are increasingly unable to distinguish and select” (5). 
As an “invitation to eat with enjoyment and consciousness,” (n.p.), the guide outlines a 
series of so-called “experiences” for instructors, where children learn to express, reflect 
on, and, develop their sensory experience in relation to food.
1
 The course is divided into 
units that engage each of the five senses, with initial and concluding units addressing all 
the senses together.  
Slow Food’s curriculum casts children’s sensory capacity as a rhetorical capacity 
on several levels. First, there is a verbal dimension to children’s developing sensory 
acuity. For instance, the guide offers a vocabulary-building prompt for each of the five 
senses. As the prompt in the vision unit suggests, a food, in interacting with light, can 
look “opaque like a grape, glossy and bright like a cherry” (21), and so on, and a food’s 
color can be not just white, but “milk, ivory, straw, cream” (21), and so on. In addition to 
the vocabulary given children, the instructor is encouraged to note and re-use the strong 
vocabulary that children themselves introduce. Through these exercises in sensory 
vocabulary, children are situated as a community of rhetoricians zoning out a realm of 
environmental ethics, composing a zone of response-ability between themselves and the 
food they encounter. As such, verbal skill feeds into what Davis identifies as a more 
fundamental rhetoricity. Children’s developing lexical literacy, that is, presumably 
supports a sensory literacy as well—a nuance in children’s response-ability, say, to a 
cheese’s straw or cream color. If, as Davis puts it, communication (and by implication, 
ethics) “can only take place among existents who are given over to an ‘outside’” (2), this 
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lexical task nuances how eaters are given over to that outside, enriches the possible range 
of responses in which eater and eaten might participate.  
In other “experiences,” this range of response-ability is enriched as children are 
challenged to rely on their senses without systematic verbal expressions. For instance, in 
the smell unit, the instructor puts local herbs into containers and children are charged 
with identifying them by smell, and in the sound unit, children are blindfolded and tasked 
with identifying foods by their sound when other children bite into them. Here, response-
ability is invited to an attunement not circumscribed by language, which, while opening 
some potential modalities of contact between eater and eaten, potentially closes others. If 
the act of eating is run through with appropriation, then, Slow Food’s intermixture of 
verbal and nonverbal practices at least keeps that appropriation dynamic.  
While Slow Food’s sensory education curriculum places much emphasis on a 
playful exploration of sensation and sensory pleasure, many “experiences” also challenge 
children to connect sensation with more reflective domains of cognition. For instance, 
several tasks connect sensation and memory. Recalling the Scottish Enlightenment’s 
connections of taste and imagination, such tasks expand sensory capacity by encouraging 
students to conjure the sensuality of food even when they are not immediately 
experiencing it. Other exercises ask children to explore or reflect critically on sensory 
features of “industrial” compared to “natural” products. Here, recalling Marx and 
resonating with Marxian conceptions of rhetoric and composition as a critical activity, 
taste is educated as a site for questioning the state of reality and imagining alternatives. 
Yet there is a posthumanist twist to the critical capacities evoked here, where sensation 
gives way to a Latourian practice of compositionist critique: the children are not just 
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receiving sensory experiences, but actively composing and questioning them together, 
with one another and with the foods themselves. So here, critique moves from a focus on 
negativity and discernment, which could have a distancing effect, to generative, 
immanent practices of judgment and response that enrich children’s intimacy with the 
foods they eat.  
The Ark of Taste 
Slow Food does not stop at direct sensory interventions, but also intervenes in 
material form, with important implications from the perspective of ethics and politics. 
Thus, in one of its projects, Slow Food identifies threatened food products and seeks to 
preserve them in a true Biblical spirit—by including them in what the organization terms 
the “Ark of Taste.” The Ark is an online, networked catalog of endangered food products 
that have been carefully evaluated to qualify as foods that at once conserve biological, 
sensory, and cultural diversity. There are currently over 2 thousand food products “on 
board” the Ark, as Slow Food puts it. Two hundred of them are grown in the United 
States. And if you visit the U.S. site for the Ark of Taste, you can search for a product by 
name, region, or type. For instance, the Datil Pepper, “St. Augustine’s most beloved 
treasure,” can be traced back to the area’s “original Minorcan settlers.”2 Usually a 
featured food product has some description of its taste—the Datil Pepper, for example, 
has a “bright, fruity flavor well-suited to hot sauces and spice mixes.”3 On the Ark 
interface, one can also click on a link to see where to buy the pepper, or do a map search.  
The Datil Pepper has gone far since it “boarded” the Ark of Taste. In the 1980s, it 
was grown only in St. Augustine and its seed was unavailable in national seed catalogs. 
But because of the combined efforts of a chef, a horticultural instructor, a technical 
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college, and its Ark status, the pepper has been recovered and is now grown across the 
country. Since its Ark status has made the Datil Pepper more recognizable in its home 
community of St. Augustine, an annual Datil Pepper Festival has begun, complete with a 
Datil Pepper Cook-Off—with judges tasting a variety of dishes, including boiled peanuts, 
citrus jam, and even smoothies made with Datil Peppers. Meanwhile, a host of Datil 
Pepper recipes circulate online, including David’s Datil Pepper Relish (which reminds 
the cook to use gloves when working with the peppers) and, for the adventurous eater, 
Tropical Datil Cupcakes. Artisanal product lines using the Datil Pepper have also 
proliferated—for instance, one product line has expanded from the original “Dat’l Do It” 
Datil Pepper Hot Sauce, to include Hellish Relish, Devil Drops, and also a Datil Pepper 
Mustard. On top of this, the food franchise Firehouse Subs now sources 20 thousand 
pounds of the pepper from St. Augustine for their Captain Sorensen’s® Datil Pepper Hot 
Sauce (Conservation You Can Taste, 2013).
4
  
There are several things that I want to point out with the example of the Datil 
Pepper. First, Slow Food’s efforts are in many ways a contemporary enactment of Marx’s 
sensory articulation of biodiversity: as for Marx, sensory and material forms are 
understood as being imperiled together, together in need of protection—an assumption 
evident in the Ark of Taste’s slogan, “conservation you can taste.” Slow Food’s focus on 
taste, then, invites a treatment of food as what Latour and Serres would term a “quasi-
object,” a site where traditionally separated realms of nature and culture come together. 
Second, Slow Food’s address of a material-sensory form—the Datil Pepper and its taste 
profile—has given way to a larger material-sensory network, bringing quite a variety of 
parties into concrete material relation. By contrast, Slow Food’s taste education 
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curriculum engages taste at a more circumscribed level—the aim of Slow Food’s sensory 
curriculum is to attune response-ability primarily from the perspective of the eater. The 
Ark of Taste, for instance, intervenes into a larger and more complex zone of contact 
between eater and eaten, more explicitly soliciting the involvement of the eaten by 
conserving it and inviting it into foodways. In short, the Ark engages taste as a rhetorical 
capacity, a response-ability, of entire human-nonhuman ecologies. In this sense Edbauer 
Rice’s notion of the rhetorical ecology mingles with Davis’s notion of rhetoric as an 
ethical capacity for response.  
A final important point that the Datil Pepper example illuminates is that insofar as 
Slow Food calls rhetorical ecologies into being, the organization sacrifices a little bit of 
its own agency. The generative rhetorical ecologies that the Ark enables have a life of 
their own, and one that can come to complicate some of the more problematic aspects we 
can identify in Slow Food’s founding manifesto. For instance, Slow Food’s rhetoric, not 
the least its choice to reference Noah’s Ark, often forwards a naturalism by which food 
cultures, products, and traditions are to be preserved in all their original, pure, God-given 
glory. But insofar as the Ark cultivates new communities of human-nonhuman being, it 
does not simply preserve food cultures and products and traditions, but also zones the 
space for new ones, new kinds of sensory-material intimacies between humans and 
things. The ethico-rhetorical ecologies that the Ark calls into being can also come into 
tension with another of the problematic dimensions we have noted in Slow Food’s verbal 
rhetoric—its resistance to the machine and its concern that we are all being transformed 
into “robot” consumers by corporate interest. This founding stance against 
industrialization and corporate power is complicated, for instance, when the Datil Pepper 
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finds its way into the corporate economy of Firehouse Subs. This complication in turn 
gives Slow Food as an organization the potential to break with the sorts of conservatisms 
and simplistic naturalisms that have long been associated with the concept of taste.  
In this manner, Slow Food’ operations are not purely oppositional (despite their 
explicit positioning against fast food)—they have the potential to work with existing 
foodways rather than outright rejecting them. This potential is even further apparent in 
Slow Food USA’s recent $500,000 partnership with Chipotle, which will fund “100 
school gardens in 10 metropolitan areas across the country.”5 As such, Slow Food offers 
an instructive example of how a thorough and committed intervention into taste as a 
rhetorical capacity pushes past the sort of conservatism and rigidity that we often connect 
with the very concept of taste reaching back to the Enlightenment.  
To the extent that Slow Food offers material and sensory interventions into the 
co-constituting response-abilities of eater and eaten, it also offers a promising step toward 
the sort of reattunement to nonhuman vitality for which Hache and Latour call. However, 
this potential is not always realized. In fact, at the same time that Slow Food offers an 
important lesson in the power of sensory-rhetorical interventions, it also illustrates certain 
crucial drawbacks. Most notably, while Slow Food benefits many chefs, consumers, 
smaller producers, and threatened networks of vital human-nonhuman entwinement, thus 
far, the smaller cultures of taste that the organization inspires are primarily elite cultures 
of consumption. Even where the Ark foods are available through affordable farmer’s 
markets and CSAs or even fast food franchises, it is typically only an educated group of 
consumers who enjoy access to them.  
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The lingering elitism of taste seemed strongest in the recent deposal/resignation of 
the president of Slow Food USA, Josh Viertel. Taking over leadership in 2008, Viertel 
attempted to build on the organization’s commitment to food justice, organizing, for 
instance, a “$5 Lunch Challenge” where individuals and organizers across the country 
pledged to make “slow food” lunches available for under $5. With similar spirit, Viertel 
turned the organization’s focus to farm bill advocacy. But initiatives like these received 
significant resistance from the group. Some felt that the $5 challenge violated the 
organization’s commitment to champion farms and secure a fair market price for their 
goods. Others felt that Viertel was taking the organization away from its identity as a 
grassroots group, moving it in a policy direction that conflicted with its core spirit. 
Private support for the group declined during Viertel’s leadership.6 And yet, when Viertel 
announced his resignation in 2012, the organization had just been awarded a $1.2 million 
grant from the W.K. Kellogg Foundation, “whose food-related financing generally goes 
toward improving the diet of poor Americans, especially children.”7 
Slow Food’s resistance to making “good, clean, and fair” food more accessible to 
the general public is disappointing. Still, to my mind, we shouldn’t fault Slow Food for 
the particular realm of food justice in which they have chosen to intervene. Slow Food is 
not wholly uninterested in food justice, but rather angled to focus on food justice at the 
level of production more than consumption. Although the group neglects and even 
outright resists focusing on eaters and food access, Slow Food rigorously champions 
farmers struggling to make ends meet by helping them carry on sustainable growing and 
eating practices. Where Slow Food goes wrong is not their explicit arena of intervention, 
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but rather their failure, even their refusal, to recognize and question the new cultures their 
work composes—both the promising new cultures and the problematic ones.  
This resistance to self-criticism became perhaps most evident in a 2006 comment 
by Alice Waters, famed San Francisco chef and current vice president of Slow Food 
International. Strolling through a farmer’s market during a 60 Minutes interview, Waters 
remarked: “We make decisions every day about what we’re going to eat . . . . And some 
people want to buy Nike shoes—two pairs—and other people want to eat Bronx grapes, 
and nourish themselves. I pay a little extra, but this is what I want to do.”8 In the 
worldview evident here, “some” people make good choices, and “other” people make 
poor ones, and these choices can be corrected through cultural interventions that educate 
the “others” into the good choices. In this position, Waters fails to realize that Slow Food 
offers the potential to move past the Enlightenment assumption that a standard of taste 
can and should be discovered and enforced. A more nuanced understanding of Slow 
Food’s rhetorical power would remind us that good taste is not something that is “out 
there” to be discovered or imposed, but it is something to be invented and co-composed 
in human-nonhuman communities of being. As the example of the Datil Pepper suggests, 
when it is recognized as an ongoing, self-inventing, rhetorical ecology, taste is always 
situated to be questioned and to be re-composed. Those who have focused on immanent 
modes of critique confirm this. As discussed earlier, Marx calls for an emancipatory 
practice whose future we cannot predict. For Adorno, “we cannot know or even imagine 
what the good, reconciliation, utopia, or a free society would look like (Freyenhagen 
178). For Latour, we must experimentally attempt to compose better worlds. Waters, 
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along with many others at the heart of the Slow Food movement, fails to recognize the 
very rhetorical powers and promise of the international organization that she helps to run.  
The shortcomings of Slow Food represent a challenge that sensory-rhetorical 
interventions indeed must face, but it is not an insurmountable challenge. Slow Food has 
not done a good job of tapping in to the very rhetorical powers that their efforts enable. 
But the possibility of doing so, and thus of mitigating their harmful side effects, remains.  
Sensory Activism and Farm to School 
Ironically, promise for a more self-critical, compositionist approach to taste lies in a 
movement that Alice Waters helped to start in her “Edible Schoolyard” (ESY) Project. As 
the ESY website narrates it,  
Twenty years ago, Alice Waters was quoted in a local newspaper, claiming that 
the school she passed every day looked like no one cared about it. Neil Smith, 
then principal of Martin Luther King, Jr. Middle School, contacted Alice with the 
acre of blighted land on the school’s grounds firmly in mind. He wanted her to see 
the school and perhaps find a way to help. It was clear to Alice: she wanted to 
start a garden and build a teaching kitchen that could become tools for enriching 
the curriculum and life of the school community. Neil and Alice met with the 
faculty and the idea slowly began to take form.
9
 
Within two years, garden construction began, and within three years, the school’s 
abandoned cafeteria was transformed into a kitchen classroom. “By year five, ESY 
Berkeley taught ten 90-minute classes a week in both the garden and kitchen.” Since 
then, edible education has been thoroughly integrated into the King Middle School 
curriculum, thanks to the assistance of a now 9-person ESY staff. The school grounds 
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now host chickens and ducks, and the one-acre garden features “more than 100 varieties 
of seasonal vegetables, herbs, vines, berries, flowers, and fruit trees.”10 The efforts have 
been fully supported by the Edible Schoolyard Project, and have expanded well beyond 
the 7 thousand King Middle School students the project reports having served. Today, a 
new dining facility “serves as the central kitchen for all 16 schools in the district, 
providing 10,000 meals per day, made with wholesome, fresh, and mostly organic 
ingredients.”11  
ESY’s own extensive curriculum is available through its website, which includes 
a total of 62 lessons for middle schoolers, a detailed documentation of the Edible 
Education Teaching Standards, video clips of lessons, and many other materials.
12
 The 
edible education curriculum at King Middle School is multidisciplinary, including 
experiential study of culture, history, language, chemistry, and geography.
13
 To take just 
one example, sixth graders meet a California common core requirement in studying the 
Han Dynasty’s “Silk Road” while preparing relating foods. In preparing steamed 
dumplings, for instance, students learn that steaming was a cooking technique originating 
in China. Another Silk Road activity has students trade for regionally arranged 
ingredients needed to complete their recipe, giving them experiential instruction in the 
cultural and economic dimensions of Silk Road trade.  
While recognizing its home location in Berkeley as the gold standard of what 
edible education can do, ESY’s vision is much wider: “The mission of the Edible 
Schoolyard Project is to build and share a national edible education curriculum for pre-
kindergarten through high school. We envision gardens and kitchens as interactive 
classrooms for all academic subjects, and a free, nutritious, organic lunch for every 
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student.”14 With Waters’ efforts and inspiration, as of 2002, more than 2 thousand of 
California’s 9 thousand schools had established edible gardens (Hinman). Beyond 
Berkeley, ESY supports six other model schools (what they term “founding programs”) 
across the country. A yearly Edible Schoolyard Academy, meanwhile, “trains leading 
educators to create powerful and sustainable edible education programs in their schools 
and communities.”15 Perhaps most valuable for schools seeking to follow in ESY’s 
footsteps, the organization hosts an extensive online network connecting similar 
initiatives around the world, currently indexing over 4,500 garden classrooms, over 4,300 
of which are in the United States. Interested parties can search not only for program 
information, but also for resources, with some 340 hits in a search of “Lessons” alone.16  
Waters’ Edible Schoolyard project has been both a model and a key participant in 
the emergence of what is often termed the “farm to school” movement. Like “slow food,” 
“farm to school” efforts are increasingly being discussed and enacted not as the effort of 
a single organization, but rather as a larger food movement. That “farm to school” names 
a movement and not just an organization is thanks in part to the similarly loose and large 
umbrella network that anchors the term: the National Farm to School Network (NFSN). 
Like ESY, the NFSN serves an important connective for activists, acting as “an 
information, advocacy and networking hub for communities working to bring local food 
sourcing and food and agriculture education into school systems and preschools.”17 The 
NFSN itself is widely dispersed, including, in addition to a national staff and advisory 
board, 51 state and 8 regional “lead organizations” (nonprofits, state agencies, and 
university bodies selected by the national network to support farm to school efforts in 
their areas). On its website, NFSN also includes “more than 8,000 farm to school 
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practitioners and supporters.”18 As such, “farm to school” extends well beyond the 
confines of the governmental organization itself.  
Farm to school efforts are dedicated to connecting schoolchildren to local, healthy 
foods. As NFSN describes it, these efforts take three main approaches:  
 Procurement: Local foods are purchased, promoted and served in the cafeteria or 
as a snack or taste-test; 
 Education: Students participate in education activities related to agriculture, food, 
health or nutrition; and  
 School gardens: Students engage in hands-on learning through gardening.19 
Though all three elements are not always present in NFSN-supported initiatives, efforts 
are made to this end. South Carolina Farm to School, for instance, which has supported 
some one hundred public schools, requires schools that implement school gardens with 
their funding to likewise implement NFSN-sponsored procurement and education 
programs, including taste education curriculum.
20
 Training materials for farm to school 
practitioners divide education into two further categories: “food and agriculture 
curriculum,” and “experiential education such as farm tours, cooking demonstrations, and 
taste tests” (“Best Practices”). In a note to presenters, the materials urge, “The Farm to 
School approach—when taken in its entirety—is the holistic approach we need to 
promote. Not just one of these strategies, but all of them together to enable lasting 
change” (“Best Practices”).  
A government-funded program, the National Farm to School Network began in 
the 1990s as the work of initiatives like Waters’ Edible Schoolyard Project. It first 
received federal funding and recognition in 2004. In 2010, an annual $5 million was 
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allocated by Congress to help support farm to school programming. According to NFSN, 
today the “demand for the program is more than five times higher than available 
funding.”21 Accordingly, the network has introduced the Farm to School Act of 2015 to 
Congress, which would increase the allocation for farm to school programming to $15 
million annually. Farm to school programming is also supported by several other USDA 
sources (“USDA Grants and Loans”), and many public and private sources beyond the 
USDA.
22
 Currently, NFSN boasts that over 40 thousand U.S. schools have farm to school 
programming.  
Farm to school efforts include tasting curricula similar to those of Slow Food 
(indeed, the slow food and farm to school movements have notable overlaps, and the two 
“parent” organizations regularly collaborate). One New Mexico program, for instance, 
offers extensive, bilingual Spanish-English teaching materials for grades K-6 available 
for purchase or download.
23
 A sample lesson plan for a “Salad Tasting.” demoed in a 45-
minute video available online, invites students to work with salad greens at many sensory 
levels. Students, for instance, draw pictures of various lettuces before tasting them, and 
write down descriptive words from a provided bilingual list. When they finally taste the 
lettuces, they generate more descriptive vocabulary as a class, and then vote on their 
favorite green. Each student makes a colorful bar graph to represent the class preferences. 
Finally, students prepare, describe, draw, and eat their own salad.
24
 Like Slow Food, then, 
this curriculum invites students to compose new contact zones at verbal and nonverbal 
levels. 
But, due to their integration with the institution of the school, the sensory and 
material interventions of farm to school efforts also often depart in significant ways from 
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the typical efforts of Slow Food. As suggested by Waters’ Edible Schoolyard model, for 
instance, education about foods and their taste is ideally integrated across curriculum. In 
similar spirit, 2014 training materials issued by the NFSN trace a wealth of ways that the 
carrot alone can be integrated across school subjects. A suggested math project, for 
instance, has students planting carrots while calculating the soil volume of their pot, the 
needed distance between seeds, estimated class yields, the cost of production, and so on. 
In social studies, suggested lessons have students research the carrot’s origins in present-
day Afghanistan; in art, students may paint their carrot planting pots; in language arts, 
they may journal about their carrot growing activities; and so on (“Best Practices”). 
Likewise supporting curricular integration, some available farm to school curricular 
materials are aligned to state educational standards and common core requirements.
25
 
This integrative approach has the advantage of making farm to school programming 
easier to work into existing curriculum and making attentiveness to sensory practice and 
material form a more seamless part of students’ education. Not unlike the corporate 
advertising that Schlosser tracks in schools, then, farm to school efforts benefit from their 
embrace of the school as an institutional site of authority and education.  
School-based sensory interventions are shaped not only by the institution’s 
curricular demands and affordances, but also by the materiality of school foodways. On 
the one hand, this makes farm to school interventions extraordinarily difficult. For a 
school to source food locally is a labor-intensive process with no pre-established 
protocol, as it involves making unprecedented arrangements with small farmers who have 
less reliable food supplies than government-sponsored sources. While the food service 
director can easily complete an order through established lines of purchasing, it takes 
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considerable, often prohibitive work to find, make, and maintain new and less 
systematizible purchasing connections with small local farmers. Schools also face 
substantial challenges keeping school lunch below cost, when many of the less healthy 
foods they are replacing are pre-prepared and available for free or at a subsidized rate. 
Even more of a challenge are schools whose food purchasing has been outsourced 
through a third party buyer. In this case, assigned representatives find it difficult or 
impossible to purchase foods outside of existing arrangements with large-scale national 
providers (“Going Local”). Likewise, food service staff must calculate and meet strict 
nutritional guidelines—easy to do with the standard suppliers, but an additional labor cost 
for unstandardized bulk foods. Finally, many schools face the material obstacle of lacking 
basic kitchen equipment and cooking staff training, since the foods provided by the 
national school food program require little beyond the ability to microwave and serve.  
On the other hand, the materiality of school foodways enables sensation to play an 
interesting and powerful role in farm to school initiatives. This is most clear in the fact 
that participating schools often host a particular kind of tasting, one regularly figured not 
as “sensory education” or “edible education,” but as a “taste test.” Quite in contrast to 
Slow Food’s recommendation that tastings avoid discussion of students’ likes and 
dislikes and focus instead on exploration, discrimination, and description, farm to school 
tastings often quite explicitly invite students to evaluate foods. There is a pressing 
practical reason for this: school lunch programs attempting to make healthy dishes from 
local sources and school gardens quite literally need to figure out what students will eat. 
For example, Vermont’s Calais Elementary holds a monthly “Taste Test Day” featuring a 
dish prepared with local, in-season ingredients, such as Corn Chowder, Winter Vegetable 
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Pot Pie, or Sweet Potato Fries. On this day, trained parent volunteers prepare the foods, 
roll them in on snack carts, and lead a tasting. The interest in discrimination, description, 
and multisensory awareness characteristic of Slow Food is evident at Calais: “When 
directed, all students taste [the dish] at once, using their senses to discuss flavors, 
textures, smells, and recognizable ingredients” (“Vermont” 18). Likewise, in Vermont’s 
Rumney Memorial School’s locally-sourced “Healthy Snack Day,” where “children 
spend 10 minutes talking about the food, guessing its ingredients, discussing textures and 
smells, making connections with their own family foods, and trying the food together” 
(“Vermont” 20). Yet veering away from Slow Food’s protocol, students in these tastings 
rate the food: at Rumney, “after the snack has been tested, students vote on whether they 
tried it, liked it, and would try it again or buy it for lunch” (“Vermont” 20). At Rumney, 
after a food excels in several tastings, it is offered on the school lunch or breakfast menu 
(“Vermont” 20). Rumney found success, for instance, with roasted root vegetables, 
roasted delicata squash smiles, edamame beans, corn-on-the-cob, granola parfaits with 
fresh local fruit, and apple-cheese quesadillas. (“Vermont” 20) 
Other “taste tests” extend beyond the individual classroom, moving even more in 
the direction of survey and evaluation. Vermont’s Sharon Elementary School, for 
instance, holds monthly taste tests in the cafeteria. Each taste test is organized by a single 
class after a brainstorm among teacher, students, and the school’s food service director 
regarding what food the class will prepare with local ingredients. The class then takes on 
the sourcing, preparation, advertising, and serving duties required to coordinate the 
tasting. Students also collect and analyze tasters’ feedback. Vermont’s Ferrisburgh 
Central School takes a somewhat different approach, with food service staff staging 
210 
 
regular “Try-Its.” In these tastings, students waiting in the lunch line are offered a sample 
of a food available in the line. Those who bring their lunch are also invited to “Try It,” as 
teachers are tasked with bringing samples to students at the lunch tables. In “Try-Its,” 
students are surveyed as to whether the featured food fell into the category “Good,” 
“OK,” or “No Thank You.”  
In these efforts, tasting invites and shapes children’s response-abilities to 
otherness. After one tasting where a student loved a winter root salad, her father was 
surprised at her enthusiasm for beets. The student replied that the salad had raw beets; the 
beets were always cooked at home (“Vermont” 23). In another tasting at a school in 
Oregon, several students had strawberries for the first time and declared them to be their 
favorite food (“Going Local” 24), while in another, a student persuaded his parents to 
purchase and prepare jicama at home. While these interventions are admittedly 
circumscribed, they have the power to seep into the student’s lifelong affectabilities. 
Whether any particular healthy food stays with a student’s palate is less the issue. More 
valuable is the potential for tastings and “Try-Its” to cultivate an attitude of sensory 
experimentation and exploration, one that situates the student and her sensory experience 
as an active, involved part of eating.  
Farm to school practices of taste education and taste testing are also part and 
parcel of a larger transition in the school foodway and its associated zone of affectability. 
Participating schools, for instance, often have new or expanding school gardens. Tastings 
work in tandem with these gardens as a way for students to make or experience prepared 
versions of foods that they helped to grow. If sensory response-ability grounds an 
environmental ethic, then, farm to school efforts can be understood to build that ethic 
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through the large, human-nonhuman collective of the school foodway. Because sensory 
interventions are linked to the specific, evolving material foodways of the school—the 
cafeterias, farmers, school gardens, snack carts, and so on that move food onto students’ 
plates and palates—novel ecologies of response-abilty are composed. In this, farm to 
school enables new contact zones among human parties who do not always engage one 
another. As farm to school curriculum guides constantly repeat, forging partnerships 
across the whole range of potential participants and stakeholders, from children to parents 
to maintenance staff to farmers, is crucial for lasting change.  
As such, farm to school’s sensory interventions shed much of the elitism of Slow 
Food. More than Slow Food, farm to school initiatives often explicitly target underserved 
communities and NFSN itself has expanded to support related work with American 
Indian cultures, Farm to Prison, and Farm to Hospital efforts. Because farm to school 
efforts are tied to school meal programs, including free and reduced lunch programs, they 
are well-situated to engage low income students. Even in better served schools, farm to 
school’s imbrication in the institution of the school marks an important difference from 
Slow Food’s more nomadic approach: with farm to school, the compositionist enactments 
of sensation shared by both approaches do not operate in a utopic or alternative space 
peripheral to dominant flows of power, but rather alongside and with them. To this extent 
they effect an affirmative queering of the norm, and not an affront to it—a re-articulation 
of existing infrastructure rather than a dissolution of it. As such, sensory intervention 
finds a way out of some of the elitism in the commitment to a standard of taste 
epitomized in Waters’ 60 Minutes comment. In the efforts of farm to school, the world is 
not divided, as Waters divides it, into “some people” and “other people.” Rather, the 
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world emerges from a zone of response-ability that is called into being by many human 
and nonhuman agents, themselves in transformation. This is perhaps most evident in the 
fact that many of the individuals that spearhead and enable local farm to school efforts 
are not world-class chefs but rather middle and working class school staff—food service 
managers most especially.  
That farm to school offers promise is not to say that it has broken fully with elitist 
notions of a standard of taste. Indeed, the notion of “healthy” foods, and of what counts 
as healthy, seems to be little interrogated in farm to school’s rhetoric. Likewise, farm to 
school efforts sometimes evoke uncritical discourse about the “obesity crisis” that risks 
inviting weight stigma, drawing overly strong connections between eating and obesity 
and obesity and disease. Another significant limitation to farm to school is the recent rise 
in school funding cuts—which, as we saw in the last chapter, have led some schools not 
in the direction of farm to school programming, but rather toward corporate food 
marketing. Given even more severe cuts of late, schools might seem the very last place to 
hang our activist hats. But, especially as farm to school successes have skyrocketed over 
the past two decades, perhaps this makes them the best.  
Zones of Response-ability  
For Davis, 
the challenge today, the social, ethical, and political challenge is to learn to think 
the sharing of community without effacing precisely this sharing by 
conceptualizing it, turning it into an object to be grasped and put to work. How to 
think a community, without essence or project, shaped by the eruption of an 
inappropriable outside . . . ? (8) 
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This chapter has suggested that sensory approaches to activism, like those of the slow 
food and farm to school movements, mark a step toward both thinking and doing 
“community, without essence or project,” an embrace of a fundamental exposure, an 
affectability, that is grappled with, reworked, and rezoned. The “community” of sensory 
activism, when it is at its best, is not bound together by some social glue or essence or 
project, but is rather embraced as the zone of exposure that precedes and enables being. 
Community in this more prior sense is continually recomposed, reassembled, rezoned, 
around (sensory) objects of concern that are themselves perpetually becoming. The 
human-nonhuman collectives of farm to school and slow food attend to sensation as a 
rhetorical practice—a practice of signification and persuasion, but also of an originary 
response-ability, one that not only imbues (sensory) worlds with value, but also builds 
those worlds.  
This work, then, continues the project of the exposé considered in chapter 4. “In 
place of conceptualization and appropriation,” Davis relates, “Nancy calls for exposition, 
the exposition of exposedness: ‘[w]e must expose ourselves to what has gone unheard in 
community’ (IOC 26)” (8). Our task, more generally, “its to expose exposedness,” (8). 
Each of the contemporary interventions I have considered in this project, from the exposé 
to the urban garden, attempts, at a sensory register, to “expose ourselves to what has gone 
unheard,” to “expose exposedness.” In so doing they invite people to attend to the vital 
others—more accurately, the vital otherness—that inextricably constitutes our being, that 
calls upon us for a response. If Marx, Bennett, Latour, and Haraway are at all correct that 
we have seen a waning of response-ability to the nonhuman, a waning of our self-
understanding as fundamentally prosthetic, cyborgian beings, then the farm to school and 
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slow food movements represent a counteracting intensification of response-ability. And 
this is rhetorical intervention at its most fundamental, its most choric. Such intervention 
moreover does not and cannot occur at solely the level of the sensing individual, merely 
as a shift in an individual’s response-ability. Rather, things (strawberries, gardens, snack 
carts) are recognized and engaged as a vital part of a collective’s response-ability, a 
constitutive part of the contact zones that call entities into being and becoming. In 
keeping with Latour’s vision of a Dingpolitik, things are invited to participate in 
collective (sensory) life, and they are invited not merely via a politics of representation 
(as Latour sometimes seems to suggest), but rather via a politics of sensation, a politics of 
the contact zone. In these movements, human comes into sensuous contact with 
nonhuman, nature with culture, ethics with politics.  
My opening chapter promised that a rhetorical theory of sensation could inform 
the problem of immanence that concerns both new and traditional materialist approaches 
to rhetoric. Representing the inability of the critic, the activist, and even the object to get 
outside of an existing realm of practices, this problem has guided what has been 
characterized (and criticized) as an immanent turn in rhetorical studies. Thus in their 
essay, “W(h)ither Ideology?” Dana Cloud and Joshua Gunn connect the field’s turn to 
immanence with a decline in ideology critique. The authors locate the beginnings of this 
turn in Raymie McKerrow’s influential 1989 essay, “Critical Rhetoric: Theory and 
Practice” discussed in chapter 1. For McKerrow following Foucault, they note, 
“discourse is material, and critical praxis must attend to its effects without resort to a 
position of epistemological privilege” (412). As such, McKerrow “sought to remedy the 
troubles of transcendence with a tempering immanence” (412). Cloud and Gunn trace the 
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development of the immanent turn in terms of the embrace of a logic of articulation to 
replace the logics of influence and representation that they connect with traditional 
ideology critique, a development they map to both Barbara Biesecker and Ronald Greene. 
As discussed in chapter 1, a logic of articulation, subsequently developed in a more 
posthumanist key by Nate Stormer, attends us to rhetoric neither as a mere vehicle for 
information nor as having a merely epistemic function. Rather, a logic of articulation 
situates rhetoric as something that articulates or composes in its very operation.  
The discussion of articulation offered by communication studies scholars aligns 
with the emphasis of rhetoric’s inventive, compositionist function on the English studies 
side of the field. Davis, for instance, can be understood to attend to how an originary, 
rhetorical response-ability articulates individuals as ethical beings. Hawhee’s notion of 
invention-in-the-middle attends us to the always prior dispersal of energies out of which 
any “I” articulates. For Rickert and other “new” materialists, the process of articulation 
extends throughout human-nonhuman agencies, making certain world possible and 
preempting others. In this sense, both corporeal and “new” materialist approaches attune 
us to the perplexing immanence of rhetorical power and agency, to the fact that arenas of 
affectability always precede meaning, subjectivity, and choice. A concern for immanence 
likewise has run through discussions of both critical pedagogy and critical methodologies 
(e.g., McHendry et al), with authors suggesting that we cannot and should not separate 
scholarship from worldly interventions, criticism from composition.  
My project has demonstrated how attention to sensation offers a way in to both 
immanent critique and immanent political intervention—from the perspective of 
rhetorical scholarship and public rhetoric alike. Power’s immanence, I have suggested, 
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manifests sensually. Immanent critique and intervention, then, might proceed with 
attention to the sense-abilities, the sensory contact zones, that enable certain kinds of 
constitutive contact and debar others. For instance, Foucault calls us to attend to “local 
centers” of power-knowledge, offering the example of “the body of the child, under 
surveillance, surrounded in his cradle, his bed, or his room by an entire watch-crew of 
parents, nurses, servants, educators, and doctors, all attentive to the least manifestations 
of his sex” (98). The figure of the child’s body, for Foucault, attunes us to the everyday 
constitution of categories, such as gender or sexuality, that in turn might shape and 
constrain political change. Here, sensory form is just as important as material or bodily 
forms: it is a certain kind of surveillance, a certain set of gendering sensibilities, that 
compose the body of the child, that codes its sex, just as much as it is a certain reigning 
set of material forms (e.g., male and female).  
My project suggests how rhetorical studies can attune to sensory-material forms 
as “local centers” of power-knowledge that operate on several planes of rhetoricity. To do 
so, I have reengaged the Scottish Enlightenment’s connections between rhetoric and 
aesthetic taste and Marx’s ontological connections between sensation and materiality. 
From the Scottish Enlightenment through the contemporary “new” material turn, I have 
demonstrated, sensation has been thought and practiced not only as the experience of an 
individual subject, but also as a qualitative realm of contact among human and nonhuman 
participants. Hume and Marx alike, I suggest, offer a way in to the practices of immanent 
critique further elaborated by Latour and today’s food activists. As contemporary food 
activism demonstrates, immanent critique and activism might proceed by experimentally 
exploring and intervening in sensory contact zones as fields of rhetorical affectability, 
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zones that invite certain qualities of human-nonhuman contact and prohibit others. This 
in turn points us toward a range of immanent loci of critique and intervention, including 
the experimentation with everyday sensory practices the analysis of an era’s sensory and 
material forms (from large scale forms like the form of private property to micro-forms, 
like squash smiles or Big Macs) and.  
The rhetorical theory of sensation I have begun to compose in these pages deploys 
and develops rhetoric’s multiple materialisms. Resonating with traditional materialist 
approaches to rhetoric, my project has figured sensation as a site where problematic 
social and environmental relations may be either reinforced or re-composed. It opens us 
onto an understanding of sensation as a rhetorical, world-building practice that zones 
ethical being, offering a sensory and material elaboration of affective approaches to 
rhetoric. Finally, this rhetoricity of sensation—its affective, ethical, and political powers 
and vulnerabilities—has emerged as something that abides not in the individual alone, 
but in contingent and generative sensory ecologies of humans, things, and environments. 
When we understand sensation as a rhetorical response-ability that is continually 
composed in human-nonhuman ecologies, this opens a new way to both map and 
intervene in the flow of corporate power and the materialization of injustices for people, 
animals, and environments. As Marx and Slow Food help us see, our powers to compose 
and recompose the relations of capital, the world’s peppers and people, can be found in 
the sensory and material forms that we compose in vital partnership with the world as it is 





                                                 








 Slow Food has not stopped at the site of material form, either. The Slow Food 
Foundation for Biodiversity also uses the Ark of Taste products as a springboard into 
supporting what they term “Presidia.” The Slow Food Presidia are committees of people 
who come together to forge the material pathways needed to conserve a traditional 
product, production practice, or ecosystem at risk of extinction. This could be a small 
project involving creating a social network of producers and marketing an endangered 
product, or it could be a project with specific material goals—as Slow Food USA puts it, 
“building a slaughterhouse, an oven, or reconstructing crumbling farmhouse walls.”4 
There are about two hundred Presidia globally; four of them are in the United States. For 
instance, the Makah Ozette Potato was “boarded” to the Ark of Taste in 2005; in 2006 
Slow Food Seattle put 500 pounds of seed into circulation; and in 2008 a Presidium was 
formed around the potato. This officially brought together Slow Food Seattle, Chefs 
Collaborative Seattle, the Makah Indian Nation, a network of farmers and elementary 
school gardens, a potato seed laboratory, and a local USDA Agricultural Research 
Station. I offer this list to point out how Slow Food’s address of a sensory-material 
form—the Makah Ozette Potato and its taste profile—has given way to a larger sensory-





























 http://edibleschoolyard.org/resources-tools?search=&type[]=3&x=55&y=13, accessed 








 Informal conversation with Sydney Daigle, Farm to School & Fresh Fruit and 
Vegetable Program Coordinator, Office of Nutrition Programs, South Carolina 




 Additional USDA funding sources for farm to school efforts include the Food and 
Nutrition Service, Agricultural Marketing Service, the National Institute of Food and 
Agriculture, Rural Development, and the Farm Service Agency. 
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 See, e.g., the Edible Schoolyard lesson plans 
(http://edibleschoolyard.org/program/edible-schoolyard-berkeley) and lesson plans from 
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